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Preface
Matti Juhani Koponen – Juhani (or Jussi) to family, friends,
colleagues and students alike – is only the second person to
hold the Development Studies chair at the University of
Helsinki. Following the tragically premature death of Michael
Cowen in  2000,  Juhani  took  over  the  reins  at  the  Institute  of
Development Studies on an interim basis and was eventually
confirmed as Professor in 2003.
Despite his relatively recent rise to the pinnacle of
Finland’s small community of development scholars,
Development Studies has undeniably been Juhani’s life’s
vocation for decades. His selfless commitment to the field, and
the Institute, have earned him the respect of all who know him.
For Koponen, Development Studies is a critical scholarly
enterprise, with the emphasis equally on critique and
scholarship. His devotion to Development Studies derives, in no
small part, from a conviction that better knowledge can make a
difference in human affairs. This guiding principle is evident
from his writings, his teaching, his administrative style and his
active participation in public affairs.
Academic research was not Jussi’s first vocation. One of
us  got  to  know  him  in  the  1970s  as  ‘that  journalist  at  the
foreign desk of Helsingin Sanomat who is writing an M.A. thesis
on Tanzania.’ The thesis was well received and the foreign desk
was soon history. Indeed, history became Juhani’s first
academic obsession, leading to thick tomes on precolonial and
colonial Tanzania. Koponen probably still considers himself a
historian  but  for  more  than  a  decade  his  academic  work  has
increasingly focused on so-called development assistance.
Every now and then one hears rumours of a definitive ‘History
of Finnish development aid’ taking shape on his computer hard
drive, but Juhani has never been one to rush to press.
Meanwhile, he and his various research teams have been
methodically analyzing and problematizing the ‘impacts’ of
Finnish ‘development interventions’ in a wide range of contexts,
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of which Tanzania, Nepal and Vietnam and the forestry sector
figure most centrally.
Juhani turns sixty on October 24, 2007. With typical
modesty,  he  won’t  be  making  much  of  fuss  about  this
biographical milestone. In light of his immeasurable
contribution to our common enterprise, however, a group of his
friends, colleagues and students have been pleased to compile
this Festschrift in recognition of his accomplishments, and to
encourage  both  Juhani  and  others  to  continue  along  the  path
he has forged.
Despite the title, Anomalies of Aid,  this  is  not  a  book
about development assistance alone. Reflecting Juhani’s wide
scope of interests there are a good number of contributions
that do not sit easily on the shelf of aid research. Yet, while one
is accustomed to extremely heterogeneous festschrift volumes,
this one seems to have a certain degree of coherence and even
debate among the contributors. This is, we think, a perfect
reflection of Juhani’s legacy as a scholar and an academic
leader. Under his stewardship, the Institute of Development
Studies fosters pluralism and discussion. For Koponen,
critique, reflexivity and interdisciplinarity are not merely
catchwords; they are something he actively seeks to facilitate
and defend.
JG  & LS
October 2007

Learning in development interventions by
non-governmental organizations
Tiina Kontinen
Introduction
Development intervention has been one of the central themes
in Juhani Koponen’s work. For him, intervention is one of the
dimensions of the very concept of development in development
studies (Koponen 2004: 6). According to Koponen (ibid.),
development consists of a goal, a process leading to that goal
and the intervention in order to initiate the process to reach
that goal. Even a quick look at development practice – what is
done under the title of development – confirms the centrality of
interventionist thinking. Development consists of an
uncountable number of development projects and programmes
that are considered as instruments to enhance development.
Moreover, huge amount of institutions, organisations and
mechanisms are devoted to development interventions.
Accordingly, hundreds of development experts are defining the
overall objectives, development objectives, inputs and outputs
of  a  project  in  thousands  of  project  planning  workshops  in
many corners of the world.
As long as the development intervention business has
existed the question of success and failure has puzzled
development practitioners as well as those engaged in
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analysing development. One development framework after
another has been doomed to failure and new approaches have
been introduced. In practice, insufficient planning has made
the scapegoat for these failures and increasing emphasis has
been put on improved planning mechanisms. Enhancing
project planning in order to improve ownership, partnership
and  participation  is  one  of  the  most  enduring  themes  in
development practice. Without Southern ownership, without
equal partnership and participation by the so-called
beneficiaries, projects are not supposed to have any chances
whatsoever of success. Thus, the recipe for the success seems
to be known. Why, then, is it so hard to put it into practice?
“Development” is considered a learning institution that
learns from its mistakes in order to improve its policies and
practices. However, as Sharma et al. (2004: 218) rightly point
out, these accounts rarely explicate a detailed definition of
learning. The discourse on learning in development often stays
at quite a superficial level. Analyses commonly refer to
monitoring and evaluation exercises along the project cycle the
results of which are disseminated in a workshop before placing
the report in the bookshelf. Learning, thus, remains an ideal
goal that is supposed to take place more or less automatically.
The guidelines on development co-operation and the civil
servants in charge of development funding continue to
emphasize that development interventions should be mutual
learning processes, but what is meant by learning is not
always very clear. In the pervasive “learning-speak” in
development it has not been made very clear who is supposed
to learn, how the learning is supposed to take place and what
is supposed to be done with the knowledge learned (Johnson
and Wilson 2000: 1894).
When left non-conceptualised, learning easily becomes
one of the buzzwords circulating in the aid system: everybody
should learn, co-operation should be a process of mutual
learning and learning in general is a good and desirable thing.
However, not all actors praise learning with such enthusiasm.
As Biggs and Smith (2003: 1745) point out there seems to be
an explicit paradox in development literature dealing with
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learning. The literature is divided into normative and critical
genres.  On  the  one  hand  there  are  a  great  number  of
handbooks and guidelines for enhancing learning based on a
positive belief in its possibility. On the other hand, there are
plenty of critical accounts stating that no learning whatsoever
is taking place in development. Thus, the two extreme poles of
“learning advocates” and “learning sceptics” identified in the
field of organisational learning in Northern societies (Argyris
and Schön 1996: xx) are also found among development
practitioners and researchers.
As known to researchers of development, learning is not
the only idealistic notion in development discourse.
Development tends to turn into idealistic goals and solutions,
into rhetoric that are at great distance from the reality (Mosse
2005).  One  of  the  recent  examples  of  such  idealism has  been
the growing emphasis given to civil society and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in development practice.
NGOs are now performing an important role as distributors of
development aid, as service deliverers in the South, as
implementers of a wide spectrum of development projects and,
increasingly, as active promoters of social change through
advocacy work. The increasing emphasis on NGOs has
influenced the writing on learning in development. With NGOs’
significant role in development, theories of organisational
learning have gained more space in the literature.
In this article I will review discussions on learning in
development  mainly  from  the  point  of  view  of  non-
governmental  organisations.   First,  I  shortly  introduce  the
discussion on the roles of NGOs in development. Then I depict
Gregory Bateson’s (1987) theory of the levels of learning. This
theory  functions  as  a  frame  through  which  I  review  some  of
the literature on learning in NGO-development co-operation. I
distinguish between institutional, project, organisational,
individual and relationship-based learning and discuss how
the idea of levels of learning emerges in these approaches to
learning. In conclusion, I ponder on the future challenges of
research  on  learning  within  the  framework  of  NGO
development co-operation.
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NGOs in development
Changes in the global geopolitical architecture during last two
decades affected development aid and development co-
operation. One such outcome was a shift from state-centred
development thinking towards a focus on civil society as an
agent  of  development  in  early  1990s.  At  that  time,
disappointment in the ability of the corrupt southern states to
promote development, along with the example of civil societies’
transformative power vis-à-vis the authoritarian regimes in
Eastern Europe supported the argument for focusing on civil
society. The political agenda of “strengthening civil society”
has mostly been realised through increasing support for non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). The development funds
allocated  for  the  NGOs  both  in  North  and  South  testified  a
rapid rise. The NGOs were enthusiastically perceived as some
kind of “magic bullets” (Edwards and Hulme 1995) that could
fulfil any expectations.
Expectations were plenty. NGOs were seen as effective
service deliverers that could stop-gap state failures especially
in the fields of education and health care. With service
privatization at the core of the structural adjustment
programmes driven by World Bank in 1980s and early 1990s,
NGOs took more responsibility for arranging basic services in
some parts of the developing world (Semboja and Therkildsen
1995).  Moreover, NGO were applauded for their ability to work
at the grassroots and exercise participatory development. The
intermediate role of NGOs between the ordinary people and
those in power was emphasised (Carroll 1992), and NGOs were
considered schools for democracy.
Support for civil society and NGOs was easily placed at
the core of development policies partly due to its suitability to
different, even opposing political agendas. For liberals, civil
society exemplified a way towards states where individual
freedom, free market economy and liberal democracy
flourished. For an alternative view, civil society represented a
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place for counterhegemonic collective action and critique.1
Thus, the notion of civil society has been one of the vaguest
and most contradictory concepts in development policy. In
practice, it has been mainly represented by NGOs, the number
of which has drastically increased in developing countries
partly as a result of such pro-NGO donor policies.
In  terms  of  North-South  co-operation,  in  the  1990s  the
NGOs  were  seen  as  harbingers  of  new  kind  of  partnership
paradigm in development. The so-called partnership paradigm
also championed in official aid discourse implies a shift in the
aid relationship towards greater equality and mutuality.
NGOs, supposedly providing ways for people-to-people
development, were perceived as the forerunners of equal
negotiations, participatory development and mutual learning.
However, soon a number of analyses showed that unequal
North-South relationships were reproduced in the realm of
civil society and NGOs just as well as in bilateral aid relations.
The Northern partners efficiently modified the agendas of their
Southern collaborators (Ebrahim 2003; Lister 2000) and
partnership at times became more of a “buzzword” to cover the
real power relationship at stake. The voices calling for a
"realistic" view on NGO-relationships became louder (Fowler
2000).
The increasing role of NGOs as well as the critique
towards their performance has strengthened the pertinence of
the concept of learning in NGO development co-operation in
different ways. NGOs should learn to be more efficient, more
reflective and more able to fulfil the rising promises. In the
following I shall discuss different approaches to learning in
development NGOs. How, after all, does learning take place?
1 These different political points of views have their background in
different social and political theories. The liberal view is based on the
liberal tradition represented, for example, by John Locke and Adam
Smith. The alternative view, for its part, was inspired by Marxism and
Gramscian view on civil society (Howell & Pearce, op.cit.).
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Learning in development
In academic theorising, learning is defined in multiple ways –
learning organisms learn in biology, learning systems learn in
computer sciences, individual children learn in classrooms in
educational sciences, and adults learn in their life-crises in
adult  education,  to  mention   a  few.  In  development,  learning
has  also  played  an  important  role  as  a  goal  and  means  of
development. For example, Freire’s (1973) pedagogy of the
oppressed showed how learning can be a means to
empowerment and development.
Any notion of learning should have an answer to the
basic questions of who is supposed to learn, what it supposed
to be learned and how the learning is taking place. In my effort
of  distinguishing  different  dynamics  of  learning,  I  draw upon
an  account  on  learning  provided  by  Gregory  Bateson  in  his
classical essay “The Logical Categories of Learning and
Communication” (1987 [1964]). In this essay, his main focus is
to classify learning on the basis of hierarchical levels and to
represent a systemic view of learning. Bateson’s idea of
different learning levels has had a widespread impact on
theories of organisational learning, for example. Bateson (ibid.:
287-305) distinguishes three levels of learning that are based
on differences in the reactions of the organism to feedback
from  its  environment.  Learning  I  is  learning  where  the
organism learns to select from the choices given to it. At this
level the mistake that is corrected by learning is a wrong
choice from pre-given alternatives and learning refers to
picking  up  the  right  choice.  Learning  II  implies  change  in  the
learning  process  itself.  In  learning  II,  the  mistake  to  be
corrected is not a wrong choice but the process by which the
choice  is  made.  This  kind  of  learning  leads  to  changes  in  the
set of alternatives from which the choice is made. Learning III
is more radical learning that leads to changes in the system of
sets of alternatives from which the choice is made. Learning III
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is rare since it at times requires questioning and challenging
unconscious premises upon which the action is based.2
According to Bateson, learning at all levels can take
place simultaneously, and the learning of an organism moves
from  one  level  to  another.  The  transition  from  one  level  to
another takes place in reaction to contradictions at the lower
level (ibid.: 303). These contradictions lead to questioning and
realising a need for change. At a more modest level, learning is
selecting a more appropriate choice; at the most radical level
learning is the re-conceptualisation of the environment, the
organism itself and the very relation between these two.
In what follows I have categorized accounts on learning
in development according to the different agents of learning
they refer to. On the basis of the literature, one can
distinguish between institutional learning, project learning,
organisational learning, individual learning and relational
learning in development and examine how these approaches
understand learning with respect to the levels of learning
presented by Bateson.
Institutional learning in development
In development discourse, talk of institutional learning seems
to be at its vaguest. While organisational and institutional
learning are conceptually separated, the concept of institution
is often not clearly defined. Van Brabant (2001: 183-4) defines
institutional learning as “changes taking place in the quality of
the interactions between organisations that relate to each
other in a given context” which is “system-wide and takes
place between and across agencies.”  He is speaking about
institutional learning within the international system of
humanitarian aid and defines learning as a change in order to
do “development more effectively informed by a knowledge of
what  works  and  what  does  not  work”  (ibid.:  184).  Such  an
effectiveness-oriented conceptualisation of learning is common
2  Bateson (ibid.) cites questioning the Western assumption of a coherent
self as one example of Learning III.
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in development practice. The rhetoric of “lessons learned” and
“best practices” circulate everywhere in the development
system (Johnson and Wilson 2000: 1984; Biggs and Smith
2000). Evaluations and other studies are supposed to enhance
the learning of the entire institution concerning what is the
best  way  to  bring  about  development.  The  results  of
institutional learning might be observed in changing
approaches and frameworks to development, for example in
changing from an economic paradigm into a human
development approach.
In  accounts  of  institutional  learning,  the  agent  of
learning is understood as the whole development institution
consisting of a variety of actors engaged in development. How
is learning supposed to take place? Most evidently, the
institution  is  supposed  to  learn  by  gathering  and
disseminating information on project successes and failures
(van Brabant 2001: 183-184). Institutional learning is based
on  the  idea  that  learning  is  facilitated  by  gathering  new
information and knowledge that will change the institution’s
objectives and the models of working in order for it to perform
its tasks more efficiently.
Institutional learning might be situated in Bateson’s
category of Learning I. Argyris and Schön (1996: 3) claim that
the  most  basic  definition  of  learning  is  when  an  organisation
or institution learns “when it acquires information.” According
to this definition, a development institution could be
considered a learning institution on the basis of the amount of
monitoring and evaluation reports, disseminating seminars,
workshops and conferences it arranges. Accounts of
institutional learning, however, remain weak in theorising the
actual processes through which the piles of disseminated
information is transformed into changed practices and
institutional learning takes place.
Moreover, as for example Smillie (1995: 158) has pointed
out, “lessons taught are not always lessons learned” and it is
rather the inability to learn that characterizes development
institutions. For example, Biggs and Smith (2000) describe
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how the lack of participation and ownership have been
“lessons learned” since the 1960s, and yet they continue to be
among the main issues mentioned in the evaluating reports.
Such observations might represent a “contradiction” in
Bateson’s sense and lead to some kind of double-loop learning:
a fundamental change in approaches and sets of alternatives.
For example, the recent shift from project-based aid to direct
budget support in official development aid could be interpreted
as a seed for such learning. In the sphere of development
NGOs, shifts in strategy from providing humanitarian aid for
integrated development projects to the building of global social
movements, as proposed by David Korten (1990), could
exemplify such institutional learning. Such proposals
notwithstanding, the bulk of development activities continues
to be performed through projects. Next, I shall thus discuss
the project as an agent of learning.
The project as a learning process
One of the central discussions considering development
projects has been the debate between conceptualising a
project as a rational blueprint or as a messier social process.
The  rational  blueprint  point  of  view  refers  to  the  idea  that
projects can be planned beforehand and thereafter they follow
an  inner  logic  that  produces  –  to  put  it  simply  -  planned
outputs on the basis of specified inputs. According to the
blueprint perspective, a failed project is the one that is not
carried out according to plan, and thus produces the wrong
kind of outputs and unplanned consequences. The anticipated
cure for such failure is an improved planning practice.
In the 1980s, as a critique of blueprint–type development
planning  started  to  grow and  accounts  of  a  “learning  project”
approach emerged (Korten 1980). The learning project
approach begins with the idea that a development project is an
ongoing social process and stresses the importance of
flexibility and the ability to adjust projects in the course of
implementation.  According  to  this  point  of  view,  project  plans
should be modified according to new observations and
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reflection over the course of the project. The need for
continuous adjustment is based on the observation that reality
is a complex process that cannot be captured by means of
mechanical planning techniques that are central to the
blueprint approach.3 For example, Rondinelli (1993) suggested
that rather than ready-made packages, development projects
should be viewed as kind of policy experiments that are
learning processes contributing to better projects in the future.
There are some common tools in project work. A project
cycle and Logical Framework (LFA)4 have been among the most
prominent examples. The project cycle model, a rational tool
for conceptualising a development project, was introduced to
development some 30 year ago (Baum 1970, cited in Biggs and
Smith  2003,  1743).  Since  then,  it  has  been  one  of  the  most
powerful tools in development work. For example, Terve Tvedt
(1998) conceives the ideal project cycle as a means by which
different organisations become integrated parts of the
international NGO-development system.  The project cycle is
based on the idea that in each development intervention one
can identify certain stages such as project identification,
planning, implementation and evaluation. According to the
model, the stages are same in each project, and do not depend
on the size of the projects or the actors involved. The
development  world  is  full  of  handbooks  and  manuals  on  how
to use the project cycle in a somewhat rigid way. However, as
Biggs and Smith (2003: 1743) argue, the concept of learning
was initially central to the project cycle. The anticipated
learning is defined as (ibid.: 1743-1742):
making adjustments during the project cycle in response
to ongoing events and taking account of past experience
in future planning.
3  For example Upphoff (1996) compares the challenges of social science
to understand complexity in development with the shift from
mechanics to quantum theories in physics.
4   Logical  Framework Approach is  an  efficient  tool  to  plan  and monitor
projects with a strong inner logic. However, it has been criticised on its
inability to take the changing contexts and the socio-political nature of
projects into account.
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In understanding projects as learning processes, external
analysts and researchers sometimes have a strong role. One
example of making a project a learning process is so-called
process documentation approach (Mosse 1998). This approach
refers to a set of practices whereby researchers systematically
provide diverse project stakeholders with spaces for reflective
dialogue. The process documentation approach underscores
the fact that learning and reflection need their own spaces and
tools. Usually, people engaged in time-bound project activities
are too busy acting and do not have time to take a step back
and  reflect.  If  something  is  not  working  there  is  no  time  to
consider the reasons for it; instead, practitioners are urged to
try other solutions without reasonably reflection (Pasteur and
Scott-Villiers 2004: 194).
In accounts of projects as learning processes, the agent
of learning seems to be the “project” itself which is, of course,
quite an abstract construction. The results of learning are
expected to be seen in modification and changes in the project.
Thus, accounts based on a learning process approach are
mostly case of Bateson’s Learning I. The project approach itself
is not questioned but learning is based on the correction of
actions based on feedback from the project environment and
the participants. Understanding a development co-operation
project as a learning process stresses the importance of trial
and error. In the framework of a single project, however, there
are also possibilities for double-loop learning. Even if the
project framework itself is not questioned, the underlying
assumptions, objectives and goals of a project may change
quite radically.
In the discussion of NGO development co-operation,
some have argued for a radical change that could transcend
the project framework. For example, Malhotra (2000) argues
for a world beyond development aid and development co-
operation  in  which  “development”  would  mainly  be  based  on
joint advocacy and of movements bringing together Northern
and  Southern  actors.  This  kind  of  change  would  also  imply
changes in the actors themselves – instead of the NGOs with
clear  organisational  boundaries,  the  main  agents  would  be
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loosely connected global networks of civil society actors. That
said,  currently  a  majority  of  development  work  is  still  done
within North-South axes and by organisational actors. In what
follows, I shall review the accounts on organisational learning
in NGOs.
Organisational learning in NGOs
Theories of organisational learning have become increasingly
important  for  studies  of  change  in  NGOs.   The  set  of  theories
on organisational development are mostly borrowed from the
studies on  private sector organisations and management
studies. Some theories emphasise organisational learning as a
way to gain effectiveness, some concentrate more on
organisational culture, while others take a more sociological
approach, focusing on interests and conflicts within the
organisations (Roper and Pettit 2002: 260).
One of the most prominent theories of organisational
learning,  also  used  in  development  world,  is  that  of  Argyris
and Schön (1978; 1996). Their theory is based on Bateson’s
conceptualisation of learning categories. Argyris and Schön
distinguish between two levels of organisational learning:
single-loop learning and double-loop learning. The distinction
of levels of learning is based on the idea that any organisation
has two kinds of action theories: espoused theory and theory-
in-use. Espoused theory refers to the explicit theory that
justifies given patterns of organisational action. Theory-in-use
refers to the theory that is not explicit but can be constructed
on the basis of what an organisation actually does in practice.
As is common in the organisational world, the strategic
rhetoric and the actual actions may differ quite radically.
Therefore,  in  this  approach  the  most  important  product  of
organisational learning would be a change in the theory-in-
use, not in the explicit strategies or policies. This idea
emphasises that a change in strategies and explicated goals
does not necessarily lead to change in action. Moreover, it
stresses the importance of recognizing the discrepancy
between espoused theory and theory-in-use as a source for
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learning.
In Argyris and Schön’s theory of organisational learning
the role of the organisational environment is important.
Learning is based on the feedback-loop between the
organisation and its environment. A level of single-loop
learning refers to learning in which an organisation improves
its performance based on the feedback from the environment
within the framework of its existing goals and objectives.
Single-loop learning aims at correcting mistakes that hinder
the effective accomplishment of the existing organisational
goals. It does not, however, involve reflecting upon these very
goals and the values that are seen as constituting the basis for
action  (ibid.:  20).  The  second  level,  double-loop  learning,  is
learning in which an organisation reflects, questions and
changes  its  very  goals  and  the  values  on  which  the  goals  are
based (ibid.: 21). Double-loop learning is not a simple
correction of mistakes in a given framework, but can lead to a
change in the framework, values and goals themselves. In
development NGOs single-loop learning means, for example,
searching for solutions and correcting action within the
framework of existing rules and procedures, whereas the
double-loop learning would mean questioning and
understanding the reasons behind the existing rules (Pasteur
and Scott-Villiers 2004: 189).
In development co-operation the very notion of
environment becomes relevant. Especially in North-South
collaboration, participating NGOs have multiple environments.
For example, Fowler (1997) emphasises the immediate
environment of Northern development NGOs. Northern NGOs
have  to  learn  about  the  expectations  of  the  public  in  order  to
maintain their reputation and ensure future support.
Simultaneously, the environment consists of the Southern
partner and the beneficiaries in the South, even if their
feedback is more mediated.   For Southern NGOs, the idea of
organisational environment can be even more complex. The
immediate environment consists of members, beneficiaries,
local governance and legislation whereas the partner
organisations in North and the institution of development itself
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form  a  different  kind  of  feedback  arenas.  As  shown  in  the
problematic of multiple accountabilities (Edwards and Hulme
1995), different kinds of feedback can be contradictory and
thus lead to ambiguous learning.
Questioning current organisational values is central to
the notion of double-loop learning. A change in organisational
values precedes the learning and change. In that change,
“reflective practice” plays a central role. Reflection of the
existing  action  and  values  is  at  the  core  of  the  learning.  In  a
similar vein, development actors should be seen as reflective
practitioners rather than ready-made experts in development
(Schön 1991: 300).5  The reflective practitioner continuously
questions her own practice and has a critical stand also on her
own expertise and the wider context within which the work
takes place.
Even if reflective practitioners are central to
organisational learning, the agent of learning is not an
individual but an organisation. Organisational agency has
some specific properties. For example, Fowler (1997, 20)
defines an organisation as “a group of individuals who allocate
tasks between themselves to contribute to a common goal: to
exist an organisation needs a purpose and an organisation is
made of people who know what their role is.”  In development
work,  thus,  an  organisation  is  more  enduring  than  a  project
even  if  the  organisation  might  get  feedback  from  the
environment through implementing a number of projects.
The organisational learning approach is strong in giving
tools for reflecting on current practice. However, even if Argyris
and Schön (ibid.:  4)  are  committed  to  a  normative  idea  of
learning as improvement, the depiction of the process of
moving from reflection to changed practices remains vague. In
5  Schön (1991) discusses a need to understand professional practice in
terms of reflection-in-action rather than technical rationality of
profession. According to him (ibid, 39-40) technical rationality
emphasises problem solving whilst the problems setting should be
more in focus. He argues that problem setting should achieve more
attention since problems are not ”out there” but they are constructed,
for example, on the basis of experienced problematic situations.
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many occasions, the role of researchers and action-research
conducted by the practitioners on their own practice is
emphasised. Like the learning project approach, the provision
of spaces for reflection is considered central. Learning requires
that  actors  take  a  step  backwards  from  their  day-to-day
activities  in  order  to  figure  out  and  reflect  on  the  larger
picture. As Eyben (2006: 3) put it, reflective practice in
development refers to the “ability to be aware of the dynamics
of our social and political environments, reflecting on how
these shape our own behaviour and the impact that this has
on other people.” In development, thus, we should pay
attention to individuals as well as to the social and political
environment specific to development activities.
Individual learning
While the emphasis on learning in NGO-development literature
has mostly been at the institutional and organisational level,
some attention has been paid to the individuals engaged in aid
work.  Still, in different tones all the institutional and
organisational approaches subscribe to a view that individual
learning is connected to institutional or organisational
learning, even if the connections between these two are not
straightforward.  After  all,  as  Biggs  and  Smith  (2003)  observe,
the project as a learning process approach tends not to
account for the fact that the “project cycle” consists of
interactions and actions between human beings. These human
beings, both Northerners and Southerners, have different
knowledge and capabilities, and face a number of learning
challenges in the course of their careers. The distance between
institutional challenges and individuals’ capabilities might be
quite wide.
Indeed, it can be the case that individuals learn but
organisations and institutions do not (e.g., van Brabant 2001).
In the development world there are a lot of stories about
innovative individuals keen on learning and change that end
up frustrated and finally return to their old institutional
practices. Edwards and Sen (2000) have criticised the
LEARNING IN DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS / 16
development learning literature for concentrating too much on
learning and change at the institutional level. They stress the
importance of “personal and inner transformation and
change,”  and  argue  that  individual  learning  is  a  basis  for
institutional change aiming at more equal and real co-
operation between Northern and Southern actors. They state
that change and learning in current development practice
requires a radical transformation of individual attitudes and of
the behaviour of development practitioners on the Northern
side. However, while change according to which “we should
love each other in professional as well as in our personal
relationships” (Edwards 1999: 219) is easy to agree with, it
also remains quite abstract and idealistic.
In  his  account  of  learning  in  NGOs,  Ebrahim  (2003)
takes a different starting point and stresses the importance of
the cognitive capacities of individuals in NGOs. The cognitive
capacities of individual both enable and constrain
organisational  learning.  In  the  work  of  NGOs,  a  large  amount
of different kinds of knowledge and skills are needed. For
example management practices, such as planning and
reporting, require skills and the capacity to acquire these
skills. Moreover, skills for networking with different actors –
including language skills – have become increasingly
important.
Edward  and  Sen’s  (ibid.) account of individual inner
transformation describes processes similar to religious
conversion, and thus might approach the Bateson’s Learning
III with its fundamental questioning and change in one’s world
view. The cognitive point of view towards learning presented by
Ebrahim (ibid.) moves between Learning I and Learning II. The
acquirement of different skills represents the learning of more
or less ready-made packages such as project cycle and
financial management models.
In Ebrahim’s (ibid.) model of learning, organisational and
individual learning is innovatively connected with the wider
framework of development institutions. Especially in the
ongoing debate on change in the relationship between
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Northern and Southern NGOs (see Lewis 1998) it is noted that
more focus should be on changes in relationships in which the
individuals  and  organisations  are  located,  and  not  on  those
actors per se.
Learning through relationships: Power in NGO development co-
operation
Recent work has emphasised the theme of learning in aid
relationships (Eyben 2006; Groves and Hinton 2004). Learning
in relationships means the reflection and transformation that
takes place in the networks and webs of different actors in
development. According to this view, is it insufficient to focus
on either individuals or organisations; rather, learning should
be conceptualised a collective effort taking place in the
network relationships of different actors –NGOs, North and
South; donors; government officials; and the ordinary people
supposedly benefiting from the development activities. The
practical tools for such learning include dialogue and
interaction through seminars, workshops and emails.  The
methods of action research have been used in bringing these
relationships under consideration. Although advocates of this
approach are optimistic about the possibilities of change and
learning,  they  point  out  that  the  main  hindrance  for  such
learning is the prevailing power-relationship attributed to
donor-recipient relationships.
This observation brings us back to the argument that the
most important learning challenge in development co-
operation is the acknowledgement of, reflection upon and
reacting to systemic power imbalances  (Ebrahim 2003; Biggs
and Smith 2000: 1754). As Fowler (2000:185) notes, any
account of learning within development co-operation that does
not  question  paternalism  and  power  relations  may  lead  to
improvement in a technical sense, but does not tackle the
most important problems inherent in the system. In the same
vein, Eyben (op.cit.:  14)  argues  that  understanding  power  in
aid relationships is a prerequisite for any learning leading to
true transformation.
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The complexity of aid relationships and prevailing power
relationships have been conceptualised from different
standpoints. Ebrahim (2003) has used the Foucauldian
concept of discourse and the concept of field as suggested by
Bourdieu in order to depict the wider context of development
that affects learning in Southern NGOs. According to him, the
international discourse, or field, of development implies factors
that govern learning. These governing factors both enable and
constrain learning, but nevertheless affect what is learned.
The agendas of international development agencies and of
Northern  NGOs that  fund  Southern  NGOs partly  define  what
kinds  of  things  are  considered  important  for  learning.  The
power relations between co-operating NGOs might also lead to
bias  in  learning  (ibid.:  112).  Southern  NGOs  might  acquire
skills that are more beneficial to the funding system – such as
proposal writing, reporting and LFA – than skills important for
their work in their immediate environments with their
beneficiaries. Additionally, Briggs (2005) has argued that,
contrary  to  the  participatory  learning  approach,  it  is  more
likely in development encounters that rural peasants will learn
planning knowledge specific to a development system than
that development experts will learn local knowledge.
Conclusion: Levels of learning in NGO development
co-operation
Even a cursory literature review on learning in development
such as this reveals multiple meanings and practices related
to learning in NGO-development co-operation.  Learning refers
to  individual  transformation  on  the  basis  of  fundamental
experiences, to the action-reflection cycle of an organisation in
interaction with its environment, as well as to the
dissemination of lessons learned within development
institutions.   In  each  point  of  view  the  agents  and  the
dynamics of learning are different. In practice, the Bateson’s
Learning  I  is  the  most  common  one  and,  by  definition,
Learning III rarely takes place since it requires fundamental
changes in basic premises and creativity – learning something
LEARNING IN DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS / 19
that is not yet there. Moreover, the time-spans of different
levels of learning vary, while the dissemination of a piece of
information  and  learning  from  it  might  take  a  few  minutes,
fundamental changes in values and frameworks could require
decades.
Table 1.  Agents of learning in relationship to levels of learning in
NGO-development co-operation
Level:
Agent of
learning:
Learning I Learning II Learning III
Institution of
development co-
operation
Listing mistakes and
successes in project
framework in order to
develop better projects.
Questioning the
project framework
and searching for
alternative ways of
working.
Questioning the
practice of
develop-ment
cooperation and
searching for
novel approaches.
A network
Disseminating
information on “best
practices”.
Identifying and
questioning the
power in the
relationships within
the network.
Fundamental
redefinition of
global power
relations.
An organisation
Trying to find more
effective approaches to
achieve the existing
goals.
Questioning the
approach and goals
of development
work, i.e., shifting
from service
provision in the
South to advocacy
in North.
Questioning
engagement in
development
cooperation and
its underlying
values.
A project
Finding best ways to
realize well-defined
objectives.
Redefining
objectives on the
basis of feedback
from or change in
the project
environment.
Reconsidering the
overall premises of
a project and
questioning the
project framework.
An individual
Improving the skills of
project planning and
implementation,
including language
skills
Searching for
different
approaches in
project work,
questioning own
values and
attitudes.
A fundamental
transformation in
attitudes and
behaviour.
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Table 1 draws together the results of the literature review
and hypothetically suggests actions that might potentially lead
to learning at each level. The function of such an exercise is to
inspire further research in different aspects of learning in NGO
development collaboration and to examine ways of combining
different agents of learning and different types of learning The
review of the literature on learning in development co-
operation also demonstrates that many accounts of learning
tend  to  be  normative  theories  of  what should be learned and
how the learning should take  place.  There  is  a  need  for  more
analysis of “real” learning in actual co-operation, in the
interaction of individuals and organisations, both North and
South, doing development and implementing projects together
(Carlsson and Wohlgemuth 2000; Eyben 2006). The emerging
challenge, in my view, is to understand how individual
learning, organisational learning and learning in co-operation
is intertwined in the course of actually doing development, in
development interventions, and in connection to the wider
system of development.6
The concept of learning is, in general, closely related to
the concept of change. While reading the learning literature
these two concepts are almost inseparable. Learning implies
some  kind  of  change,  but  not  all  change  is  learning.  In
learning, change is accompanied by conscious reflection, and
experimentation of new ways. Moreover, at least the
organisational learning approaches and the project learning
approach emphasise the potential of outside intervention by
consultants or researchers in enhancing learning. Thus,
learning is conceptually close to that of development since the
practice of development is also based on the idea of
“mastering” immanent development by intentional
interventions (Cowen and Shenton 1996), facilitated by
experts. Additionally, the problematic of non-development and
non-learning seem to be close to each others. Thus, a
6  In Kontinen (2007) this connection is made by through concepts of
activity  and contradiction  that  provide  a  promising  way  of  improving
our understanding on the intertwining trajectories of learning in NGO-
development co-operation.
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challenge for the future is a conceptual clarification of
development, change and learning at different levels in the
context of the actual practice of NGO-development co-
operation. In this effort, we have many lessons to learn from
Koponen’s ideas on development, intervention and
developmentalist complex.
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Aid and underdevelopment
Toward an emancipatory development cooperation
regime
Severine M. Rugumamu
Introduction
One  major  rationale  for  aid  transfers  from  rich  to  poor
countries  in  the  immediate  post-World  War  II  era  was  to
substitute for the lack of developed private capital markets. The
scarcity of investment capital, both at the international level
and within developing countries, was said to have hindered
economic growth and even condemned them to perpetual
misery. The once-famous Chenery-Strout. “gap model”
(Chenery & Strout 1966: 679-733) had earlier postulated that
economic growth in poor countries with inadequate domestic
resources and weak institutional and organizational capacity,
require additional foreign resources to bridge various resource
gaps by providing technical assistance, training, education,
managerial capacity and entrepreneurial talents. For poor
countries that could not borrow from private capital markets,
official development assistance (ODA) was the only predictable
source of external financing. All these lofty and unrealistically
optimistic expectations, assumed that adequate, quality and
predictable foreign aid would be provided, be used for purposes
mutually agreed upon by both donors and recipients alike, and
be complemented by fair international trade and investment
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regimes as well as more democratic international financial and
political institutions.1
However, other than promoting short-term foreign policy
interests of donor countries, the international aid industry has
had virtually little else to celebrate. A close examination of the
overall impact of bilateral aid tends to belie most rhetorical
claims regarding its development objectives. There is, in fact, a
growing body of evidence that suggests that not only has ODA
failed to mitigate critical problems of extreme poverty and
underdevelopment, but quite often, it has helped to debilitate
rather than stimulate potential productive energies in most of
Africa. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1996)
finds that during the 1980-95 period, for example, serious
economic decline and stagnation was experienced in 100 poor
countries, by reducing incomes of 1.6 billion people. In 70 of
these countries the report adds, “average incomes were less
than  they  were  in  1980  –  and  in  43  countries  less  than  they
were  in  1970”  (ibid.:  1).  Moreover,  in  one  of  the  most  quoted
studies on the impact of aid on development William Easterly
(2002), former senior economist at the World Bank, reviewing a
forty-year period and a cross-section of over 100 countries,
concludes that there is no positive correlation between aid,
investment and economic growth.
Those  findings  are  roughly  in  line  with  those  of  Paul
Mosley (1987), Ian Vasquez (1998) and the Congressional
Budget Office (1997), which concluded flatly that “foreign aid
overall appears to have only a marginal effect on development
and may even hinder it.” Differently put, instead of generating
economic  growth,  promoting  improved  standards  of  living  and
1  Although the transfer of foreign assistance between states is probably
as old as the existence of states themselves, the emergence of
institutional economic aid programs is essentially a Post-World War 11
phenomenon. The U.S Marshall Aid to war-ravaged Western Europe
serves as the starting point in attempting to understand
institutionalized aid programs from state to state. They are
institutionalized in the sense that aid allocations in donor countries are
part  and  parcel  of  the  national  budgetary  process  and  are  ultimately
sanctioned by parliaments. Aid is, senso stricto, politics. For details see
Streeten 1972: 8-12.
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sustainable peace, ODA has, almost invariably, resulted into its
exact opposite in most of Africa. As will be discussed below, it
has degenerated into unprecedented economic stagnation and
waste, tyranny and despotism, crippling debt crises, human
rights abuse, as well as encouraged extensive foreign
interventions in national economic policy management. The
obvious and critical questions that ought to be asked are: Why
is it that, despite massive infusions of financial and technical
assistance from the North, the economic, social, and
environmental conditions of Africa, and particularly, sub-
Saharan  Africa,  are  dramatically  worse  off  than  they  were  30
years ago? Were economic development, poverty alleviation,
and democracy, the overriding objectives of donor and recipient
states in the first place? To what extent has ODA been risk
management for the national security and defense policy
priorities of respective donor countries? What must enlightened
development cooperation policies and strategies be that will be
able to reduce harm and create better for and with the African
people? It is to the possible answers to these questions that
this Chapter seeks to address.
This chapter is divided into five substantive sections. In
Section  One,  the  organizing  argument  of  why  aid  is  requested
and  given  is  presented.  It  is  posted  that  as  an  instrument  of
statecraft,  aid  is  requested  and  given  in  order  to  advance
multiple and often, potentially conflictive donor and recipient
interests. This unfortunate policy dilemma helps to expose
most of the contradictions that analysts encounter in trying to
determine and evaluate the real impact of aid on the publicly
stated objectives such as economic growth and development.
The  actors,  rationale  and  impact  of  aid  on  African  countries
during the Cold War period are presented in Section Two. It is
argued that the ideological competition between the two supper
powers, the need to win allies in developing countries and their
desire to project their power on a global scale drove the scope
and  distribution  of  aid  resources.  In  the  third  section,  it  is
argued  that  with  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  the  rationale  for
giving aid was reconfigured to promote globalization. The
criteria for giving aid, included among others, the promotion of
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market economies, good governance, poverty reduction, and
the observance of human rights in most African countries. As
the  volume and  quality  of  total  aid  increasingly  ebbed,  donor
conditionalities grew stiffer and only “good” performers were
largely picked for support. Section Four discusses the role of
aid  in  the  period  after  the  New York  and  Washington,  DC on
September 11, 2001. It is argued that these events and the
aftermath radically changed the entire aid rationale, actors,
and dynamics. Like military assistance, aid and new trade
preferences were used to reward strategic allies in the fight
against  global  terror  regardless  of  the  nature  of  the
institutional and policy environment of recipient states.  The
fifth and last section proposes a comprehensive development
cooperation strategy that would genuinely support economic
transformation, poverty reduction and promote enduring and
sustainable peace in Africa.
Organizing arguments
The central argument of this Chapter is that all the talk about
the role of aid in economic development, poverty reduction,
democratization and disaster relief has almost always been
marshaled essentially to rationalize the self-interest motives of
various actors on both sides of the aid process. During the last
five  decades  of  the  post-World  War  II  period,  foreign  aid,  like
diplomacy or propaganda, has been used as an instrument of
statecraft to advance multiple and, potentially conflicting donor
and recipient state interests. Although the predominant
rhetorical objectives of the international aid regime were always
shrouded in the primacy of high-sounding altruistic motives,
namely economic development, disaster relief, solidarity with
the poor and oppressed or poverty alleviation, yet almost
consistently, the aid administration has persistently revealed
the very opposite. In practice, the political, commercial and
security interests of donor states have often acted at cross-
purpose with the declared developmental objectives. The
conflation of the different conflicting interests has been further
complicated by the inability of analysts to desegregate relevant
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data in order to determine the real impact on every objective. In
order to demystify the underlying overriding objective of the
international aid regime, Keith Griffin (1991:671) concisely
concludes, “aid will follow, as always, not necessarily where it
is most needed, but where the dictates of national interests
suggest it will be most productive”. The rest of the discussion
on the impact of aid, to say the least, is but details.
Secondly and interestingly, it is argued that the explicit
and implicit objectives of giving aid have a tendency to change
from one epoch to another, from one donor to another, and
indeed,  from  one  definition  to  another  of  what  exactly
constitute ODA. To begin with, military aid and enforcement
aspects of peacekeeping were excluded from the original
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DCA)
aid criteria. Currently, the ODA criteria include them. Even
more disturbingly, there is changing donor prioritization,
ranking of interests as well as the volatility of aid flows. During
the Cold War period, for example, the US aid policy was driven
primarily  by  three  major  objectives:  to  support  its  Cold  War
diplomacy, further development in friendly countries, and to
provide humanitarian relief. With the end of the Cold War, the
objectives of US aid-giving expanded to include supporting
economic and political transitions in former communist
countries, promoting democracy and managing conflict in
developing countries (Lancaster & Martin 2004:42-43).
Obviously, in such a highly complicated and diffuse
scheme of things, the economic rationale was only one of the
many competing objectives of giving and receiving aid. If this
proposition is accepted, it is absolutely unhelpful to interrogate
the effectiveness of the aid system exclusively in terms of
developmental and humanitarian objectives as most
conventional mainstream economists often do.2 Similarly, in
the contemporary post-9/11 period, the national security
2  The argument that evaluating the aid systems purely in terms of any
single purpose does not assist our understanding of the system is
found in Rugumamu 1997:19-87.
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interests of donor countries are dominating international
relations, with very troubling consequences for poor people
living  in  inconsequential  parts  of  the  world.  In  addition  to
humanitarian and development objectives, bilateral donors are
now refocusing their development cooperation policies to reflect
their respective defense and security policies, including
counter-terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction, organized crime reduction and
counter-narcotics, communicable disease control and an array
of trade, energy and environmental issues, as well as concerns
around social cohesion and immigration. As the Dutch Minister
for Development Cooperation, Anna Maria Agnes van Ardenne,
belatedly acknowledged, “the distinction between foreign policy
and development cooperation is vanishing. It was never very
useful  to  begin  with.  Aid,  politics  and  diplomacy  form  a
seamless whole and we should not try to pick them apart”
(cited in Development Initiatives 2003).
Thirdly and as pointed out earlier, the range of purposes
of bilateral donor and recipient governments is much broader
than has often been claimed by conventional development
thinking. Sir W. Arthur Lewis (1971:12), the 1979 Nobel
Laureate  in  economics,  was  audaciously  blunt  about  the
overriding  motives  of  giving  aid:   “when  you  look  at  the  table
showing how much each of the one-hundred countries receive
in foreign aid, it is a distribution which cannot be defended on
any principle of need, size of population, absorptive capacity or
any economic test... politics was the chief determinant of aid.”
Broadly defined, politics includes all aspects that traditionally
fall under the rubric of “vital national interests”.  Similarly,
subsequent aid critics have concluded that standard debates
about the moral imperative for aid are sterile, inconclusive, and
irrelevant to the politics of aid.3 Yet very few critical
commentators such as Teresa Hayter (1971) and Cheryl Payer
(1982)  have  been  courageous  enough  to  paint  aid  and
development cooperation exactly for what they are – “merely the
smooth face of imperialism.” It will be further demonstrated
3  On the politics of foreign aid see Riddell 1987 and Mason 1964.
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that the pervasive poverty in aid recipient countries has
repeatedly been attributed more to the lack of specific critical
resources than to the organic nature and structure of the
economies and societies in question. As discussed in the
author’s earlier work (Rugumamu 1997: 65-8), this deliberate
posing of false questions and proffering of less than sanguine
solutions have consistently helped to divert attention away
from genuine and urgent problems that afflict African societies
and economies.
Fourthly, like donor states, recipient states have their
own interests, ambitions and purposes for requesting and
receiving aid. Despite the abhorrent dependence that aid often
engenders, recipient states have undeclared private interests
and ambitions of their own. Above everything else, states in
Africa seek aid in order to strengthen and perpetuate their
fledgling regimes. Foreign aid generates new factors of power. It
provides state elites with much-needed resources to
manipulate their respective political environments. It is used to
solidify popular support, reward political supporters, neutralize
enemies and ultimately, consolidate the elites’ hold on state
power. Like donor states, the overriding objective of recipient
states has never exclusively been economic growth or poverty
reduction, but rather, the imperative of regime survival.
Inevitably, public policies in aid recipient countries will often
tend to be at variance not only with the often hidden self-
interest political agendas of the given recipient state regime but
also with some those of their benefactors. Politically visible
white elephant aid projects, for example, are likely to make
more political sense to statespersons than either economic
growth or poverty alleviation. As rational political calculators,
African statespersons have not hesitated to use aid resources
to pursue competing subterranean objectives including narrow
regime interests. Above all, much of donor aid to Africa remains
highly conditional on African governments’ acquiescing to
donor policy prescriptions that are often of dubious value.
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Aid and Cold War politics
During the five decades of the post-World War II period, foreign
aid was often promised, given, withdrawn or denied to support
‘trusted ideological allies’ even when some of them blatantly
pursued unacceptable domestic policies. Both the capitalist
West and socialist East capitalized on the economic poverty
and political weaknesses of the South to advance their
ideological struggles and rivalries on a global scale. Foreign aid
tended to supplement, and to some degree, substituted
traditional instruments of statecraft such as diplomacy,
propaganda, and the military. The two superpowers
assiduously competed to win friends and allies for their
respective military and ideological camps. For the capitalist
bloc, the mobilizing development ideas were those of economic
growth and political modernization. Technology transfer,
capital investment, and the establishment of institutions were
considered strategic factors for the economic “take-off” in
friendly developing countries. As for the socialist bloc, their
organizing development ideas included, inter alia, the
institutionalization of the vanguard communist parties and
socialist planning and management of the national economy.
Furthermore, from a strategic point of view, both superpowers
and their allied European powers sought to establish military
and defense alliances with ideological partners in the
developing  world.  In  fact,  by  the  mid-1970s,  more  than  two
dozen African states had entered into bilateral security
agreements  with  major  powers  on  both  sides  of  the  Cold  War
conflict (Manuruzzamann 1982). Such security cooperation
almost exclusively focused on modernizing militaries and
security establishments. More often than not, military officers
took power, occupying governments in support of elite interests
and those of their Cold War patrons.
Like their superpower counterparts, former colonial
European powers like Great Britain, West Germany, France,
Portugal and Belgium made foreign aid an integral part of their
foreign policies and indeed one of the key foreign policy
instruments for statecraft. This fundamental rationale
remained true whether aid was given directly to governments of
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developing countries, international and local non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) or through multilaterals such as UN
agencies or the international financial institutions (IFIs).
National aid policies and motives were largely influenced not
only by the Cold War rivalries but also by their respective
national interests, operational modalities and colonial
experiences. One of their immediate post-World War II security
objectives was to contain the communist expansion,
particularly in their former colonies and territories. And as
their respective aid disbursements increased, foreign aid
interests grew in importance within their foreign affairs
bureaucracies. The creation of Ministries of Overseas
Development and Agencies for International Development and
other similar institutions in the West established a permanent
place for advocates of foreign aid in those countries. When the
OECD was inaugurated in 1961, the DAC was also formalized.
It became a formal forum where Western donors collectively
thought out their aid strategies, articulating long-term
directions, changing directions, evaluating results, and
identifying needs for stronger efforts.4 In the so-called
“Resolution  for  Common  Aid  Effort”,  members  agreed  to
increase the aggregate volume of resources flowing to
developing countries and to share the burden of such increases
more fairly. The commitment to increase resource flows was
qualified  by  the  mutual  understanding  to  share  “in  some  way
not yet specified”, thus making it impossible to regard these
commitments as binding obligations (Rugumamu op. cit.:42-
45). Although aid categories, objectives and target countries
overlapped over time, the vital national interests of donor
countries have remained almost the same and indeed
predominant. Describing the primary objective of aid in the UK
foreign policy during the 1960s, one former British Minister for
Overseas Development stated (Morton 1975:52):
4  For expenditure to qualify as ODA, it has to meet several conditions: it
must have economic development or welfare as its primary purpose; it
must  come  from  a  government  and  must  go  to  a  defined  list  of
developing countries; and it must be a grant or a concessional loan with
a grant element of at least 25 percent. For details see OECD 1982:171.
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The (aid) program is based on moral considerations and on the
interests of the UK which, particularly in the long-term, centre
on security, stability and prosperity…It is also a consideration
that that we have important investment and trading interests
in the Third World from which many materials of importance
to us are supplied. Balance of payments considerations add to
the importance of maintaining and developing these very
substantial and other economic interests and of maintaining
the stable political and economic conditions on which they
depend.
As for medium-sized Western industrial powers with no
colonial history, like the Scandinavian countries and Canada,
their aid policies had a relatively limited scope. Their
governments were largely influenced by the desire to support
the liberal economic global order and the international peace
and stability which they had helped to establish after the end of
World War II. However, deep down beneath their undeclared
policies they regarded the Soviet Union expansionism as the
major threat to international peace and security. As Olav
Stokke (1989:276) succinctly notes, security goal was perceived
as  an  “international  common  good”  for  all  outside  the
communist bloc. In a similar vein, Cranford Pratt (1999:14)
observes that, given their relatively weak power capabilities in
the global system, these states could not directly link their aid
policies to respective national security concerns. They could
only  relate  them  to  the  broader  international  stability  norm.
The North-South arena offered them a greater scope for
articulating distinctive contributions to the international scene
than they could have hoped to achieve in regard to national
security issues or East-West relations. Moreover, with no
previous extensive interactions with the South, in general, and
African countries, in particular, these “middle powers” sought
to  use  foreign  aid  as  an  instrument  to  improve  their  trade
investment, and political influence. This observation helps to
explain, in part, the enthusiasm with which they have
financially contributed to this cause over the years; and in part,
as  one  way  of  increasing  their  power  and  influence  in  the
international aid regime and other related issues.
What was the impact of these bilateral development
cooperation arrangements during the period under
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consideration? Why were there such wide disjuncture between
the rhetoric and practices? Were the key actors in any way
moved by persistently dismal performance? The end of the First
United Nations Development Decade was marked by the
issuance of two major reports of international authorship – the
report  of  the  Pearson  Commission  (Pearson1969)  and  of  the
Tinbergen Committee report (Tinbergen 1970) – which analyzed
the progress of the international development effort until the
end of the 1960s as a basis for recommendations for the future.
The Pearson Commission report summed up the aid program at
the end of the first UN Development Decade as follows (Pearson
1969:4):
A good deal of bilateral aid has indeed been dispensed in order
to achieve short-term political favors, gain strategic
advantages, or promote exports from the donor. Much foreign
aid was granted in the 1960s to enable countries to maintain
large armed forces rather than to promote economic growth. In
none of these cases was the promotion of long-term
development a dominant objective of the aid given.
The above-quotation aptly sums it all: it clearly shows how
different donor agencies and aid recipient states used foreign
aid to achieve essentially non-developmental objectives. More
specifically, while the late President Mobutu Sese Seko of
former Zaire was reportedly amassing one of the world's largest
personal fortunes using aid-related resources, which was
invested in West European financial institutions and in real
estates, decades of large-scale foreign assistance left not a trace
of progress in his country. Zaire (now the Democratic Republic
of Congo) is just one of several examples where a steady flow of
aid ignored, or even abetted, incompetence, corruption,
repression, and misguided policies. Mobutu’s donor patrons
simply  looked  the  other  way!  Former  US  ambassador  to  the
United Nations, Jeanne Kirkpatrick (1982:51-52) rationalized
the  US  government  aid  policy  by  asserting  that  “right
authoritarian regimes, whatever their faults, were natural
allies, and potentially reformable. Left totalitarian regimes and
movements, however, were irredeemable.” It is therefore little
surprising that the Cold War aid politics left behind
traumatized societies after years of proxy wars, a legacy of
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ineffective aid, partly in the form of loans that had accumulated
into large debt stocks and partly in the form of compromised
state institutions. Writing immediately at the end of the Cold
War, Keith Griffin (1991:678) concluded that, “the debt burden,
not economic development, has become the legacy of forty
years of foreign aid".
On the recommendation side, the Tinbergen report notes
that although developing countries bear the primary
responsibility for their development, their efforts would not be
sufficient without increased financial assistance and more
favorable economic and commercial policies on the part of
developed countries. Without setting benchmarks or deadlines,
the  report  urged  the  latter  to  endeavor  to  provide  annual
financial transfers to the South to a tune of 0.7 percent of their
respective GNI, minimize practices of tying aid, and ensure
much closer coordination of trade, aid and private investment
policies to promote sustainable development. It also urged
multilateral agencies to increase their respective aid portfolios
and introduce better modalities for reducing debts.5 As  the
following section will amply demonstrate, because the status of
the international aid regime has remained essentially a “quasi-
regime, with neither binding norms nor principles, critical
issues such as aid amounts, proportion of bilateral to
multilateral, levels of financial concessionality, or aid tying
were left exclusively to the discretion of individual donors
(Ruggie 1983:435-36). For example, the quantity of aid (0.7
percent of GNI) represented an aspiration rather than a
commitment. In fact, donors were not seriously expected to
comply, but the above target was employed as a “devise for
nagging any outstanding laggards in the right direction”
(Shonfield 1976:11). Worse still, the aid regime has been
considered a quasi-regime because the entire aid policy
management deliberately and consciously excluded its
Southern beneficiaries. The latter remained, literally speaking,
on the receiving end, with no substantive decisional inputs on
5  This target was set by the UN General Assembly Resolution on
International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade
approved on 24 October 1970. See also Tinbergen 1970.
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how the institution was run and managed. A one-sided,
patronizing affair, with hopelessly misplaced accountability
system as far as the aid recipients were concerned!
The post Cold War aid regime
With  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  it  was  widely  hoped  that  the
international aid regime would be significantly de-politicized. It
was also hoped that the new global political dispensation would
allow rich countries to direct a significant portion of the ‘peace-
dividend’ to finance enlightened development cooperation. In
fact,  for  the  first  time  in  a  long  time,  the  UN  together  with
major powers was able to engineer a series of comprehensive
peace treaties and internationally mediated negotiations in
war-torn Namibia, Mozambique, and El Salvador. However, the
post-Cold War euphoria was quickly shattered. The motivating
rationale for development cooperation in general, and for
foreign aid, in particular, virtually disappeared as new threats
to states in the West and new development problems,
opportunities and agenda gradually emerged. The imperatives
of human solidarity, poverty alleviation, humanitarian
assistance, and the promotion of democracy and human rights
did not possess the same organizing power as the Cold War
once had to rationalize foreign aid. It is little wonder therefore
that  international  aid  flows  in  subsequent  years  went  into  a
secular decline in real terms. The long anticipated peace
dividend for development failed to materialize. Rather than
increase  the  quality  and  quantity  of  aid  to  poor  developing
countries, particularly those in Africa, most donors increasingly
focused on their immediate domestic and regional issues.
These include facilitating the transition of the former state-
socialist societies to market economies, helping immigrants
and refugees, cutting the international flow of narcotics,
reducing national fiscal deficits, stimulating trade, and
improving education, health care, and the like. Paradoxically,
African states were repeatedly counseled not only to learn how
to do more with less aid, but also to look for alternative sources
of development finance (see Rugumamu 2001b).
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With the end of the Cold War, the liberal and democratic
world view has become hegemonic. A standardized pre-
packaged development solution for poor developing countries
was  no  longer  a  subject  for  debate,  rethinking  or  resolution.
Free trade and investment are the only engines of economic
change and transformation. The theory and resulting policy
praxes have continually been paraded as a panacea for a broad
range of social ills, from internal and international violence to
poverty, famine, corruption, and even environmental
destruction. For this purpose, we quote Larry Diamond
(1995:6-7) on the subject in extenso:
The experience of this century offers important lessons.
Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic
fashion do not go to war with each other. They do not aggress
against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify
their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically
“cleanse” their own populations, and they are much less likely
to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor
terrorism  against  one  another.  They  do  not  build  weapons  of
mass destruction to use or to threaten one another.
Democratic countries form more reliable, open and enduring
trading partnerships. In the long run, they offer better and
more stable climates for investment. They are more
environmentally responsible because they must answer to
their citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their
environments. They are better bets to honor international
treaties since they value legal obligations and because their
openness makes it much more difficult to secretly breach
agreements. Precisely because they respect competition, civil
liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, within their
borders, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which
a new world order of international security and prosperity can
be built.
The above quotation is a clear demonstration of structure-blind
politics. It is unable to interrogate the basic claim that the well-
being  of  the  rich  countries  is  based  to  a  significant  extent  on
wrongful control over the resources of others, disparity in
earnings  between  different  parts  of  the  world,  unfair  terms  of
trade  and  pure  power  politics.  Be  that  as  it  may,  since  then,
development theory, policy discourse and institutional designs
have been largely derived from a single and virtually
unchallenged source of intellectual inspiration. The neo-liberal
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framework provides a set of broad ideas that define, elaborate
and  justify  the  contemporary  capitalist  order  and  the  ways  in
which changes can “legitimately” take place within that order.
These ideas are the products of the institutional thinking of the
World  Bank,  the  IMF,  the  WTO,  the  OECD,  and  affiliated
universities and think tanks that espouse and produce similar
ideas and views on economics, governance and politics.
These ideas coalesced within the Bretton Wood
institutions  to  form what  came to  be  popularly  known as  the
“Washington Consensus.” More ominously, from then onwards,
the Bank urged bilateral donors to become far more selective
and to direct their aid resources only to countries pursuing
“sound  and  sustainable  reform  programs”  (World  Bank
1989:14). Evidence of intellectual triumph of liberalism and
democracy came in arguments that stressed time and again
that these hegemonic ideas faced no credible alternative.
Fukuyama’s (1992) celebrated “End of History” essay summed
up  the  liberal  democratic  triumph  as:  the  end  point  of
mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of
Western  liberal  democracy  as  the  final  form  of  human
government.” Under those circumstances, and given the
overwhelming power of the Bretton Wood institutions vis-à-vis
African countries, such recommendations tended to foreclose
any  debate  on  development  by  literally  insisting  that  it  was
either  their  way  or  no  alternative.  Broadly,  the  same types  of
prescription are recommended for all conflicts and contexts,
regardless of social circumstances, exigencies or structural
factors.6
Similarly, the refocused aid regime came to underscore
the imperative of a strong institutional and policy environment
as necessary conditions for converting aid resources into
economic growth. The new development orthodoxy claimed that
6  The IMF determines the conditions for foreign confidence in a country’s
economic prospects and places priority on macroeconomic stability,
both  as  the  first  task  of  economic  policy  and  as  the  context  within
which all other aid and policy takes place. For an excellent review of
Bretton Woods’ role in post conflict reconstruction see Woodward
2002:183-214.
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countries with strong performance in respect to those key
attributes can absorb higher levels of aid and these were likely
to be more effective in converting aid into economic growth and
poverty reduction. Consensus grew rapidly within the official
development community around the notion that by that there
had to be a concentration of aid resources on a few countries
that  were  performing  relatively  “well”  as  certified  by  the  World
Bank  and  IMF.7 As  for  a  large  and  growing  sub-set  of  low-
income countries that were variously labeled “difficult partners”
or “low-income countries under stress (LICUS)”, these were to
be relatively isolated from much of the mainstream aid system.
Such countries were defined by chronic weak institutions and
poor governance systems as well as their vulnerability to
unrest, conflict and state failures (see Hewitt & Waldenburg.
2004:19; Maxwell 2005:5). Furthermore, these were countries
which, according to the World Bank Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment (CPIA), were in the lowest two
quintiles of CPIA scores.8 They  could  only  be  provided  with
limited aid support to reinvigorate state-society relations, and
promote trust and legitimacy.
The disappearance of the Communist threat signaled not
only a radical shift in the global power configuration in favor of
the West, but it also triggered off fresh security concerns. The
value of most of African states as either ideological spoils or
strategic assets in the great power rivalry was dramatically
diminished. The military, diplomatic and ODA scale downs
were further graphically manifested in a systematic
downgrading and/or closure of embassies, as well as deep
slashing of development cooperation resources. Not
7  On the importance of strong institutional and policy environment see
Burnside & Dollar 2000: 847-68; Collier & Dollar 1990.
8   CPIA  annually  assesses  the  quality  of  the  World  Bank  and  IDA
borrowers’ policy and institutional performance in areas relevant to
economic growth and poverty reduction. This controversial framework
has 20 equally weighted criteria presenting policy dimensions of an
effective poverty reduction and growth strategy. The criteria are grouped
into 4 clusters: economic management; structural policies; policies of
social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and
institutions.
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surprisingly, foreign military bases in sub-Saharan Africa were
closed down one after another and African states were
constantly reminded to fend for themselves. By the same token,
formerly heavily aid-supported African dictators in the name of
“global peace and security” were quickly abandoned. The
Mobutus, Bandas, Menghistus, Mois and Barres of Africa were
literally left in the cold: in the new political dispensation and
refocused interests, these abominable dictators had outlived
their usefulness. With diminished resources at their disposal,
almost  all  post-Cold  War  “orphan  states”  fell  from  grace  one
after another as a radically new development paradigm came to
vogue demanding economic and political liberalization, good
governance, administrative decentralization and the protection
of human rights, were now paraded as the necessary conditions
for requesting and receiving foreign aid. Once again, foreign aid
was  being  used  a  primary  economic  instrument  to  promote
donors’ interest rather than genuine development in recipient
countries.
Even as the ability to use aid effectively increased in most
of Africa by the early 1990s, the international aid levels began
to ebb while donors seldom acknowledged, much less
attempted to address the systemic structural causes of Africa’s
poverty and underdevelopment. More ominously, there was
little evidence to suggest that donors were preparing for a
sustained increase in their aid budgets to support Africa’s
development efforts or to reconstruct economies and societies
that had been badly devastated by decades of Cold War-
induced proxy wars.9
Strangely enough, huge cuts in aid budgets were
accompanied by the slogan ‘trade, not aid’, together with
exhortations  for  countries  in  the  South  to  participate  fully  in
the global market place. Between 1990 and 1998, for example,
9  At the U.N.’s Millennium Summit of September 2000, the international
community rededicated itself to the Millennium Development goals. At
the International Conference on Financing for Development in
Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002, several major donors resolved to halt
and significantly reverse the decline in aid.  It need hardly be stressed
that such lofty commitments have been made earlier!
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the overall ODA fell by one-third in real terms (see OECD 2001:
table 29). Apparently, the pressure to prune development
budgets  gradually  evolved  into  a  dogma  that  aid  should
necessarily  be  cut.  The  share  of  net  ODA  in  the  GNI  for  the
OECD countries declined to 0.22 percent in 1998, compared to
0.35 percent in the mid-1980s. The total net disbursement
from Europe to sub-Saharan Africa fell from 52.1 percent of the
members’ total aid budgets in 1988/89 to 44.4 percent in
1998/99. The cuts were particularly remarkable for big donors
like  the  United  States,  France  and  the  United  Kingdom,  who
drastically reduced their aid budgets, measured both as a
share of their GNI as well as a share of their total budgets that
went to Africa. The aggregate result of these changes was that
net disbursements to Africa declined markedly. Measured in
1998 prices and exchange rates, the total bilateral aid from the
15 European Union (EU) members went down from $8.8 billion
in 1988/89 to $5.4 billion in 1998/99 (Ibid.: table 33).
More specifically, there was a fall dramatically in the real
value  of  E.U.  aid  to  sub-Saharan  Africa  from  $2.1  billion  in
1988/89 to $1.6 billion in 1999, measured in 1998 prices and
exchange rates. The reduction in the E.U. aid is better
appreciated  when  it  is  recalled  that  on  1  January  1995  three
affluent countries, Sweden, Austria and Finland, joined the
European Union. The decline is even more telling when one
compares these figures with what went to other developing
regions  of  the  world.  Sub-Saharan  Africa’s  share  of  total  E.U.
development aid dropped sharply from 61 percent in 1988/89
to 31.3 percent in 1998/99, while aid to other geographical
regions grew from 39 percent to 68.7 percent during the same
time period.  More ominously, “poor performing” countries were
particularly hit the hardest. According to one authoritative
study, between 1992 and 2002 these countries received 43
percent less aid than predicted by their population and poverty
levels, policy and institutional environment (Levin & Dollar
2005).
France, the biggest European donor, reduced its total
ODA/GNI aid commitment from 0.63 in 1992 to 0.39 in 1999.
Within this shrinking budget, the share of French ODA going to
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Africa was reduced from 51.8 percent in 1988/89 to 34.2
percent in 1999. Germany, the second biggest European donor,
reduced its ODA/GNI from 0.38 percent in 1992 to 0.26 in
1999, while at the same time, the share of German aid going to
Africa was reduced from 31.3 in 1988/89 to 27.7 in 1999.  This
resulted in a reduction of net disbursement from Germany to
Africa from $1.3 billion in 1988/89 to $939 million in 1998/99,
measured in 1998 prices and exchange rates. Like France and
Germany, the British ratio of ODA to GNI fell from 0.31 in 1992
to 0.23 percent in 1999. Measured in 1998 prices and
exchange rates, British aid to sub-Saharan Africa decreased
slightly during the 1990s, reaching $784 in 1999. The decline
was especially sharp in the United Sates ODA budget where it
was a mere 0.08 percent of GNI in 1997 (OECD 2001, op. cit.:
table 29). With the sole exception of Finland, all Scandinavian
countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), along with the
Netherlands, have had a commitment clearly superior to the
rest. These are the only countries which consistently fulfilled
the famous United Nations resolution that calls on developed
countries to give 0.7 percent of their national income as
international aid. Despite the falling level of aid to African
countries, the region is still, on average, the most aid-
dependent of the major world regions. In 1997, net
disbursement of concessional resources to sub-Saharan Africa
amounted  to  US$16.4  billion.  Foreign  aid  as  a  percentage  of
the gross GNI of sub-Saharan countries averaged five percent
in 1996-1997, down from 10 percent in the 1980s but still the
highest of any major developing region (for details OECD 1999).
However, it is important to note that these figures understate
the real decline since they include debt forgiveness, which is
officially counted as aid. This is not really aid since most of the
forgiven debt would not have been repaid anyway.
With radical changes in global politics and interests, the
direction and composition of aid resources began also to
change. As the World Bank study demonstrates the
composition of aid flows shifted from project assistance and
structural adjustment loans towards humanitarian assistance
and peace-building. Emergency aid rose sharply since 1990,
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peaking in 1994 at some US$3 billion bilaterally and US$2.5
billion multilaterally, with a further commitment of US$3
billion to peacekeeping. However, the increasing share of aid
going to emergency assistance meant that the amount of ODA
devoted to promoting development actually declined in the
1990s. It further notes that the pie was not only diminishing, it
was also being distributed among a greater number of clients!
At the same time, relatively less aid was earmarked for the
South, in order to make room for other priority regions. Africa
emerged as the net loser in these developments (World Bank
2000:  71-72).  This  was  not  the  whole  story.  Following  the
collapse of the Soviet bloc, it became increasingly apparent that
the former communist countries needed substantial assistance
to help manage their transitions to market economies. The
Federal Republic of Germany began to concentrate its aid and
private investment resources in its own backyard, the former
East Germany and other Eastern European countries. These
new  demands  on  the  EU  aid  budget  drastically  reduced  the
funds available in the long run to regions of less priority, such
as Africa.
Critics of foreign aid have welcomed the decline of aid
flows, arguing that aid was less effective than private
investment and commercial loans in stimulating long-term
economic growth.10 They have charged that the foreign aid
regime reflected naïve assumptions about world politics and
insisted that aid programs should be either related to narrowly
defined donor self-interests or eliminated outright. They have
further  pointed  to  the  dubious  Cold  War  record  of  subsidizing
autocratic regimes, fostering neo-colonialism and inflaming
regional conflicts. Still others focus on the self-serving and
wasteful use of official development assistance. They have also
exposed the pervasive practice in which nearly all of the
bilateral aid to Africa was tied to the purchase of over-priced
donor goods and services. Furthermore, they have criticized the
bloated and often heavy bureaucracies of many aid agencies
that often spent much of the aid on themselves and
10  For critical reviews of foreign aid see Thorp 1971 and Hook 1996.
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misappropriated funds for luxurious capital-intensive projects
that do little to improve overall living standards.
To all these critics, the apparent global rise of private
capital as the principal mechanism for transferring resources
from rich to poor states has been perceived as an encouraging
trend. Paradoxically, as aid budgets became increasingly
parsimonious, expenditure devoted to the aid administration of
bilateral and multilateral programs increased dramatically. The
increase in administration costs reflects, in part, a greater
emphasis on social programs, which can be labor-intensive.
Higher administrative costs are also a clear manifestation of
donor supervision at a ridiculously detailed level. As some
Lomè Convention studies have shown, with the end of the Cold
War, over and above economic conditionalities, the European
Union introduced political conditionalities as well as
cumbersome administrative procedures down to fine
operational details.
The principle of co-management administration proved
more theoretical than real. Development priorities and project
planning, and management came to be largely influenced by
the  donor  side,  with  joint  management  remaining  only  on
paper.  More  damagingly,  the  overall  decline  in  aid  was
compounded by three related problems. First, the decline was
steepest in the poorest countries, with the share of aid going to
low-income  countries  falling  from  45  percent  in  1991  to  28
percent in 1996. Obviously, this was inconsistent with the
internationally declared goal of reducing poverty. Second, basic
education and health, two of the greatest priorities in terms of
developing more equitable patterns of globalization, accounted
for less than 5 percent of the overall aid effort. Finally, a large
share of development assistance, 40 percent of the total, was
spent on technical assistance, much of it in the donor
countries. Ultimately, one is left wondering who is helping
whom in the international aid regime (see McQueen 1998:669-
692; Raffer 1999:125-142).
Although there are general agreements in the literature
on the means to achieve significant poverty reduction, three
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disturbing differences of opinion remained unresolved. First,
there are issues concerning the questionable legitimacy of
external agencies in determining sensitive policy agendas such
as the anti-poverty crusade. Arguably, any effective
implementation of a major domestic policy requires a well-
planned mobilization campaign of key national actors and
various political constituencies. In this regard, only national
governments with relatively high degrees of legitimacy would
have the capacity to mobilize various domestic constituencies
for such an undertaking. Rajni Kothari (1993: 152) makes
similar compelling arguments concerning the limitations of
foreign actors in determining national development policies. He
argues that foreign agencies can influence, but not determine,
national political agendas. He further warns:
History has shown very clearly that one cannot constructively
transform a society from outside. All genuine social
transformations have been initiated from within the society,
even though in many cases the genesis for such
transformation lay in the cross-fertilization of ideas and
experiences from different societies.
Second, and more poignantly, it is argued that sensitive policy
interventions, such as the anti-poverty agenda, which is driven
largely by international agencies such as the World Bank,
United Nations Children’s Education Fund, or the United
Nations  Development  Program,  is  lacking  on  other  important
grounds. According to John Toye and Carl Jackson such a
policy  should  ideally  be  home-grown  and  command  broad
national  support.  As  the  deprivation  of  particular  groups
becomes politicized, they acquire a level of support far beyond
what obtained earlier. In other words, enlightened politics and
informed broad public discussions are more likely to play a
unifying role in the anti-poverty agenda in any country than
are foreign international agencies. More specifically, they
recommend (Toye & Jackson 1996:57):
Any international efforts, like that of the World Bank to
promote poverty reduction in particular countries must face
up  to  the  implications  of  one  very  central  difficulty.  It  is
perhaps not fully appreciated that the poverty reduction
agenda has received high political priority in the now
developed countries only at particular historical moments and
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under well-defined conditions. Research shows that the
attitude of the elite was critical. They took action on poverty
alleviation issues because they shared a consensus around
three beliefs. These were that (i) the welfare of the elite and the
welfare of the poor were interdependent, and the elite was not
able to insulate itself from the living conditions of the poor; (ii)
the  poor  did,  in  fact,  have  the  means  to  affect  the  welfare  of
the elite, principally by three methods namely crime,
insurrection and epidemic disease; and (iii) some actions by
the state would be efficacious in reducing the threat to the
welfare of the elite posed by the behavior of the poor.
Thirdly and finally, the World Bank's prescription for perverse
economic integration of developing countries into world
markets, and the benefits thereof for the poor, is far from being
generally accepted. The instability of commodity prices, the
increasing decline in the demand for them in the West, the
weak bargaining power of poor countries vis-à-vis the
multilateral agencies, and the constraints on economic recovery
imposed by onerous debt burdens make it extremely difficult
for  African  economies  to  grow  on  the  basis  of  an  outward
orientation. As earlier noted, since the early 1970s, economic
growth in the North has been increasingly associated with new
technologies rather than the use of natural resources such as
energy, agricultural raw materials and minerals.
Understandably, continued dependence on primary
commodities and foreign assistance as engines of development
has  few  prospects,  if  any.  It  is  against  this  backdrop  that  the
Bank/Fund revised its near-theological commitment to neo-
liberalism and launched, in 1995, new initiatives, the Poverty
Reduction  Initiative,  and  later,  the  Highly  Indebted  Poor
Countries initiative (HIPC). While the name and nomenclature
changed,  the  add-ons  did  not  make  any  major  dent  in  the
overall thrust of original reform framework. The Poverty
Reduction  Strategy  Papers  (PRSPs)  came  to  be  known  as  the
“second generation reforms” – to be developed, implemented
and evaluated through a mutual dialogue by all key actors. The
PRSPs are essentially a more comprehensive package than the
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), its predecessor. They
include requirements to improve corporate governance, fight
corruption, introduce greater flexibility in the labor market,
AID AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT / 47
accession to WTO agreements, introduce financial codes and
standards, prudent capital account opening, application of
non-intermediate exchange rate regimes, ensure the
independence of the central banks together with attainment of
lower single-digit inflation targets, creation of safety nets and
targeted  poverty  reduction  (Berg  &  Taylor  2000).  It  was  within
the context of such poverty reduction policy focus that the
Bank acknowledged the role of the civil society in bringing to
the decision-making process their tacit knowledge, perspectives
and analysis. The new reforms sought to mitigate the adverse
social  effects  of  SAPs.  This  change  of  mind  was,  in  part,  a
response to the now famous UNICEF study, Adjustment with
the Human Face (Cornea & Stewart 1987) that had concluded
that SAP tended to aggravate poverty; and in part, to the
publication  and  wide  distribution  of  the  UNDP  Human
Development Index11 that  emphasized  the  claim  that
development was much more than simply economic growth.
The securitization of aid after 9/11
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on US cities and
their aftermath, a big cluster of critical observers in the West
belatedly acknowledged that economic growth, security and
peace in developing countries were organically intertwined and
dynamic aspects of social development. Poverty, alienation and
violent conflict in developing countries were increasingly viewed
as  “threats”  to  the  security  of  the  West.  Arguably  also,  ODA
was seen as one of the key tools for pre-emptively defending
against these threats by carefully targeting security sectors of
poor  countries.   In  reaction  to  the  terrorist  attacks,  the  US
government led the way in redefining its security agenda. The
“war on terror”, often defined by dubious inter-linking of issues
ranging from non-state terrorist networks, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, “rogue states” of “the axis of evil”
to  weak  and  failing  states  in  developing  countries.  It  has
11  The HDI was developed in 1990 to measure a complex of life expec-
tancy, literacy, education and standard of living for countries
worldwide.
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pursued  its  “war  on  terror”  by  employing  its  full  panoply  of
power capabilities, but has clearly privileged the utilization of
military power, directly in Afghanistan and Iraq, and indirectly,
in counter-insurgency operations in the Horn of Africa, the
Philippines and Indonesia. US has often complemented the use
of military force by the employment of economic instruments
such as foreign assistance and military aid to confront
transnational security threats, in general, and to reward
security-strategic “allies of the global terror”, in particular.
This was the beginning of the re-securitization of foreign
aid. As the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security
Strategy (Bush 2002) observed, “poverty does not make poor
people into terrorists and murderers. Yet, poverty, weak states
and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist
networks and drug cartels within their borders.” The Strategy
further claims that extreme poverty tends to be breeding
grounds for despair and violence, which in turn, undermines
global  peace  and  security.  Since  2002,  US  aid  flows  have  not
only tripled but most of the increase has been allocated to
priorities under the war on terror criteria. Ngaire Woods’ (2005:
5-6) definitive study on aid diversion concludes that almost all
of the increase in the US assistance (military, economic and
ODA) between 2002 and 2004 went to strategically important
countries, with the top six recipients of ODA being Egypt,
Russia,  Israel,  Pakistan,  Serbia  and  Columbia.  The  war  on
terror  was  perceived  by  US  policy  makers  as  global,  it  had
therefore to be confronted on a global scale as well. Reflecting
on the globalized insecurity, the former US Assistant Secretary
of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz remarked (cited in Rasmussen
2002:323-349):
Along with the globalization that is creating interdependence
among the world’s free economies, there is a parallel
globalization of terror, in which rogue states and terrorist
organizations share information, intelligence, technology,
weapons and materials and know-how.
Since the events of 9/11, the African continent has been tagged
as a “soft underbelly of global terrorism” (Rosnau 2005:1; Mills
2004: 157-158). With numerous weak, conflict-ridden and
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failed states, Africa has been depicted as one of the major
hotbeds of terror and a cause of security concern. There is a
growing perception in the West that the continent is a home of
numerous porous borders, pervasive corruption, major
conduits  for  arms  and  drugs  smuggling  networks  and  weak
police and security establishments, which allow terrorists to
move freely and establish basis (Rosenau op. cit.:  1-2).  It  is
against such security perceptions that the Bush administration
“elevated” Africa in its rhetoric on global terror, and in more
concrete terms, it proposed a number of security-related aid
programs to Africa. They include, as will be discussed below, a
$5 billion increase in annual foreign aid through the
establishment of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA); the
June  2004  signed  free  trade  agreement  with  Morocco,  a  $15
billion  US initiative  to  fight  AIDS;  and  the  extension  of  AGOA
beyond 2008. Some critics have warned that US securitization
of ODA is likely to shift aid distribution away from where it may
have the largest impact on poverty and development (Hewitt &
Waldenburg op. cit.).
In  responding  to  the  “war  on  terror”,  most  European
states generally supported the US interpretation of new threats
to global security. In its refocused joint security policy (DAC
2003: 9), the OECD Development Assistance Committee
asserted that foreign aid was to be guided above all by security
concerns. It had an important role to play in “helping to deprive
terrorists of popular support and addressing the conditions
that terrorist leaders feed on and exploit”. Like the US security
policy, the EU security strategy interchanges notions of poverty
reduction, conflict and peace with those of terrorism and
security. Its post-9/11 criteria for allocating aid have shifted
discernibly as well. Disbursements have largely sought to
reward those states that have committed themselves to “fight a
common  war  against  terror”.  Just  as  during  the  Cold  War
period,  the  ODA instrument  is,  once  again,  playing  a  growing
and visible role in the security donor countries.  Aid
disbursement decisions are increasingly weighted in terms of
security and foreign policy rather than on developmental and
humanitarian  goals.  Not  surprisingly,  the  most  important  aid
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allocation criteria is virtually no longer the level and scope of
need, but rather the recipient strategic importance of states in
the war on terror.
Toward an emancipatory development cooperation
regime
As the discussion in this Chapter has demonstrated, in the
contemporary global political economy, global power and
wealth structures are skewed and heavily biased against poor
countries. The post-World War II governance institutions reflect
the  power  relations  and  modes  of  thinking  from  the  time  of
their establishment to the present. They dominate international
agenda, ideology and processes which have a direct bearing on
present and future development trends in economic and
political  affairs.  What  is  required  for  Africa  is  to  strategize  on
how  to  maximize  both  the  voice  and  power  of  the  South  in
general, and Africa in particular, in the global political
economy.
The express purpose of the proposed dialogue is to evolve
new thinking about global ethics that recognizes a ‘duty of care’
beyond borders, as well as within them, and a global new deal
between rich and poor states. The notion of social democracy
beyond borders seeks to strengthen solidarity between those
social forces in different regions of the world that are contesting
globalization  and  are  seeking  a  more  just  and  humane  world
order. African people and countries as a collective, together
with  other  countries  in  the  South,  should  actively  work  with
progressive forces in the West in order to place their
development agenda at the center stage in international
economic and political negotiations. For this to happen, the
struggle should be directed at the democratization of
international relations, institutions and processes, so that the
South  can  play  an  active  role  in  all  major  decision-making
institutions.12
12 For more insights see Falk 1995 and Rugumamu 2005.
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It was noted that the rules and regulations that make up
the world trading system are biased against the very economies
and societies that most need a fair system for development. In
redressing this historical imbalance, a new development
cooperation strategy driven by a duty of care beyond borders
should seek to design and implement a comprehensive aid,
trade, investment, debt, technology and power partnerships
that underwrites a genuine sustainable development. Economic
growth  and  export  promotion  in  Africa  would  be  chiefly
dependent on factors beyond the continent’s control. The terms
of trade of non-fuel commodities vis-à-vis manufactures have
continued to fall and many African economies have suffered
tremendous losses.
These losses have adversely affected the sustainable
development prospects of such countries due to the fact that
they contribute to the debt problem and to persistent poverty in
many  communities.  A  deliberate  reform  effort  in  the  South’s
terms of trade vis-à-vis the West through some institutional
mechanisms would be required in order to stem or even better,
reverse the current South-to-West flow of economic resources.
Seriously affected countries would require compensatory and
contingency financing without IMF-related conditions or
currently  compromised  ODA  flows.  The  World  Bank
recommendation of considering the provision of such a global
public good, as global commodity price insurance instruments
to address the key price volatility problems of developing
countries should be aggressively pursued by all genuine
development cooperation platforms. Such a multilateral
instrument would also help to create conditions for a more
equitable trading system, reduce resource wastage and
unsustainable consumption patterns, and expand financial
resources in Africa for a smooth transition to sustainable
development (World Bank 2000).
Irrespective of whether or not Africa's external debt
should  be  repaid,  such  payments  cannot  and  will  not  be  met
given the structural, political and economic constraints that
the continent currently faces. If, indeed, economic growth and
poverty reduction are at the heart of the emerging development
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co-operation crusade, then the very conditions that give rise to
stagnation and structural rigidity should be tackled head on. In
these circumstances, debts should be paid only as a result of
economic growth, not through reduced consumption and
austerity as in the current practice. Moreover, realistic debt
relief imposed by IFIs and bankrolled by donors must not be
conditional upon controversial structural adjustment measures
that  in  many  cases  have  only  made  the  poor  poorer.  For
countries of such limited revenue bases and such intense levels
of  deprivation,  debt  payment  from  Africa  to  rich  countries
usually carries high opportunity costs. Such costs are reflected
in the notorious imbalances between the ever-growing spending
on debt repayment and the declining public spending on health
and  education  in  many  of  the  HIPCs.  It  is  also  salutary  to  be
reminded that such unpropitious socio-economic realities as
well as the exigencies of social justice and morality provide
compelling arguments against debt repayment.
Together with debt cancellation, African governments,
civil society and the private sector will have to work closely with
their enlightened development partners in the West in order to
achieve economic growth, poverty reduction, and institutional
development. The 1995 Copenhagen World Summit for Social
Development report, and later, the 1996 OECD/DAC report,
Reshaping the 21st Century, committed themselves to various
noble development ideals. These included, among others, debt
relief and poverty reduction. Both reports recognize the fact
that, while the primary responsibility for establishing and
implementing strategies for meeting social development targets
lay with the national governments, an enabling environment for
social development needed to be created by the international
community. Adequate support, including resources and other
forms of assistance, has to be provided by the international
community. Surprisingly, rich countries have not taken their
commitments seriously; nor have they honored such
commitments. In his blunt advice to the donor community
Juhani Koponen (2003: 214) notes that “if donors are serious
in their quest for poverty reduction, they should also
investigate how poverty was overcome in their own countries
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and compare such experiences against present-day policy
advice  emanating  from  Washington.”   That  will  provide  an
objective starting point for the emancipatory development
cooperation.
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State agency and the structure of foreign aid
in Nepal
Sudhindra Sharma1
Agency and structure
An important debate in the social sciences centers on the
relationship between agency and structure. The debate focuses
on the problem of how structures determine what individuals
do, how structures are created, and what are the limits of
structure on individual's capacities to act independently of the
constraints it poses. The debate revolves around the kind of
limits structure poses on human agency (Abercrombie et al
1994) Structure generally refers to constraints posed on
agency,  which  in  turn  refers  to  the  capacity  for  autonomous
social action (Calhoun 2002).
Various scholars have argued that agency and structure
should be seen as inextricably linked, with neither altogether
ascendant over the other. Gidden's structuration theory (1984),
for example, is one such approach. It attempts to step back
from the long debate within the social sciences over the relative
priority accorded to social structure and individual agency.
1  The author is grateful to Laxman Acharya and Binod Bhattarai.
Exchange of notes and conversation with them over the years has
helped in making issues clearer.
STATE AGENCY AND AID IN NEPAL / 59
Rather than chose sides, Giddens argues that structures are
neither independent of actors nor determining their behavior.
Rather they are a set rules and competencies on which actors
draw and which, in the aggregate, they tend to reproduce over
time. In other words social structures are not simply "facts"
that constrain human action; they exist only in so far as they
are recognized by agents.
In common usage agency places the individual at the
center of analysis. However, collectivities may also be said to
possess greater or lesser capacity to exercise agency or
autonomous action. Whether it is individuals or collectivities,
agency suggests not merely the ability to act, but to act in ways
that demand the recognition and/or response by others
(Calhoun  2002).   The  agency  and  structure  framework  is,  I
believe, useful in trying to understand the relationship between
foreign aid and the Nepali state. If the Nepali state can be seen
to possess agency, Nepali state's dependence on foreign aid
becomes an important structural constraint on the state. In the
relationship between the Nepali state and foreign aid, I
subscribe to the first position with regard to the debate on the
relationship between agency and structure: Nepali state's
dependence on foreign aid severely constrains its capacity to
act.
Agency in the context of the state refers to its will and
power to act. It presumes will and political capacity; it refers to
the primacy of politics. Agency underscores the proclivity of the
Nepali political actors to determine the outcome by themselves.
Structure in the context of foreign aid refers to constraints by
way of international expectations and finances that set limit
upon  the  Nepali  state's  capacity  to  act.  In  so  far  as  Nepal
receives a high proportion of funds required to run the country
in the form of foreign aid, this becomes a constraint on its will
to act. The Nepali state, because of its dependence on the
donor community, has to take donor preferences and
expectations into cognizance and cannot act entirely on its
own. In so far as these are forces beyond its control, foreign
aid, sets out structures which limit the space for the maneuver
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by the Nepali state. It constitutes the glass ceiling, so to speak,
beyond which the Nepali state cannot go.
Foreign aid is not the only structural constraint faced by
the Nepali state. Historically, since its emergence in the late
eighteenth century, the Nepali state had had to contend with
the constraints posed by whosoever happens to be the
hegemonic power in the south and in the north: in India and in
China. For a long period in its history the Nepali state has had
to reckon with this structural constraint posed by geo-politics.
With  the  beginning  of  the  era  of  aid  from 1949,  and  with  the
Nepali state's overwhelming dependence on aid to finance its
development expense since the 1950s, this has emerged as yet
another structural constraint.
The  paper  explores  how  foreign  aid  has  limited  the
capacity of the state in Nepal's recent history. If foreign aid has
indeed restricted the agency of the Nepali state, how it has
done  so?  In  this  particular  paper,  the  period  from  the
emergence of the Maoist conflict onwards viz. 1996 up to
present times is discussed. Through this examination the
specific  ways  in  which  aid  has  infringed  upon  the  capacity  of
the state to act are analyzed and some tentative conclusions
are formulated towards the end.
The Maoist insurgency and foreign aid
The  Communist  Party  of  Nepal  (Maoist),  ‘Maoists’  for  short,
launched  their  ‘people’s  war’  in  1996.  During  the  first  few
years, the insurgency was limited to districts in the mid-
western region and its effects were localized. His Majesty's
Government, as the Nepali Government was then known, did
not take the insurgency seriously and dealt with it as though it
was  a  local  law-and-order  problem.  However,  following  the
massacre  of  the  royal  family  in  June  2001 and a series of
successive unstable governments since, the Maoists’
insurgency took the shape of a full-blown conflict. The conflict
between the Maoists and the Nepali state was exacerbated due
to  a  growing  rift  between  the  monarch  and  parliamentary
political parties.
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With the escalation of the insurgency by the late 1990s,
the donors began to pay attention to identifying the root causes
of the conflict. Nepal's donors saw social exclusion, inequality
and  lack  of  good  governance  as  the  main  problems  of  the
country, simultaneously accounting for both the emergence of
the Maoist insurgency and continuing poverty. As the Maoist
conflict escalated some donors also toyed with the idea of
withdrawing  from  the  country  but  eventually  all  donors
continued their engagement, though some downsized their
programs.
Most of Nepal's donors understood the Maoist insurgency
as being based on certain historical conditions. They have
generally considered the failure of past development efforts in
providing development benefits to all the people, along with the
existing poor socio-economic conditions of the people as having
fueled the insurgency. The growing frustration of the people
over the failure of successive governments to meet their rising
expectations after the restoration of democracy in 1990 is
considered to be another important factor. According to donors,
the situation was further aggravated by rampant corruption,
along  with  lack  of  good  governance  during  the  1990s.  The
conflict was to bring significant changes to the aid strategies of
the donors, at least on paper. The country assistance
plans/strategies of all donors, especially those formulated after
2000, include the issue of conflict and attempts to respond to it
through development strategies.
The government’s reading of the situation, to a certain
extent, converged with that of the donors. This was a period
when the government was instituting a Poverty Reduction
Strategy Program (PRSP), and some of the donors’ concerns,
especially those dealing with the alleged root causes of the
conflict made their way to it. The PRSP was broadened to make
it  into  the  country's  Tenth  Five-Year  Plan  (2002–07).  The
PRSP/Tenth plan was centered on four approaches: (1) broad-
based and sustainable economic growth; (2) social sector
development; (3) social inclusion; and (4) good governance.
Among its other strategies the government also introduced the
Medium  Term  Expenditure  Framework  (MTEF).  At  the  same
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time, Nepal's priorities were influenced by the global paradigm
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
While the Nepali state largely concurred with the donor
reading of the insurgency, the military option was not forsaken.
As the insurgency escalated the state allocated more and more
funds for security-related personnel and expenses. Thus one of
the consequences of the Maoist insurgency on the state's
finances, especially as the insurgency turned into a full conflict
from  2000  onwards,  was  the  proclivity  of  the  Nepali  state  to
siphon resources from much-needed development activities and
reallocate them to security areas.
This can be can be detected from the anomaly between
regular and development expenditure.  (It is from the regular
budget that the state procures arms, while the donors allocated
funds through the development budget). An examination of the
government's income and expenditure from FY 1990/91 to FY
2003/04  provides  insights  into  how  the  state  was  trying  to
divert its investments in development activities into areas such
as defense.
Between 1990/91 and 1995/96 there was a steady
increase in social and economic expenditure and marginal
increase in security expenditure.  Even after the launch of the
Maoist People's War in 1996, social and economic sector
spending increased. However from FY 2000/01 to 2003/04
there was a decline in economic sector expenditure while
security spending has increased.
As the insurgency escalated the government began
spending more on security, while internal revenue did not
increase. Likewise, the government’s expenditure on
development sharply decreased. By 2000/01, the government
was allocating less (in both absolute and relative terms) to
development and more (again in both absolute and relative
terms)  to  the  regular  budget,  which  then  could  be  used  for
security-related expenses.
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Table: Nepali government spending 1999-2003 (Rs. millions)
Source: Economic Survey 2003/04 & 2004/05, HMGN/MoF. 2
Donors sought to understand the conflict as a result of existing
poverty, inequality and the failure of past governments to
address the socio-economic conditions of the people. This
reading underplayed the Maoists’ agency and the ability of the
Maoist leadership to mobilize people on the basis of ideology.
As the insurgency escalated, donors adopted specific
approaches to maintain operating in conflict affected areas in
Nepal such as increasing transparency and using staff from the
regions involved. Donors acknowledged that the conflict
affected the effectiveness of development cooperation and some
were even in the process of realigning future assistance
strategies with the evolving political and socio economic
changes in Nepal. The interaction between conflict and
development and how aid would achieve desired outputs in the
2  Data courtesy of Laxman Acharya.
Particulars 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03
Total Expenditure 66,273 79,835 80,072 94, 006
Annual change (%) 20.5 0.3 4.9
Regular 34,523 42,769 48,590 54,973
Annual change 23.9 13.6 13.1
Development 31,749 37,066 31,482 29,033
Annual change 16.7 -15.1 -7.8
Royal Palace 88 93 116 388
Annual change 5.8 25.1 233.8
Total Security 6,750 9,009 11,987 13,619
Annual change 33.5 33.1 13.6
Defense (Military) 3,482 3,813 5,860 7,382
Annual change 9.5 57.3 26.0
Police 3,268 5,195 6,128 6,237
Annual change 59.0 17.9 1.8
Total foreign aid
(budgetary)
17,528 18,757 14,385 15,885
Annual change 7.0 -23.3 10.4
Grant 5,721 6,753 6,686 11,339
Annual change 18.2 -1.0 69.6
Loan 11,812 12,004 7,699 4,546
Annual change 1.6 -35.9 -41.0
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face of continued political instability and conflict were being
examined. For donors to work effectively in the conflict
situation,  the  acceptability  of  their  programs  by  both  the
government and the Maoists was increasingly emerging as a
concern.
Due to the insurgency, strategic shifts were discernable
among donor agencies. They admitted to ‘operating in grey
areas between relief and development’ activities. Along with
community-based approaches, donors adopted humanitarian
principals. An example could be the Risk Management Office
(RMO)  jointly  established  in  2002  by  DFID and  GTZ to  ensure
that programs can be continued safely and effectively without
exacerbating the conflict.  RMO developed a 'Safe and Effective
Development in Conflict' approach which is based on concepts
such as 'Risk Management' and 'Do No Harm'. These concepts
are generally associated with humanitarian work but have been
applied to the development context. A group of donors have
also adopted the ‘Basic Operating Guidelines’ (BOG)3 while
working on development and humanitarian assistance.
As the Maoist conflict escalated Nepal's donors did not
question the right of the state to use force to quell the conflict.
If at all concerns were raised, these related to the issue of aid
fungibility: donor support to development work should not be a
pretext for the government to allocate less to development and
more  to  security.  This  was  a  time  when  the  heads  of
government were leaders of the political parties in the erstwhile
House of Representatives. With the monarch assuming
executive authority and forming a government under his
chairmanship much of this was to change.
3  Basic Operating Guidelines (BOG) is a code of conduct adopted by
international agencies in Nepal to carry out programs and to set
standards for their programs and staff at the field level. BOG prohibits
using development and humanitarian assistance for political, military
or secular purpose, refuses to make forced contribution in cash or
kind for activities other that development and humanitarian areas and
asserts withdrawing from areas where staff and project safety are
threatened.
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To remain or exit: Aid under the King’s rule
In May 2002 the elected Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba,
dissolved the House of Representatives, intending to hold a
mid-term election within the next six months. In doing this he
was exercising his constitutional prerogative as Prime Minister.
By October 2002, when he failed to hold general elections as
required by the constitution, a constitutional crisis emerged.
The framers of the 1990 Constitution had not foreseen
such an eventuality and there were no directions in the statute
to guide the state in such circumstances. A constitutional crisis
arose in that the major legitimate political players – political
parties in the dissolved House of Representatives and the
monarch – viewed the situation and the possible solution to the
stalemate differently. The political parties asked for a
reinstatement of the dissolved house, while the monarch
pushed for new elections.
The monarch viewed his role as the custodian of the
Constitution and subsequently dismissed Prime Minister
Deuba for not holding elections as promised.4 He  then
appointed successive caretaker governments. These, however,
failed to hold national elections because of the continuing
armed  insurrection  that  had  engulfed  a  large  part  of  the
countryside.5 Finally,  on  1  February  2005  King  Gyanendra
dismissed Prime Minister Deuba – who this time around had
been nominated by himself – and declared a state of
emergency. The king took executive powers and formed a
cabinet under his own chairmanship.
4  The fact that he was the supreme commander-in-chief of the Royal
Nepal  Army and that  the  army would  remain  faithful  to  his  political
moves must have been taken into consideration by the monarch when
he decided to make this move.
5  Gyanendra became king in abnormal circumstances. In June 2001 a
‘Royal Massacre’ took place in the palace in Kathmandu. According to
an official investigation, a drunken Crown Prince Dipendra killed his
parents, King Birendra, the queen, and seven other royals before
killing himself. Subsequently, the King’s younger brother, Gyanendra
was crowned King.
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The King's step on 1 February 2005 appeared dramatic
but was in fact a culmination of a long series of events taking
place on the political scene in Kathmandu progressively
overshadowed and curtailed by the Maoist insurrection that
has been spreading in the country-side for nine years.
Even as the state got embroiled in constitutional crisis
after October 2002, a political crisis had been unfolding in the
country for some time. The Maoists who waged war against the
state of Nepal from 1996 onwards adopted violence for
achieving their objectives.  This political party, which was
largely a guerilla force, acquired indirect control over large
tracts of the country, and posed a serious challenge to the
state's monopoly over the instruments of coercion. Though the
governments dubbed this political actor as 'terrorist' and the
state adopted largely a military solution to what it viewed as
the  'Maoist  problem',  years  of  military  action  was  not  able  to
suppress of this force. The fact that this 'unconstitutional'
political actor seriously challenged the sovereignty of the state
by virtue of its indirect control over a large part of the territory
fueled political crisis.
By the end of 2002, with the new constitutional dilemma
compounding the already existing political crisis, Nepal began
to  be  seen  by  many  in  the  international  community  as
becoming a ‘fragile state’, generating instability and trouble not
only  for  itself  but  for  its  surroundings.  By  2003,  development
efforts were suffering due to the escalating conflict between the
state security forces and the Maoists. As early as 2001 the
Nepali government had sought to take ‘development’ to core
Maoist areas. Accordingly, it had increased spending on the
development budget considerably. However, by 2003 nearly
half of the development projects in the country were coming to
a halt. The multilateral agencies and some bilateral donors
encouraged the government to involve the Maoists in
development. Print media carried reports telling how Maoists
had  asked  donors  to  sign-up  with  them,  extorted  money  from
them and threatened their staff.
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By the  end  of  2004  some donors  began  pulling  out  from
parts of Nepal most severely affected by the rebellion. The U.S.
Peace Corps Volunteers packed up and left Nepal after nearly
42 years of service. The German Technical Grant (GTZ)
terminated its green road project in Gorkha, Danida suspended
a rural electrification project in Kailali and Kanchanpur
districts and SDC (Swiss) also suspended some field-level
projects (Khadka 2005).
The nature of the development partnerships so patiently
built up during the preceding years between the Nepali
government, other Nepali partners, and donor representatives
were put under severe strain during the spectacular political
developments in Nepal that unfolded after October 2002 and
came  to  a  head  in  February  2005.  Just  as  there  was  a  rift
among the legitimate political actors in Nepal from October
2002 onwards so, too, was there a difference of opinion among
Nepal's donors as to the course of action they should pursue in
the rapidly changing terrain. The rift among Nepal's donors
could be seen, for instance, during the Nepal Development
Forum (NDF) meeting in May 2004.
The donors were divided into competing camps; at least
two major camps can be discerned. The multilateral agencies
and the Americans were in one camp, and the remaining
bilaterals in another. To start with, there was concern among
the donors whether or not the NDF meeting could be held
according to schedule because of the ongoing agitation and
violence. The multilaterals like the Asian Development Bank
(ADB)  and  the  World  Bank  (WB)  favoured  the  government's
meeting schedule whereas the bilateral donors preferred a
consensus between the palace and the political parties before
the meeting. A pre-consultation of the eleven donors was held
at the Norwegian embassy. These donors included Britain,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland (Khadka 2004). On the
eve of the NDF meeting these bilaterals had asked the political
parties  and  the  king  to  come  up  with  a  suitable  prime
ministerial candidate. In spite of the dissention and political
turmoil, the NDF meeting concluded with some consensus on
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the  part  of  the  donors  to  continue  aiding  Nepal.  Some
disagreements arose concerning how the aid was to be
disbursed. But most of the bilateral donors actually increased
their aid commitment. The donors pledged to provide $560
million a year as assistance under the new poverty reduction
strategy that had been endorsed in 2003.
On 1 February 2005 King Gyanendra sacked Prime
Minister Deuba for the second time and assumed executive
powers. This complicated the situation further and forced the
donors  to  rethink  their  position  in  Nepal  and  in  its  various
internal conflicts. This was particularly so when the king’s
royal proclamation criticized political parties for misusing their
parliamentary privilege and most of the political elite including
former Prime Ministers were put under house arrest.
The king's dramatic move heightened donor concern and
dissatisfaction over unfolding political events in Nepal. Donors
faced the ultimate question in developmental partnerships at
the country level: If the partnership is ideally between ‘peoples’,
who  is  entitled  to  claim  to  represent  the  people  and  forge
partnerships  in  their  name?  Each  of  the  donors  had  originally
entered  into  a  partnership  with  the  Nepali  government  of  the
day, but what was to be done when the nature and legitimacy
of the government itself was being called into question? One
option would have been to exit. If partnership is a relationship
that is entered into freely, the partners, in principle, must also
be free to withdraw. On the whole, donors decided to stay put
in  Nepal,  however,  and  tried  to  influence  the  events  the  way
they saw fit (Sharma et al. forthcoming). The main predicament
of most of the donors was to achieve a rapprochement among
the ‘constitutional forces’, i.e., the monarchy and the political
parties.
The line taken by many of Nepal's donors after the critical
juncture  of  1  February  2005  was  to  continue  programmes  for
which  agreements  had  already  been  made,  but  to  refrain  from
signing new agreements. There were, however, some
exceptions. The ADB signed a $19 million loan the day after the
royal proclamation. The government of Japan, although
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expressing its concern about detentions of politicians, agreed to
extend grant assistance of over ¥1.2 billion (US$ 17 million) to
Nepal  for  two  projects  in  the  latter  part  of  Japan’s  fiscal  year
2004, which ended in April 2005, because the funds had
already been allocated. Though the World Bank also
‘postponed’ its US$70 million anti-poverty budgetary support, it
is said that this step had already been decided before the royal
coup because of the previous government’s failure to meet
reform targets.
Different bilateral donors responded differently to the
royal moves. India suspended its arms deliveries to the Nepali
army but later on resumed non-lethal military aid. China said
that the whole thing is Nepal’s internal matter. Subsequent to
the  event  China  began  to  aid  Nepal  in  a  variety  of  ways,
including through direct budgetary support. Nepal’s main
European  donors  said  that  the  King’s  political  move  would
make it more difficult to resolve the insurgency.
The  EU as  a  whole  took  the  line  that  on-going  activities
would  be  continued  but  new  ones  will  be  put  in  hold.  It
reduced official contacts with the Nepali administration to the
level of middle officials. Among the donors taking most vocal
critical stands have been the non-EU Swiss and Norwegians,
and  among  the  EU members,  the  Danes.  Danida  became the
first aid agency to announce a suspension of aid to the Nepali
government. Though it terminated its aid to rural development
projects it said that it would continue to help civil society. The
Finns decided to follow the EU mainstream line continuing with
existing activities but refraining from new commitments for the
time being.
When Denmark expressed disappointment at the lack of
Nepali commitment to democracy, some Nepali stakeholders
felt that Denmark had reneged on its commitment to Nepal.
This illustrates a difference in understandings of the aid
partnership concept. Whereas the Danish government
understood the partnership to depend on democracy as a
precondition, Nepali stakeholders expected a different
commitment. Some Nepali officials and newspapers accused
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critical  donors  of  double  standards  and  argued  that  a
suspension of civil liberties and other emergency measures had
been taken by other governments to fight terrorism, and hence
Nepal alone should not be punished for taking such measures.
The Nepali government reacted angrily to what it perceived as
donor unilateralism. The seven-party alliance, on the other
hand, generally welcomed the donors’ concerns.
After the king's move on 1 February 2005, the country
witnessed a re-alignment of political forces with the seven-party
alliance and the Maoists moving closer to one another. Whether
it was the question of a constituent assembly or the question of
monarchy, the stance taken by political parties had over the
months increasingly gravitated towards the Maoist agenda. And
this was in spite of the intentions of the donors who wished to
see a rapprochement among the constitutional forces, i.e., the
king and the political parties.
Nepali Congress, a political party that had professed
constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy decided to
remove  any  mention  of  constitutional  monarchy  from  its
statute during the party convention held in September 2005.
The United Marxist-Leninist party (UML) has been more
equivocal in deciding to adopt democratic republicanism
through elections to a constituent assembly.
The leaders of the seven-party alliance and the Maoists
then began secret negotiations in India. An understanding was
finally reached between the two in November 2005 in New
Delhi. In a joint statement released as an 'understanding'
between the seven-party political alliance and the Maoists, both
sets of actors agreed to establish peace by resolving the 10-year
old armed conflict through a forward-looking political outlet,
stating that the long struggle between absolute monarchy and
democracy in Nepal had reached a very grave and decisive turn
in Nepali history (Kathmandu Post 2005).
The  course  of  action  proposed  by  the  monarch  for
overcoming the constitutional crisis as has been previously
discussed, was holding local elections for municipality followed
by  election  for  the  lower  house  of  parliament  and  then
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eventually handing over executive authority to this parliament.
And the monarch seemed to be pursuing this line of action
seriously. The date for municipal elections was announced for
8 February 2006. This was viewed as a prelude to the national
election.  With the municipal elections just around the corner,
the Maoists, in spite of commitments made in the
memorandum of understanding and in order to deter people
from participating in the municipal elections, went on a blitz
attacking the state security forces and candidates for municipal
elections. The Maoists tactics of rejecting election and the seven
political  parties  boycotting  the  polls  paid  off  when  the  turnout
to the municipal election was 22 percent – lower than had been
anticipated. This generated questions on the legitimacy of the
exercise.
In accordance with the 12-point understanding, the
seven-party alliance (SPA) announced their protest programs
against autocratic monarchy and for establishing total
democracy.6 The nationwide protests were to take place from
April 6-9, 2006 with the Maoists extending their moral support.
The major political parties in the erstwhile House of
Representatives had protested against the royal move and had
organized agitations and demonstrations in Kathmandu
immediately after the king had assumed executive authority;
these  were  not  able  to  gather  big  crowds.  The  April
demonstrations, in contrast, were much better organized and
mass-based. Besides the sister organizations affiliated to
political parties – such as trade unions, journalists, lawyers,
teachers, NGOs, the business community and other
professional bodies – there was spontaneous participation of
ordinary people across the country. The SPA, who were strong
in  urban  areas  and  the  Maoists  who  controlled  a  large  part  of
the hinterland synchronized their efforts as a consequence of
which the masses were galvanized to participate in
demonstration throughout the various cities and towns across
the country.
6  What this meant in terms of actual politics was deliberately left
undefined.
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What began as a four-day strike stretched to sixteen days
of relentless confrontation between the masses and the state,
with the state repeatedly resorting to the imposition of a
curfew.  On the  night  of  April  21,  2006  King  Gyanendra  called
upon  the  SPA  to  form  a  new  government  to  be  headed  by  a
prime minister recommended by SPA. In spite of the
declaration of the monarch at the eleventh hour, the mass
agitation did not subside nor did the leaders of the SPA accept
the king's offer.
Donor  differences  surfaced  also  in  the  final  stages  of  the
political confrontation between the monarch and the SPA-
Maoist alliance. When the King tried to solve the crisis by
asking  the  SPA to  form a  new government,  most  of  the  donor
community  –  India,  China,  the  US,  the  UK and  EU –  quickly
welcomed the declaration.
The  king's  step  was  to  take  Denmark,  a  donor  that  had
been very vocal against the king, by surprise. Denmark was
among those who had quickly welcomed the declaration and
seemed surprised that the demonstrations by the masses
against the monarch continued. On the other hand, donors
such  as  Japan  and  Norway,  which  had  much  longer  aid
relationships with Nepal as a country and not simply as a
democratic state, waited and did not respond right away. These
donors such as Japan, Switzerland and Norway, remained
silent either due to caution or because they sensed the public's
unwillingness to acquiesce to the King's demands.
During the next few days, mass demonstrations
intensified in magnitude. Finally on the night of April 24, 2006,
King Gyanendra succumbed to public pressure. He
acknowledged the people's sentiments in the mass
demonstrations, affirmed peoples commitment to total
democracy and declared the revival of the House of
Representatives.7
7  The King's restoration of parliament did not invoke any constitu-tional
clause but was implicitly legitimated by political necessity.
STATE AGENCY AND AID IN NEPAL / 73
The massive demonstrations in Kathmandu and other
parts of the kingdom between April 6 and April 25, 2006 had
been aimed against 'autocratic monarchy' and for establishing
'total democracy'. However, what this meant in terms of actual
politics was deliberately left undefined. Once the movement
was successful, both the SPA and the Maoists were to claim
credit for mobilizing the masses and to espouse the course of
action that should be pursued by the new regime.
The outcome of the people's movement of 2006 was not
something the donors had wished or anticipated. While they
had called for a rapprochement between the king and the
political parties, the turn of events brought the Maoists, an 'un-
constitutional' political actor and a force that had initiated a
rebellion against the Nepali state, into the center-stage. The
turn of events led to a rapprochement between the seven-party
alliance and the Maoists and marginalized the monarch.
Political events since April 2006
Direct rule by the king, which commenced on 1 February 2005
ended in April 2006 when, under relentless pressure from the
masses, the monarch reinstated the House of Representatives
that had been dissolved some two-and-a-half years earlier by
the then Prime Minister. The forces that came to the centre-
stage in Nepali politics subsequent to the peoples' movement –
the seven-party alliance (SPA) and the Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoists) – had reached a consensus on the ways and
means for overcoming the constitutional and political crises
facing the country. This consensus revolved around an elected
constituent assembly drafting and then ratifying a new
constitution. The SPA and CPNM envisaged such a new
constitution formulated through such as measure then
becoming the new governing framework for the country.
Holding elections for the constituent assembly then became a
necessary condition for resolving the twin crises facing the
country.
Political events after the peoples' movement of April 2006
moved rapidly. The SPA nominated Girija Prasad Koirala as the
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Prime  Minister  in  April  26,  2006.  Late  in  the  evening  of  the
same day, the Maoists issued a statement declaring a three-
month unilateral ceasefire. This was reciprocated by the
Koirala-led SPA government. The first session of the dissolved
House  of  Representatives  was  held  in  April  28,  2006  in  which
the SPA leaders presented a proposal for formulating a new
constitution on the basis of constituent assembly. In April 30,
2006, the second session of the House of Representatives
unanimously approved the proposal for constituent assembly.
The SPA formed a seven-member cabinet of ministers on May
2, 2006.
On May 3, 2006, the government removed the ‘Red
Corner’ notice and terrorist tag on the Maoists, declared an
indefinite ceasefire and invited the Maoists for peace talks at
the earliest. The government also decided to dissolve the local
municipality bodies constituted after the municipal elections
held in February 2006. On May 4, 2006, the Maoist chairman
Prachanda issued a press statement accepting the offer made
by  the  government  to  hold  peace  talks.  Likewise,  on  May  5,
2006, the government formed a five-member commission under
the chairmanship of Krishna Jung Rayamajhi to investigate
into atrocities committed by the ministers, security persons
and civil servants of the royal regime against pro-democracy
demonstrators.
The declaration removing the king's executive authority
was presented at the House of Representatives on May 18,
2006. According to the declaration, the House of
Representatives would be the sole body on which the sovereign
rights of the people rest. The proclamation declared Nepal as a
secular state and renamed His Majesty's Government as
Government  of  Nepal  and  the  Royal  Nepalese  Army  as  the
Nepali Army. The Cabinet was now the entity to appoint the
army chief, this authority previously being vested in the king,
and the king no longer holding position as commander-in-chief
of the army and Security Council. The proclamation also
disposed  the  existing  Royal  Council  and  all  the  works  of  the
council that would from henceforth be performed by the House
of Representatives. The existing law on royal succession was
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also disposed. While the palace budget under the new
dispensation would be fixed by the House of Representatives,
the  king’s  property  would  also  be  taxable.  Provisions  of  the
1990 constitution giving the monarch discretionary powers in
certain cases were also nullified.8
To  pave  way  for  longstanding  Maoist  demands  for
elections to a constituent assembly, the government conducted
the  first  round  of  talks  with  the  Maoists  in  which  a  25-point
Ceasefire Code of Conduct was approved. Series of peace talks
took place between the government and the Maoists to chart
out modalities for holding elections for constituent assembly.
Likewise, the Koirala government made swift, sweeping changes
intended to accommodate long standing Maoists demands,
which give many in Nepal the optimism that perhaps things
will go right this time.
On June 16, 2006, the first round of the summit talks
between the top leaders of the ruling SPA and CPN Maoist
concluded in Kathmandu. Both sides agreed to invite the
United  Nations  to  help  and  monitor  the  management  of  arms
and armed personnel of both sides. In his first public
appearance, the Maoist chairman Prachanda said that his
party would like to see an interim constitution and interim
government within a month and elections to be held for
constituent assembly by April-May 2007. The both sides agreed
to  form  a  six-member  committee  to  draft  an  interim
constitution.
The second round of the summit talks between the SPA
and  the  Maoist  leadership  began  on  October  8,  2006.  After
some rounds of negotiation the SPA and the Maoist entered
into an agreement, which paved the way for formal entry of the
Maoists into the peaceful political mainstream. The agreement
mentioned about how to reach the consensus on monarchy,
arms management, interim constitution, interim parliament,
interim government and electoral system for constituent
assembly.
8   For  more  details  on  the  18th  May  Declaration  of  the  House  of
Representatives see Himalayan Times 2006.
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On November 21, 2006, Prime Minister G. P. Koirala and
the  Maoist  chairman  Prachanda  were  finally  able  to  sign  a
peace accord that brought the decade-long armed insurgency
to  an  end.  In  the  peace  accord,  the  SPA  and  the  Maoists
expressed their commitment to write an interim constitution,
form an interim parliament and government, and hold elections
for the constituent assembly by mid-June 2007. The accord
explicitly noted that the first session of the constituent
assembly would decide on the fate of the monarchy by a simple
majority.  It  also  expressed  that  the  United  Nations  would  be
asked  to  verify  and  monitor  arms  of  the  both  sides  and  army
management. The UN would be asked to observe the
constituent assembly elections as well.
On 28 November, 2006, the government and the Maoists
signed  the  'Agreement  on  Monitoring  of  the  Management  of
Arms  and  Armies'.  The  two  sides  also  agreed  to  form a  nine-
member Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee comprising
three members each from the government, the Maoists and the
United Nations (UN). The UN formally approved the agreement
on arms and armies management between these two sides on 8
December, 2006, when the special representative of the
Secretary-General in Nepal, Mr. Ian Martin, signed.
On 15 January, 2007, the House of Representatives
promulgated the 'Nepal Interim Constitution 2063' replacing
the Constitution of Nepal 1990 as promised by both the SPA
government and CPN (Maoist) in the November 21 peace
accord. Then the House of Representatives announced its
dissolution.  The  interim  constitution  has  a  number  of
distinctive features. For the first time in the history of Nepal, a
constitution has been written and promulgated by the people's
representatives and has sidelined the role of the monarchy.
Some legal experts have criticised the interim constitution for
concentrating too much power on the prime minister and
curtailing the independence of the judiciary and other bodies.
However, most political parties and activists see the decision to
concentrate power on the prime minister as the best approach
possible during the transition (International Crisis Group
2007). Also on 15 January, a 330-member interim legislature
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(the  term  used  in  place  of  'interim  parliament'),  including  83
representatives from the Maoists, was formed. At its first
meeting, which was held immediately after the dissolution of
the House of Representatives, the interim legislature
unanimously endorsed the Nepal Interim Constitution 2063.
The legislature will exercise law-making powers until the
constituent assembly is formed. It can amend the interim
constitution by a two-thirds vote. More importantly, its power
is not limited to transitional tasks; in fact, it can vote on long-
term legislation as well (International Crisis Group, 2007).
In the meantime, on 23 January, 2007, the UN Secretary
Council unanimously approved Resolution 1740, which
established a UN political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) with a 12-
month mandate. Its mandate includes five major tasks: (1) to
monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of the
Nepali Army (NA) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); (2) to
assist the parties through the Joint Monitoring Coordinating
Committee (JMCC) in implementing the peace agreement on
the management of the arms and armed personnel of both
sides; (3) to assist in the monitoring of the ceasefire
arrangements; (4) to provide technical support for the planning,
preparation and conduct of the election of a constituent
assembly in a free and fair atmosphere; and (5) to provide a
small team of electoral monitors to review all technical aspects
of the electoral process (International Crisis Group 2007).
The interim constitution was formulated and the
legislative parliament that included the Maoists convened on
15 January 2007, which in turn led to the formation of a new
government that included the Maoists. Yet, the government was
unable to hold the constituent assembly elections at the
stipulated  date.  The  inability  of  the  government  to  hold
elections was due to events overtaking the Tarai region. Soon
after the endorsement of the interim constitution by the interim
legislative-parliament, some Madhesi political leaders
demanded that it be amended in order to take into account the
concerns of the Madhesi people. Non-violent Madhesi groups
such  as  the  Madhesi  Janadhikar  Forum  (MJF)  and  groups
espousing violence such as Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha
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along with the Madhesi leaders of dominant political parties
subsequently called for mass action. In Eastern and Central
Tarai, the Madhesi peoples heeded to these calls as a
consequence of which there were massive political
mobilizations. The main demands of the protesting groups were
for proportional representation, the delimitation of election
constituents on the basis of population and a federal state
structure.
One of the unintended consequences of the transition and
the peace accord between the state and the former rebels has
been the decline in the presence of the state security forces.
There is a general perception that the law and order situation is
deteriorating. The media regularly report stories of theft,
robbery and extortion in urban settings, while in the
hinterlands, with the state security apparatus virtually absent,
media report how the villagers are at the mercy of criminal
elements. Stories of serious lapses in law and order reported in
the  media  generate  and  reinforce  the  impression  that  law  and
order has seriously weakened.
In  response  to  the  demands  of  the  various  agitating
groups, a bill was registered on 18 February 2007 to amend the
interim constitution with a view to incorporating the issues
raised by Madhesi and Janajati activists. The bill was
subsequently approved. This amendment paved the way for
moving towards a federal democratic structure, holding
constituent assembly elections using a mixed-proportional
system, re-delineating constituencies in acknowledgement of
the increased population in the Tarai, and representing all
marginalised communities, like Madhesis, Janajatis, Dalits and
women, at all levels and in all sectors of the state
proportionally. Likewise a new date for the constituent
assembly was set for November 2007.
Donors after April 2006: Consensus and quarrels
After the people's movement had marginalized 'autocratic'
monarchy, brought the Seven-Party Alliance to the helms of the
state and the Maoist rebels into the political mainstream,
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Nepal's 33 development partners – donor countries and
organizations –spared no words in praise of Nepal's peaceful
transition.  There  had  been  a  lot  of  commitment  on  the  part  of
the donors to assist Nepal in the difficult transition into a post-
conflict democracy. The eight-party government (meaning the
SPA-Maoist alliance) had expected peace-dividends, windfalls in
the  form  of  increased  aid  from  its  donors  but  that,  however,
was not to be. The weekly newspaper, Nepali Times, captured
the  mood  aptly:  ‘Peace  without  dividend:  Donors  talk  the  talk
but don't yet walk the walk’ (Bhattarai 2007b).
Government data suggests that there had been no
substantial changes in bilateral aid during the first eight
months after April 2006 compared to the period preceding it.
During the same period multilateral aid tripled; this was largely
due to the fact that funds were released based on old
commitments  rather  than  fresh  grants.  During  the  past  3-4
years, support from the donors – including grants and loans –
generally accounted for about 25 percent of the budget
annually. The difference between this 25 percent and the new
amount would indicate the real “peace dividend.” Surprisingly,
donor disbursements have remained at this level, which goes to
indicate that there has, in fact, not been any real peace-
dividend.
That the donors have given only lukewarm support
becomes obvious if one examines the Nepal Peace Trust Fund
(NPTF). Created by the government in January 2007 the NPTF
comes closest to a fund created specifically for Nepal to access
the peace and development dividend. Intended to mobilize
funds to strengthen peace and restart development it seeks to
support the rehabilitation of displaced people and Maoist
fighters, rebuild infrastructure destroyed by rebels, hold
constituent assembly elections and support law and order.
However  as  of  late  August,  NPTF  was  able  to  attract  a  meager
US$14  million  into  the  basket.  Of  the  20  bilateral  countries
that deal in Nepal, only five – Britain ($4.8 million), Finland ($4
million), Denmark ($3.6 million), Norway ($2 million) and
Switzerland ($1.5 million) had made contributions to the NPTF.
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Even this money has already been allocated to the Election
Commission.
Among Nepal's various donors, the largest peace-dividend
had  come from India  –  a  country  that  is  not  a  member  of  the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). That India has made the largest contribution over the
past year and a half can be ascribed to its role in the transition
of April 2006 and its immediate interest in seeing to it that its
neighborhood is stable.9 India's initial economic package
announced in June 2006 was $25 million. Besides this it
provided $100 million in soft-credit, and pledged to increase
annual outlays from $1.6 million to $37 million. India also
wrote  off  military  hardware  loans  that  it  had  been  giving  over
the past several years (Bhattarai 2007a).
India,  however,  has  not  put  any  money  in  the  NPTF.
Although Indian aid had increased over the past several years
and  particularly  so  during  the  last  one  and  a  half  years,  its
spending as a donor has not been institutionalized and much
continues to depend on the discretion of the embassy
diplomats.  Neither  has  the  United  States  put  funds  into  the
peace-basket. Despite the fact that the US is one of Nepal's
major donors and spends annually around $50 million, much
of the fund is channeled through intermediary US firms. Since
the modality does not involve the funds flowing through the
Nepali government coffers, it is difficult to ascertain how much
has come in and how much has flowed out as high salaries for
its advisers. China and Japan, other important donors, have
agreed  to  support  in  kind.  Japan  has  gifted  the  Election
Commission various election-related items valued at $1.2
million while China as promised in-kind support valued at $1.3
million (Bhattarai 2007a).
Some in Nepal see the donors as fractured and as
cantankerous as Nepal's political parties. As a magazine put it:
‘What donors will never admit is that they are as fractured and
9  After all, the 12-point agreement between the Seven-Party Alliance and
the  Maoists  had been done  in  New Delhi  at  the  behest  of  the  Indian
government.
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cantankerous as are the political parties, and therefore unable
to agree on a common approach to aiding the Nepali process’
(Bhattarai 2007a).
The National Planning Commission earlier in the year had
prepared a three-year planning document on reconstruction
and development aimed at economic recovery from the conflict.
It had proposed a budget of $2.5 billion. Only a small
proportion of this has actually been committed by the donors.
Likewise the Finance Ministry had made a request at a
conference in London in March 2007 asking for aid including
loans  to  the  tune  of  $721  for  the  current  fiscal  year.  Though
the  British  aid  agency  DFID raised  its  commitment  from $60
million in 2005/06 to $79 million in 2006/07 and to about $95
million  in  2007/08,  others  have  not.  In  contrast  to  what  the
donors allege as the inadequate preparations by the
government, Nepal's donors had proposed a 'Peace and
Development Framework (PDF)'. This framework, among
others, recognizes that peace and development are not
exclusive and that basic services must reach the villages to
enhance peace. Donors allege that the Nepali government,
involved as it is in putting out sporadic bush-fires, has not
taken this up with the required seriousness that it deserves
(Bhattarai 2007b).
The Nepali government is displeased with the donors for
not  putting  their  money  where  their  mouth  is.   Others  who
have  watched  the  donors  over  a  period  of  time  concur  that  by
and large Western donors tend to denigrate the Nepali political
process, and do not give enough credit to the political parties.
However, on the part of donors, there could be several reasons
why they are not putting in more than what they already have,
into the peace-basket at this particular historical juncture.
First is the question of what would be the right kind of aid
modality  in  a  post-conflict  transit  context.  Donors  are
apprehensive that the issue of 'fungibility' of aid may be very
real in a basket-funding arrangement, especially in a post-
conflict transit context. In a basket-funding arrangement the
government of the day, and particularly, the concerned
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ministry, has unhindered access to funds, while other partners
in  the  coalition  may  not  do  so.  It  could  also  provide  a  pretext
for the government to reallocate its resources away from the
much needed priorities to other sectors. Likewise, there could
be a possibility of the funds provided through donor assistance
not getting to the local levels where the funds are needed the
most.
Though the basket-fund approach is generally preferred
by recipient governments, in the post-conflict situation that
Nepal is transiting today, it may not be the best of approaches.
A more conventional aid modality – such as the project-
modality – may hold better prospects for the utilization of such
aid. Among others, these provide less possibility for the funds
to be siphoned off for various unstated purposes. Likewise it
could lead to greater control over expenditure by the donors
and focus on delivering tangible outputs rather than spending
the  funds,  which  may  be  a  real  danger  in  the  situation  that
Nepal finds itself today.
A  second  reason  why  donors  are  not  allocating  funds
through the government apparatus could be because of the
absence of local all-party peace councils at the district and
village levels. In a context where there are no locally elected
government bodies, how to channel funds locally could be
tricky. A compromise solution is the local all-party peace
councils, which could be a viable means of taking funds to the
people. The inability of the government to institute this may be
another reason why the donors are hesitant to directly support
the government.
A third issue is the apprehension towards the Maoists, an
important  party  in  the  coalition.  The  Maoists,  in  spite  of  their
rhetoric have not demonstrated their commitment to
democratic values and norms. This becomes evident through
the behavior of their various sister organizations such as the
Young  Communist  League  (YCL),  which  are  continuing  with
their threats and extortions. Likewise, the Maoists still have not
returned the houses and properties of the people forcibly
occupied during the conflict.
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Donor's apprehension towards the Maoists was
substantiated by Maoist ministers. Ministries headed by the
Maoists have tried to revoke decisions of previous governments
leading to complications in the executions of projects. The
Asian Development Bank, for instance, burnt its fingers in
dealing with the Maoist minister in the Physical Planning and
Housing Ministry, who decided to review the Melamchi water-
supply project, which the ADB had been involved in since
1998.
A fourth reason is the political parties themselves.
Perceiving political parties as being authoritarian and
undemocratic, some of the donors had sought internal
democracy among the major political parties. This does not
seem to be forthcoming.
Finally,  there  is  the  issue  of  the  legitimacy  of  the
government. The people power movement of April 2006 for all of
its positive achievements has not been an exercise in ballot.
The government formed subsequently has not been an elected
government. At the end of the day, an important benchmark of
democracy is periodic elections. How long could a 'people
power'  last  without  being  mandated  by  the  people  through  an
election, is something that the donors are increasingly
concerned about.
Conclusion: Aid and state agency
The paper has discussed the relationship between foreign aid
and the agency of the Nepali state. The relationship between
the two indicates that on the whole the former (i.e., foreign aid)
has  tended  to  limit  the  latter  (i.e.,  the  agency  of  the  Nepali
state). Foreign aid does indeed appear to be a structural
constraint on the Nepali state's capacity to act. On the basis of
the materials discussed it can be argued that foreign aid does
pose as an invisible boundary that constrains the state.
However,  this  should  not  be  construed  to  imply  that  the
foreign aid regime prevents the Nepali state from acting in
whatsoever a manner it so desires. The recent history of Nepal
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– exemplified by the king's 1 February 2005 unilateral action –
suggests that the state has acted. In other words, even though
the Nepali state is heavily dependant on foreign aid, this
dependence does not preclude political action.
Undertaking  a  unilateral  action  is  one  thing,  carrying  it
through, however, is another. Well within a year and a half, the
king's government collapsed. What could be surmised from this
is that dependence on the foreign aid regime serves to ensure
the viability or otherwise of political actions. In other words, the
Nepali state (being sovereign), in principle, can act the way it
wants, but if that act goes against established donor norms or
expectations, there is a very real likelihood of it being aborted.
It is in this indirect or round about way that foreign aid acts as
a structural constraint.
The foreign aid regime has not always exerted this great
influence. As Nepal's past 60 years of history attests, it is only
with the demise of the cold war that the aid regime has come to
have such a hold. Since the post World War II there have been
major transitions that the Nepali state has moved through:
these include 1950/51, 1959/60, 1989/90 and 2006. The end
of the Rana regime and the beginning of democracy in 1950/51
had as much to do with the backing from independent India as
domestic constituencies represented by the insurrectionary
activities of the Nepali Congress. The foreign aid era had
already  begun  prior  to  this  juncture  (in  1949  after  President
Harry  Truman's  Point  Four  Program).  The  Nepali  state,
however, had not entered the regime and was not dependant on
it  whatsoever.  Rather  than  foreign  aid  per  se,  it  was  India's
political role that led to a decisive outcome at this particular
juncture of Nepali history.
Although the Nepali state began receiving aid during the
1950s, the state had a considerable degree of autonomy. This is
exemplified for instance by king Mahendra's unilateral actions
in 1960. During this period the United States, India and a
couple  of  European  donors  had  begun aiding  the  Nepali  state
and the Nepali state's dependence on aid to meet its
development needs had increased over the years. Though what
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king Mahendra did – dissolving the parliament, imprisoning the
popularly elected Prime Minster and banning political parties –
went against established international conventions, foreign aid
continued  the  way  it  did,  which  in  turn,  implies  that  Nepal's
donors did not punish the king for his unilateral actions.
Another important watershed was in 1989/90. This
period  that  was  ushered  in  after  the  demise  of  the  Cold  War
coincided with the growth in popular assertion and uprooting
of totalitarian regimes worldwide; this moment in history is also
popularly  known  as  the  'third  wave'  of  democracy.  Though
there were some voices that championed for the donors
suspending all aid (alleging that aid had resulted in giving
continuity to the authoritarian regime), donors generally
continued  what  they  did.  The  fact  that  the  monarch  quickly
responded to popular demands and that the interregnum was
short and smooth meant that there were no confrontations
between the Nepali state and the donor community.
In all of these transitions, with the exception of 1959/60,
India's role was of paramount importance. In 1950/51, a
compromise was struck between the Ranas, the Nepali
Congress and King Tribhuvan at the behest of New Delhi. When
King  Mahendra  took  unilateral  action  in  1960,  New Delhi  did
not take this well. However, due to a major Chinese assault in
the Indian territories in the Himalayas, India's security became
vulnerable, and in the interests of security in the larger region,
New Delhi came around to accepting the king's moves. In 1988
the year-long economic blockade imposed by India led to
deterioration in the Nepali state's capacity to deliver basic
services, which in turn, spanned the 1989 popular movement
for  the  restoration  of  multi-party  democracy.  And  finally,  the
genesis of the second popular movement of April 2006 was in
the 12-point agreement between the Seven Party Alliance and
the  Maoists  that  was  signed  in  New Delhi  in  November  2005
and of which India was the facilitator; had it not been for New
Delhi's behest the two dramatically different political forces
would not have come together.
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As a donor in Nepal, India has gone through a checkered
history. Though it was a significant donor in the 1950s, its role
declined since 1960. What the events leading up to 2006 and
the events subsequent to it reveal, is the emergence of India as
an important donor in Nepal. The recent commitments made by
India attests to a growing role it envisages for itself as a donor
in  Nepal.  The  commitment  it  has  made  subsequent  to  April
2006  indicates  that  it  would  be  investing  three  to  four  times
more  than  it  had  during  the  past.  Even  before  the  people's
movement, India had pledged to implement some major
projects related to transportation and security such as
strengthening four major border check-posts along the Nepal–
India border, constructing 22 link roads, including 14 large
bridges, to link the East–West Highway with major cities of the
Tarai  region  and  others.  This  is  an  inkling  of  the  things  to
come.
What the discussion on foreign aid also reveals is that the
pressure by the international community towards the Nepali
state is not simply by way of allocating funds. Though funding
is the most obvious or visible way it adopts other, more subtle
means. This is by setting up of normative standards, which the
Nepali  state  may  choose  to  ignore  at  its  own  peril.  It  is  the
pressure to conform to the international norms that is no less a
compelling force than allocating funds.
Even as this paper is being written, there is a new turn in
Nepali politics. The Maoists who have long championed
elections for the constituent assembly that will draft and ratify
a  new  constitution  have  said  that  the  date  set  forth  by  the
government for the elections is not convenient for them and
have  unilaterally  moved  out  of  the  coalition  government.  The
donors have made known their preference for the election to be
held on time and have warned the government that if things
continue to drift, the very legitimacy of the government may be
called  into  question.  Prime  Minister  G.P.  Koirala  is  firm  on
holding the elections, but if the Maoists do not let the elections
happen or if the election cannot be held for whatsoever reason,
it is unlikely that the government will continue indefinitely. The
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Nepali  state  behaving  whatsoever  the  way  it  wants  to  is  one
thing, but continuing on that course is quite another.
References
Abercrombie, N., S. Hill, & B. S. Turner (1994), Dictionary of
Sociology. London: Penguin Books.
Bhattarai, B. (2007a), "Nepal's Missing Aid Money", Himal South
Asian, 20(9): 54-58
Bhattarai, B. (2007b), "Peace without Dividend: Donors talk the talk
but don't yet walk the walk", Nepali Times 366 (14-20
September): 4.
Calhoun, C. (2002), Dictionary of the Social Sciences.  New  York:
Oxford University Press.
His Majesty's Government of Nepal (2004), Economic Survey Fiscal
Year 2003/04, Kathmandu: Ministry of Finance.
His Majesty's Government of Nepal (2005), Economic Survey Fiscal
Year 2004/05, Kathmandu: Ministry of Finance.
Giddens, A. (1984), The constitution of society. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Himalayan Times (2006), May 19 edition.
International Crisis Group (2006), Nepal: From People Power to
Peace? Asia Report Number 115 (10 May), International Crisis
Group.
International Crisis Group (2007a), Nepal's Constitutional Process,
Asia Report Number 128 (26 February), International Crisis
Group.
International Crisis Group (2007b), Nepal's Troubled Tarai Region,
Asia Report Number 136 (9 July), International Crisis Group.
Kathmandu Post (2005) 22 November.
http://www.kantipuronline.com
Khadka, N. S. (2004) "Divided Donors: Its Just Not Nepalis Who are
Not United" Nepali Times, Issue 194 (30 April – 6 May): 1.
Khadka, N. S. (2005) "Development Dillemma: Caught Between an
Ineffectual Government and the Maoist Threats, Donors
Wonder if They Should Pull Out or Go On" (p.) Nepali Times,
Issue 231 (21 – 27 January): 8.
Sharma, S., A. S. Hansen, T. Fujikura, & J. Koponen (forthcoming),
"Nepal  and  its  Donors  –  Partners  in  Learning  to  Cope",  in
Jerve, Shimomura and Hansen, eds., Aid Relationships in
Asia. Palgrave Macmillan.
88
Development or Disillusionment?
Economic Partnership Agreements and the goals of
European Union development policy
Marikki Stocchetti
Economic Partnership Agreements:
One tool, two targets
The on-going negotiations on the EU-ACP Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) demonstrate once again how
setting goals for development policy is a much easier task than
agreeing on the actual means to get there. According to the
European Commission (EC), the EPAs are meant to constitute
an  integral  part  of  the implementation of the European Union
(EU) – African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP)1 Cotonou Partnership
Agreement (2000). They are regarded as integral because of
their expected positive impact on development through trade
in ACP regions and countries.
In particular, these “economic partnerships” should
facilitate the achievement of the overarching goal of EU’s
development policy and the Cotonou Agreement – poverty
reduction, and eventually poverty eradication – in a way which
is both consistent with sustainable development and the
1  ACP constitutes 79 member states of which 48 are from Sub-Saharan
Africa, 16 Caribbean and 15 Pacific states.
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gradual  integration  of  the  ACP  countries  into  the  world
economy.2
According to the Article 1 of the Cotonou agreement, the
pursuit of these objectives should be conducted through an
integrated approach  which  takes  into  account  at  the  same
time political, economic, social, cultural and environmental
aspects of development. This integrated approach is further
guided by fundamental principles of equality and ownership
between the ACP and EU partners, participation that includes
both state and non-state actors, dialogue between the partners
as well as differentiation according to the needs of each ACP
state and regionalization to promote co-operation between the
ACP countries.3 Moreover,  all  the  parties  “shall  refrain  from
any measures liable to jeopardise these objectives.” These
terms were also to apply to The New Trade Arrangements
section of the Cotonou Agreement, which provides the basis
for the current EPA negotiations.4
The conventional explanation by those in favour of EPAs
– and the EU commission in particular – stresses that the EU-
ACP  economic  relations  need  to  be  changed  for  two  main
reasons. First, according to the Commission, there is a mutual
recognition  by  the  main  Parties  that  “existing  trade
preferences have not promoted the sustainable development or
integration  into  the  world  economy”  (COM  2005d:  3).
Especially, this quotation refers to the non-reciprocal market
access arrangements which have been inadequate to reverse
2  See the Cotonou Agreement, Article 1 Objectives of the partnership
and European Consensus on Development: par. 5.
3  See the Cotonou Agreement: Article 2 Fundamental principles.
4  In essence, EPAs are described as trade agreements which are being
negotiated between the European Commission (EC) and six ACP
regional groups, which do not however coincide with the existing
regional  bodies  of  regional  integration.  Four  out  of  six  of  the  EPA
configurations are Sub-Saharan African where the need for poverty
reduction is particularly pressing. The negotiations are to be
concluded by the end of this year as stipulated in the Cotonou
Agreement. Once (and if) in place, the six separate EPA agreements are
expected to replace the unilateral, non-reciprocal trade preferences
that provided the ACP countries with so-called preferential market
access to EU under the successive Lomé Conventions.
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the declining share of ACP countries’ exports at the European
market.  Second,  and  perhaps  more  acutely  for  the  EU,  the
current trade preferences are inconsistent with the prevailing
international  trade  rules  as  defined  by  the  World  Trade
Organization (WTO) and therefore need to be changed. What is
considered particularly problematic is that the non-reciprocity
aspect of the Cotonou Agreement is not in line with the WTO’s
so-called “enabling clause”.5 To ensure WTO compliance the
EPAs  are  to  be  regional free trade agreements that set out
reciprocal liberalisation of “substantially all trade within
reasonable length of time” between  the  EU  and  ACP  partner
regions.6 In  the  context  of  EPAs  this  has  come  to  be
understood  as  roughly  90  per  cent  of  trade  that  should  be
liberalized within 10-12 years (EP 2005: 8). There has been a
WTO given waiver in place allowing EU-ACP unilateral
preferential agreements to exist, but this waiver expires at the
end this year which puts strong pressure particularly on the
ACP side (ODI 2007 and Bilal & Rampa 2006). However, the
European Commission sees no contradiction here. On the
contrary, the EC considers it possible to tackle both the
objectives of poverty reduction and trade liberalization under
the EPA free trade agreements.  Moreover, the EC sees that
“reforming”  the  EU-ACP economic  relations  in  line  with  WTO
rules will also improve EU’s contribution to the set
development policy goals. In a sense, for the European
Commission the proposed free trade EPAs are to play a double
function in governance of two fundamentally different global
policy processes – on the one hand, EPAs are to contribute to
5  Under the “enabling clause” industrial countries are permitted to give
unilateral non-reciprocal preferential treatment to just two categories
of countries: either, all LDCs, or all developing countries. As the ACP
group  is  a  mix  of  the  two  types  of  countries,  therefore  the  original
preferences are incompatible with current WTO rules. Therefore, under
the proposed EPAs the trade relationship between the EU and ACP
regional groups will be based on reciprocity and EPAs will be governed
by GATT Article XXIV rather than its “enabling clause”.
6   EPA  groups  consist  of  six  ACP  regions:  CEMAC  plus  Sao  Tome  and
Principe (Central Africa), ECOWAS plus Mauritania (West Africa),
COMESA minus Egypt and South Africa (East and Southern Africa),
SADC plus Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania (Southern Africa),
CARIFORUM (Caribbean) and Pacific ACP States.
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poverty reduction and on the other hand, they are to reinforce
WTO-led economic governance7 in the area of international
trade.
At the same time, scepticism prevails on the ACP side.
Critics  of  the  EPA agreements  agree  on  changing  the  EU-ACP
economic relations but for quite different reasons. The ACP
countries, together with the European Parliament Committees
on Development and International Trade as well as various
NGO platforms, perceive market access measures as
inadequate to advance development in ACP countries and
stress so-called supply-side constrains8 within the ACP states
which  make  it  unlikely  that  major  part  of  the  ACP countries
producers can benefit from the market access. Further, the
critics point to the unequal trade rules, as well as to the high
and distorting level of EU’s own protectionism which in their
view hinder possibilities for development through trade in ACP
countries. These critics fear, inter alia, that in the current
international setting allowing the EU increased access to the
ACP markets by liberating “substantially all trade” will have a
negative impact  on  the  development  of  local  producers  and
industries as well as on public revenues of the ACP states.
Therefore  the  EU  approach  is  more  likely  to  lead  to  growing
inequality instead of the achievement of the joint development
goals.9
The criticism on EPAs has been further reinforced by the
failure  of  the  WTO  Doha  Development  Round  as  well  as  the
consequent debate on the current international trade rules’
impact on development. However, while the multilateral trade
7  On the concept of governance, see Ba & Hoffman 2005.
8  By supply-side constrains is generally referred to factors such as poor
economic infrastructure, unfavourable investment climate, weak
institutions, lack of trained work force that prevent developing
countries from taking advantage of trade liberalization, see more Bilal
& Rampa 2006.
9  This position is largely shared by the ACP states, the European
Parliament  as  well  as  various  NGOs both  in  Europe  as  well  as  in  the
ACP Countries. Compare for instance ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary
Assembly 2006, EP 2005, EP 2007, Oxfam 2006 and Stop EPA
campaign of 171 NGOs.
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negotiations  are  on  hold,  the  EU  is  aiming  at  further  trade
liberalization through EPAs on bilateral basis even beyond the
required WTO compatibility.10 Although,  the  text  of  the
Cotonou  Partnership  Agreement  already  sets  out  EU  –  ACP
parties’ accord to conclude new World Trade Organization
(WTO) compatible trading arrangements, progressively
removing barriers to trade and enhancing cooperation in all
areas relevant to trade and development,11 a mutually
acceptable interpretation of this commitment were left to the
actual negotiators to find.
At the core of the disagreement has been the
interrelationship between development objectives and the
nature of the proposed EPA trade agreements. In this debate,
the positions of the main parties: the EU – represented by the
European Commission/DG Trade – and the ACP group appear
as worlds apart. Yet, all the parties seem to indeed agree that
EPAs are first and foremost about development and that so-
called “development dimension” should be central to the future
EU-ACP economic relations.12 However, how this “development
dimension” is conceptualized and how it relates to the very
objectives of poverty reduction and sustainable development
have been a subject of an unparallel debate.
In  this  chapter,  I  will  address  the  EPA debate  from the
point of view of discourses related to the “development
dimension”. I claim that each party interprets development
objectives and EPA negotiations according to its own discourse
of “development dimension”. Or, more precisely that distinctive
type of discourse of EPA “development dimension” defines a)
the social context of the negotiations, b) the object (the
10  Namely, the EU has proposed inclusion of so-called new trade issues
known also as the Singapore issues which include investment,
competition and public procurement that were rejected by developing
countries at the multilateral WTO level.
11  See the Cotonou Agreement Chapter 2, New Trading Arrangements,
Article 36.
12  In the EPA debate it has become commonplace to make references to
“development dimension” by participants across the board when
preconditions for development or expected development outcomes of
EPAs are discussed.
DEVELOPMENT OR DISILLUSIONMENT? / 93
possible content of EPA agreements) and c) the expected
implications of EPA agreements on development. In line with
Agnew’s and Corbridge’s definition (see Grainger 2004: 283-
284), I see these discourses as a historically, socially and
institutionally specific structure of statements, terms,
categories and beliefs on which parties constitute their
positions.  Finally, I have inferred these general discourses
from the documents and statements of development and trade
policies which guide the EPA negotiations.
My contribution will focus on the EU statements
regarding the interrelationship between EU’s development and
trade policy objectives that define the “development
dimension”.  In  particular,  I  will  discuss  the  way  in  which  the
EU legitimizes its promotion of EPA free trade agreements both
in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement and the WTO
rules.  In  order  to  do  so,  I  will  first  look  at  the  nature  of  the
development policy goals as stated in the Cotonou Agreement.
Then, I will move to discuss the EU’s commitments to these
goals  and  third,  I  will  analyze  the  EU  understanding  of  the
interrelationship between these goals from the point of view of
policy coherence as presented in the EU’s new trade agenda
Global Europe and in the European Consensus on Development
policy statement as well as in the Commission’s
Communications on the UN Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).  Fourth,  I  will  map  out  the  key  elements  through
which the EU constitutes development dimension in its EPA
negotiations position, and finally I will conclude with short
analysis of the EU conception of the development dimension
with respect to the stated development policy goals.
Contending goals of the Cotonou Agreement
Translations of objectives and principles of any given policy
into practice is a complicated process. It is especially difficult
when the objectives and principles are just nominated or
defined  so  broadly  that  they  are  left  open  to  various
interpretations.  This is very clearly the case with the key
objectives of the Cotonou Agreement – “poverty reduction”,
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“sustainable development” or “the world economy” to which
the ACP countries are meant to be integrated into. Despite of
these difficulties, the way in which the objectives of the
Cotonou Agreement are declared in the text suggests that
there is a shared prior understanding between the Parties on
what the objectives of poverty reduction and sustainable
development imply and how the integrated approach to
pursuit these goals should be governed as it is not otherwise
explicated  in  the  text.  This  joint  understanding  of  the
objectives is supposed to come from the references made to
certain international agreements in the preamble of Cotonou
Agreement. Yet, the debate around EPAs demonstrates that
there is a fundamental conflict between the parties on the very
purpose of the EPA agreements both with respect to the
poverty reduction objective and integration into the world
economy goal. Regarding sustainable development, the
question appears even more complicated.
When we start to look at the reasons for the conflicting
visions  on  EPAs,  we  may  first  look  at  the  nature  of  the
international agreements the Cotonou Agreement refers to.
These include the pledges of the major UN Conventions and
first among these the preamble lists the Rio Declarations on
sustainable development.13 On the other hand, the Cotonou
Agreement also refers to the commitments made within the
framework  of  the  World  Trade  Organisation.  However,  the
issue of compatibility of agendas of these two international
organizations has been itself a subject of a large policy
debate.14
Regarding the Rio agenda on sustainable development,
what  is  important  to  note  for  the  purpose  here,  is  that  the
thinking behind “sustainable development” is largely based on
the Brundtland’s notions of sustainable development as
13  These include The Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, Agenda 21, The UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), The UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
and Statement on the Forest Principles.
14  For contesting views in the WTO - Sustainable Development debate
see e.g. Haxton & Olsson 1998, Dresner 2004 and Sampson 2005.
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defined in Our Common Future report  by  the  World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED).15 The
WCED report also discusses the role of international economy
and how it should be changed in order to promote sustainable
development  (WCED 1987:  2-18).  At  the  core  of  the  report  is
the idea of balance through integration of economic, social and
environmental aspects of development which is needed to
tackle poverty and inequality within the limits of world’s
ecological system. The report defines poverty and inequality
both  as  the  planet’s  main  environmental  problem  as  well  as
main development problem (ibid.: 3; 5-6).  Moreover, the report
presents as a fact that the faith of the world’s ecological
system and world economy are interlocked, which urgently
requires policy integration of the three main aspects of
development and respective institutional change to carry out
this integration. The policy integration is of particularly
importance with respect to economic growth and its equal
distribution which WCED sees as crucial both for developing
countries and the international system as a whole. At the
same time growth should be directed to be socially and
environmentally sustainable and the report states that it is
largely the responsibility of developed countries to mitigate the
harmful consequences of growth (ibid.: xii; 31-32; 5-54).  In
this  paper,  I  adopt  the  Brundtland’s  claim  on  poverty  and
inequality as the core challenge for sustainable development.
This  claim  is  particularly  challenging  if  we  address  it  in  the
context of the international economy.
With  regard  to  the  “world  economy”  of  the  1980’s,  the
WCED report singles out factors that have hindered
sustainable growth in developing countries. These obstacles
include trade barriers in the wealthy nations and in many
developing countries, unfair terms of agricultural trade and
subsidize practices in the North, depressed commodity prices,
protectionism, intolerable debt burdens, and declining flows of
development finance (ibid.: 6-17). According to WCED in order
to alleviate poverty and to build basis for sustainable
15  On Rio and Brundtland linkage, see Baker 2006.
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development, these trends must be reversed (ibid.:  17)  –  a
quest that has been echoed twenty years later in the debate
around EPA negotiations and WTO-led international trading
system.
Obviously, many actors while adopting a commitment to
sustainable development have not embraced the full agenda as
envisage by Brundtland’s commission. What makes the
question of promoting “sustainable development” particularly
difficult is the way by which different actors have been able to
use the concept for their own purposes by creating and
changing priorities between “environment, economic and
social” dimensions or simply using the “sustainable
development label” without specifying its indented content.
This  has  also  made  it  possible  for  the  World  Trade
Organization to become one of the key promoters of
“sustainable development” while advancing its main agenda of
trade liberalization.16
In contrast to the UN organizations and agreements, the
WTO operates with binding rules on global trade which gives to
the commitments made at the WTO unique legal standing in
comparison to UN-led pledges to pursuit development targets.
Furthermore, these international institutions have each their
own agreed principles, norms, rules, procedures and
programmes  that  govern  the  activities  and  shape  the
expectations of the actors in specific issue area (Grainger
2004: 283).  However, in terms of broad development goals,
the agendas of these two organizations tend to increasingly
overlap although their original mandates have remained
unaltered.  This  has  been  particularly  the  situation  after  the
launch of the WTO Doha Development Round Agenda in 2001
which  was  followed  by  the  UN  Johannesburg  Summit  on
Sustainable Development in 2002 where participants agreed
on promoting “mutual supportiveness” between sustainable
development and trade liberalization (Ayre & Callway 2005:
15-16).
16  On the WTO as a promoter of sustainable development, see Sampson
2005.
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However, for many scholars of sustainable development
the attempts to superficially consolidate free trade and
sustainable development have been worrying. Their fears are
based on the free trade related tendency to lower
environmental standards for short term economic advantage,
to intensify the use of natural resources, to encourage
consumption as well as to increase environmental impacts
from transport of goods. In addition, it is seen that free trade
also exposes developing countries to international competition
which can prevent them from developing their own industries
and which drives small local producers to the wall (Dresner
2004: 46-49; Elliot 2006: 109-113). In addition to the social
and environmental development concerns related to the
current WTO-led trading system, criticism emerges also within
economists’ circuits. For instance, Stiglitz and Charlton (2005:
111-114) have presented an alternative “Agenda for a true
Development Round” according to which world trade system
as well as the Doha Development Round could be reformed in
order to promote development and poverty reduction.
Similarly, Sunanda Sen (2005) points to the contradiction of
how theoretically  discarded  principles  of  free  trade  are  still  in
use to push trade liberalization in developing countries while
developed countries themselves have adopted new approaches
for  strategic  trade  and  growth.  Borrman  and  Busse  (2007)
have  looked  at  this  phenomenon in  the  context  of  EPAs  from
the point of view of institutional quality as a precondition for
beneficial trade liberalization. They argue that current EPAs
imply  major  risks  for  the  vast  majority  of  African  ACP
countries  due  to  their  lacking  regulatory  capacity  that  is
needed to take advantage of the reciprocal trade agreements.
Interestingly, the EU has made commitments both with
respect to the WTO and UN-led processes towards poverty
reduction and sustainable development with legal obligations
based on its founding treaties. Particularly interesting for the
purpose of this contribution are the terms according to which
the EU perceives the interrelationship between these
commitments. Therefore, in the following section, I will
address the objectives of Cotonou Agreement in the larger
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institutional context of EU’s Development and Trade Policies. I
will  mainly  look  at  the  issue  from the  point  of  view  of policy
coherence which  I  regard  as  a  crucial  precondition  for  any
policy integration.
EU commitments to poverty reduction and the
principle of policy coherence
The status of development policy as a common EU policy was
established in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 1992
known  as  the  Maastricht  Treaty  with  juridical  basis  and
common objectives.17 Although the Maastricht Treaty provided
a  new institutional  foundation  for  the  policy,  it  was  build  to
govern already existing and expanding aid and economic co-
operation relations formed since the 1957 Treaty of Rome.
Under the Maastricht Treaty, the Community development
policy was defined as complementary to policies pursuit by the
Member States with three main objectives: the promotion of
sustainable economic and social development of developing
countries;  their  smooth  and  gradual  integration  in  the  world
economy; and   campaign against poverty in developing
countries (Article 130u/177).
In  addition  to  the  principle  of  complementarity  in  the
Treaty,  two  other  principles  were  laid  down  to  support  the
pursuit of the policy objectives. These formed the so called
triple Cs’; complementarity, co-ordination and coherence
which were later completed with a fourth C component:
consistency of EU’s external relations regarding security, trade
and  development  policies.  At  the  same time,  the  Council  and
the Commission became the representatives of single
institutional framework of the Community as legal personality
with power to enter into international agreements. This was
17  Title XVII Development Co-operation Articles 130u, 130v, 130w,
130x and 130y. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam provided
amendments  to  the  TEU  but  did  not  change  the  content  for
development co-operation. Note that in the Amsterdam Treaty
Development Co-operation is dealt under Title XX, with new
numbering of the Articles 177 (ex 130u), 178 (ex 130v), 179 (ex
130w),180 (ex 130x) and 181 (ex 130y).
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most clearly the case with Community policies exercising sole
Community competence such as External Trade Policy.
Common policies were also formulated within “pillars” of
shared competency between the Community and the Member
States such as Development Policy whereas more
intergovernmental-based approach prevailed in Common
Foreign and Security Policy.
Regarding the coherence principle referring to the
relations of development policy objectives and other EU
policies, the Article 178 (Ex Article 130v) of the Treaty states
that:
The Community shall take account of the objectives referred
to in Article 177 in the policies that it implements which are
likely to affect developing countries.
After the establishment of the EU development policy, the
policy objective of “campaign against poverty” has been made
even more central by EU’s involvement in international
development processes. These processes include, among the
most important ones, the UN’s Millennium Declaration and
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); Financing for
Development in Monterrey; the commitments made at WTO
Doha Development Round of international trade; as well as at
the World Summit on Sustainable Development and during
the processes around aid effectiveness and donor
harmonization (COM 2005a: 3-4).
With respect to the commitments made to support
Millennium Development Goals, the EU has pledged to achieve
them by  the  year  2015  both  at  the  Community  as  well  as  at
the Member States levels (COM 2005b: 3). In this context the
objective of “campaign against poverty” has been redefined as
poverty eradication. At the same time the principle of coherence
has become one of the main tools to govern the process
towards this goal in EU’s development policy.
This shift was consolidated in the first joint development
policy statement in the history of the EU called “the European
Consensus” which was adopted by the EU Commission, the
Parliament and the Member States presented at the Council of
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General Affairs and External Relations in November 2005.
Building on the Maastricht Treaty, the European Consensus
Statement  (par.  5)  formulates  the  objectives  of  the  EU
Development policy as follows:
The primary and overarching objective of EU development
cooperation is the eradication of poverty in the context of
sustainable development, including pursuit of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs).
To  this  end,  the  EU development  policy  first  of  all  builds  on
two main means to the poverty eradication objective. These
are, first, increased aid and secondly, governance of EU’s non-
aid policies by policy coherence for development (PCD) principle
(The  European  Consensus:  par.  9).  Regarding  the  former,  the
EU has set a common timetable according to which the annual
EU aid would double by 2010. The European Consensus
Statement nominates Africa as the main beneficiary of this
commitment to increased aid as the EU promises to allocate at
least  half  of  this  additional  aid  to  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (ibid.:
par. 23).18 With respect to the so called Policy Coherence for
Development in the European Consensus Statement (ibid.:
par. 9), the EU has restated the coherence principle of the
Maastricht  Treaty  and  committed  itself  to  ensuring  that  it
shall take into account and make sure that all implemented EU
policies support development objectives,  an  issue  to  which  we
will  next  turn  to.  This  commitment  has  been  formulated  as
follows:
We reaffirm our commitment to promoting policy coherence
for development, based upon ensuring that the EU shall take
account of the objectives of development cooperation in all
policies that it implements which are likely to affect
developing countries, and that these policies support
development objectives.
The general principles which were later on incorporated in the
Policy Coherence for Development approach were originally
18  In addition, the EU-Africa Strategy (2005) names Africa as the first
priority for implementation of the Commission’s “MDG package” as
defined in COM 2005a, 2005b and 2005c.
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launched at the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of
the OECD in the beginning of the 1990s and from there it has
developed  into  a  larger  area  for  debate  which  has  spread  to
include academic work and civil society campaigns.19 The
debate over policy coherence for development has largely
revolved around the observation that development aid and
development co-operation in their traditional forms will not
lead to poverty reduction if other policy sectors simultaneously
contradict the pursuit of development policy objectives.20
According  to  the  definition  of  the  DAC,  the  principle  of
policy coherence in its narrowest sense implies that the
objectives, strategies, mechanisms, intentions, motives and
outcome pursued  within  a  given  policy  framework  are
consistent with each other and are at the minimum and –
most importantly here – not conflicting with objectives,
strategies, mechanisms, intentions, motives and outcome of
other policy frameworks of the system (OECD 1996: 8).
Against this institutional background, the case of EU’s
Trade policy and Development policy is particularly intriguing.
Both are policies of the same political system and legal entity
but they are implemented by different agencies within the
European Commission. Namely, the policy formulation and
implementation in these domains are conducted by DG Trade
and DG Development which have very diverse missions and
policy  goals.  If  we  look  at  the  Economic  Partnership
Agreements in this institutional setting, we may note that the
issues dealt in the proposed EPAs cover both domains. From
the point of view of the Cotonou Agreement, its objectives as
19  See Forster & Stokke 1999 and Hoebink 2004 for studies and defi-
nitions of policy coherence. For Civil Society Campaigns see e.g. Call
for…(website), CFFA (website), Eurocoherence (website), Stop EPAs
(website) and WIDE (website).
20  In this context especially the interrelationship between OECD
countries’ agriculture and development policies is seen as one of the
crucial cases in point. Regarding the efforts to poverty reduction, the
implications of domestic agricultural policy, agricultural trade policy
as well as regulatory policies affecting agricultural production and
trade have been addressed and found very problematic in the recent
studies  by  the  OECD,  see  OECD  2005a,  OECD  2005b  and  OECD
2006.
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well  as  development  aid  provisions  the  EPAs  situate  in  the
area  of  EU development  policy  but  in  terms  of  their  form as
free trade agreements they are regarded as an issue of EU
Trade policy and thus competence of DG Trade.
In the following section, I will discuss the
interrelationship between the trade and development policies
as defined in the key EU statements regarding the respective
policy goals. I will look at the issues from the point of view of
EU’s notion of policy coherence which I see problematic and I
claim that  the  limits  of  the  EU approach  to  policy  coherence
constrict also the EU understanding of the development
dimension.
Trade and Development: Competing goals or
compromised coherence?
As defined in the previous section, the main objective of EU
development  policy  is  to  eradicate  poverty  and  promote
sustainable development outside Europe.  In  terms  of  its
“instruments” development policy comprises development aid
and cooperation in various overlapping economic, political,
environmental and social sectors. In order to improve the
development policy impact, the EU commitment to policy
coherence for development principle should make sure that
the EU policies in other sectors than development policy also
support  or  at  the  barest  minimum  –  do  not  contradict  the
development policy objectives. If we look at the EU’s trade
policy agenda as defined in the Commission’s DG Trade
formulated Communication “Global Europe” (2006), it first
seems that EU’s self-interest driven trade discourse could not
be consolidated with EU’s development policy agenda.
However, I will come to note that in the EC discourse of these
trade and development policy statements a trade-led
consensus prevails which takes over the development goals.
While the EU development policy targets are set outside
Europe, the trade policy objective is first and foremost to build
a Global Europe by reinforcing EU’s own competitiveness,
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growth  and  job  creation  in  the  global  economic  system which
according to the DG Trade are essential conditions for
economic prosperity, social justice and sustainable
development within Europe (Global Europe 2006: 2). The
advancement of EU’s trade agenda is to be done by “opening
markets were European companies can compete abroad while
rejecting protectionism at home and promoting fair trade
abroad”.  The  latter  “fair  trade”  policy  task  is  to  be  conducted
through the WTO-led multilateral trading system (ibid.: 6-7).
Moreover, the EU’s trade strategy text states that the EU’s
trade policy also seeks to contribute to development goals and
maintains that coherence in this respect is vital to
strengthening the EU’s global role (ibid.:2). Again, how this
coherence that is to strengthen EU’s role also contributes to
development objectives is left unspecified.
However, what is clearly advocated in the new trade
strategy  text  is  that  EU’s  trade  policy  model  is  not  only
suitable to serve EU’s interests, but it is also assumed that
liberalization and increased competition in the multilateral
trading system work also for the EU’s developing country
partners regardless the huge differences in the size and stage
of the economies as well as the societies as a whole. Therefore,
DG Trade states further that progressive trade opening is an
important source of productivity gains, growth, job creation,
that is seen as essential factors in reducing poverty and
promoting development (Ibid.:6). However, preconditions for
this kind of economic development are not discussed. These
assumed positive economic impacts are also what the DG
Trade regards as the very essence of the EPAs.21 In general,
the DG Trade’s position to Free Trade and Association
Agreements is that while these arrangements have reinforced
economic and regulatory ties with the EU as well as supported
development objectives, the EU’s own trade interests have
been less well served (ibid.: 10-11.)
21  Here the EPA negotiations are presented in the context of the other
planned bilateral Free Trade and association agreements between the
EU and Central America and Andean Community.
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With  respect  to  the  on-going  EPA  negotiations,  this
statement increases ambiguity. First, the formulation suggests
that  the  primary  function  of  Free  Trade  Agreements  is  to
reinforce economic ties with EU and only secondarily to
support development objectives. Second, the current Free
Trade Arrangements have contributed to these objectives but
they have not sufficiently promoted EU’s own trade interest.
Since the EPAs are yet under negotiation, this argument might
mean increased pressure to include EU’s trade interests into
the Economic Partnership Agreements. However, based on the
DG Trade vision of mutual benefits through increased
competition and trade liberalization, there is no conflict
between trade and development goals. Therefore, the EU’s
discourse reinforces the conception that coherence prevails
between the trade and development policies.
If we address the trade and development policy objectives
from the point of view of EU’s development policy discourse,
the interrelationship between the two appears even more
ambiguous. It is interesting to note that on the one hand, the
European Consensus Statement stresses the importance of
policy coherence principle for the achievement of the
development policy goals and restates EU’s full commitment to
this principle. What is more, the statement acknowledges that
there is need to advance policy coherence for development in a
number of areas and nominates trade as the first of these
sectors which are likely to affect developing countries
(European  Consensus:  par.  35).  But  on  the  other  hand,  the
European Consensus Statement expresses up-front strong
support to “a rapid, ambitious and pro-poor completion of the
Doha Development Round and EPAs” with no single critical
reference or concern with respect to EPA process or the
international trading system (Ibid.: par. 36).
On the contrary, the statement describes the latter as
“open, fair, equitable, rules-based which takes into account
the interest and concerns of the weaker nations” (ibid.: par.
36). In this context, the development policy statement puts
pressure on the ACP Countries to reform and liberalize their
markets in a way which is very concretely linked to the on-
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going  EPA  negotiations,  whereas  the  larger  context  of  the
international trading system reflects more an idealized EU
vision  of  the  WTO  than  the  current  WTO  setting  with  the
suspended Doha Development round. However, European
Consensus statement contains a list of measures that the EU
is willing to use in order to pave the way for the EPAs. These
measures include additional assistance for trade capacity-
building, sequenced market opening, addressing special and
differentiated treatment as well as preference erosion. In
addition,  EU  promises  quota  and  tariff  access  for  LDC
countries and mentions CAP reform, asymmetry and flexibility
as facilitating factors in the implementation of the EPAs (ibid.:
par. 36).
In the discourse of EU’s development policy documents
the role of development aid, essential and necessary though it
is seen to be, it is also regarded as insufficient to achieve
poverty reduction, let alone poverty eradication. This emphasis
is particularly strong in the Commission’s official
communications regarding the EU’s contribution to UN
Millennium Development Goals.22 Therefore;  in  these
documents the EU development policy argumentation
increasingly builds on assumed positive synergies between
development policy and trade (COM 2005b: 9).  However, at
the same time, the EU states that its non-aid policies
especially in areas such as trade, agriculture, fisheries, food
safety, transport and energy have all a direct bearing on the
ability of developing countries to generate domestic economic
growth,  which  at  its  turn  is  at  the  basis  of  any  sustained
progress towards poverty reduction (COM 2005a: 7). To which
extend this direct bearing is perceived as policy incoherence is
less explicit.
However, in order to advance policy coherence for
development in the area of trade both at the multilateral WTO
and bilateral EPA levels, the EU development policy
documents list out issues that the EU promises to tackle.
22  The specific MDG and coherence documents include COM 2005a,
2005b, and 2005c 132, 133 and 134.
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These issues include, for instance, support measures to EU
agriculture (e.g. export subsidies and price-support), market
access for agriculture, industrial goods as well as services,
elimination of tariffs and tariff peaks, antidumping and fishery
subsidies  (COM  2005a:  5-8).  In  sum,  the  EU  refers  only  to
measures  that  are  thought  to  be trade-distorting by the WTO.
To certain extend these measures –if truly put in place– can
also have a positive development impact. However, what is
important  to  note  here  is  that  the  EU  is  considering  the
interrelationship between trade and development exclusively in
terms  of  trade  liberalization.  As  for  instance  Khor  (2006)  and
Goodison (2007) point out, mere removal of “trade-distorting”
effects to advance trade liberalization is not sufficient enough
to guarantee positive impact on development and poverty
reduction.23
From the point of view of development goals, this trade-
led conception limits decisively the EU quest for policy
coherence with respect to its development policy objectives
and  thereby  questions  the  adequacy  of  the  EU  approach  to
promote poverty reduction and sustainable development. The
extent to which policy coherence for development is defined is
directed by the WTO rules, rather than development
objectives. However, the EU discourse presents the WTO
compliance as part of the process of advancing development
goals. Drawing from this analysis on the interrelationship
between trade and development, I will next turn to assess the
EC  position  at  the  EPA  negotiations  and  the  construction  of
development dimension to the proposed Economic Partnership
Agreements.
23  This is particularly the case with EU’s agricultural subsidies which
the  EU  has  been  able  maintain  high  by  changing  their  form  from
price-support to WTO compatible income-support that both Khor
2006 and Goodison 2007 discuss and claim that EU’s reforms have
been insufficient to remove the negative implications of EU’s
agricultural policy on development country producers.
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The EC partner in the EPA battle and the limits of
the development dimension
The  complex  process  of  negotiating  EPAs  began  in  2002  with
the Council providing the Commission’s DG Trade with a
mandate  to  negotiate  on  behalf  of  the  EU whilst  on  the  ACP
side guidelines for negotiations were agreed by ACP Trade and
Finance Ministers.24 The first round of actual negotiations took
place  between  the  EU  and  all  the  ACP  countries  in  order  to
agree on issues of interest to all regions followed by a current
round  between  the  EU  and  regional  groups  to  address
thousands of regionally specific issues and commitments.
Progress and problems at these fronts were aimed to be
assessed in mid-term review in September 2006. However,
already  the  first  round  of  negotiations  was  marked  with
difficulties in translating the spirit and principles of the
Cotonou Agreement to the negotiation process and did not
lead  to  formal  ACP-EU  agreement.  In  the  following,  I  will
briefly discuss the main elements that define the EC EPA
negotiations stance with respect to the expected “development
dimension”.
It can be safely assumed that each party in a negotiation
has its own view or discourse which defines their negotiations
stance. In the case of the Economic Partnership Agreement,
the EC enters into negotiations with certain aims, desires and
beliefs based on EC officials’ understanding of the nature of
the social change the economic partnership agreements
should bring about, what are the contexts where they are to be
applied and why a change is needed. Based on the previous
sections of this paper, inferences about EC general discourse
on development dimension are made in the following by
identifying three aspects of the EC negotiations stance:
24  The so-called “Joint Roadmap” documents between the EC and each
regional  grouping  define  the  organization  of  the  parties  for  the
negotiations. The EC organization is based on the Treaty
Establishing the European Community. The European Commission
negotiates on behalf of the EU, represented by the Commissioner of
Trade,  on  the  ministerial  level,  and a  senior  official  of  DG Trade  on
the ambassadorial level. Preparations on the technical level will be
co-ordinated by the geographical responsible unit in DG Trade.
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a) EC’s dominant paradigm which defines its general attitude
to the subject under discussions
b) EC’s primary goal which is what it wants to gain from the
negotiations, and the achievement which it may make
concessions on other topics, and
c) EC’s minimum acceptable compromise, which is its “bottom
line” and the ultimate limit on its freedom to negotiate.25
At the level of broad guidelines, EC’s dominant paradigm can
be inferred from its Trade and Development Policy Statements
as discussed above. The EU expresses strong support to trade
liberalization and increased competition which it regards as
beneficial both for its own trade and development policy
interests and thus also for the ACP partners. Reciprocity per
se is not considered problematic if market liberalization takes
place  gradually.  The  rational  for  reciprocity  rests  on  the
principle  that  the  liberalization  of  ACP  markets  towards  the
EU is expected to increase competition within ACP economies,
reduce price for consumers, and stimulate investment as well
as transfer of technology and knowledge (Bilal & Rampa 2006:
41).  What  follows  is  that  the  EC  is  in  addition  willing  to
include so-called New Trade issues of competition, investment
and  public  procurement  into  the  EPA  agreements  which  the
EC sees as reinforcing elements to the EPA packages.
However, the phase by which the gradual progress
should  take  place  is  directed  by  the  WTO  rules  and  not  by
development needs of a specific ACP country or region. To
discuss and assess the development benchmarks in terms of
the  advancement  of  poverty  reduction  goal  is  not  EC  trade
competence and it is to be therefore excluded from the actual
negotiations. However, according to some key officials of the
Commission, the EU itself does not have any offensive
interests vested in EPAs that would conflict with the poverty
reduction goal (Wunenburger 2.10.2006; Manservisi 4.12.2006
and Dihm 2007). Even the suggested inclusion of New Trade
Issues is compatible both with the EC’s Global Europe Trade
Agenda and necessary for EU’s development through trade
25  See and compare with Grainger 2004: 283-292 on positions to
Climate Change negotiations.
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approach. In the reform of the EU-ACP economic relations, the
EU will assist ACP countries in adjustments costs and
capacity building. But negotiating on additional aid and
cooperation are regarded as matters of the shared competence
between the DG Development and the Member States and they
should be therefore kept out from the actual free trade
negotiations agenda. Thereby the development issues form a
parallel agenda  but  they  are  not  directly  integrated  into  the
free trade discussions. In order for EPAs to deliver their
expected development benefits, they should be part of
economic and development policy reform of each ACP State. In
sum, EPAs are seen as the main instrument of economic and
trade co-operation, closely linked to  the  political  and
development finance aspects of the Cotonou agreement (COM
2005d:3; COM 2003).
EC’s primary goal with respect to the EPAs is to conclude
Free  Trade  Agreements  and  certain  WTO compatibility  in  line
with its Trade Policy. The EC can however consider making
concessions regarding the New Trade Issues. In addition, what
the  EC promises  to  ACP countries  as  part  of  the  Free  Trade
Agreement include increased market access, gradual and
asymmetric trade liberalization to protect fragile sectors,
removal of non-tariff barriers and support trade facilitation
and deeper regional integration.  It also considers reforming
measures regarding export and price-support subsidies as
required under the WTO rules.
EC’s bottom line can  be  described  with  two  words:  WTO
compliance. This would imply a reciprocal Free trade
agreement to open the ACP markets to the minimum level
necessary to secure WTO compatible economic relations.
However, the EC’s interpretation of the WTO rules is very strict
and it has not showed willingness to explore alternatives to
reciprocal free trade agreements.
In  order  to  draw  the  limits  which  define  the  EC
understanding of the development dimension, we may look at
three factors. First, the EC assumes that development impact
will follow the adoption of the trade liberalization paradigm in
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the ACP countries. Second, this impact will be supported by
development measures that will be negotiated outside the free
trade agenda by DG Development which will consist of
traditional elements of EU-ACP economic partnership, namely
development co-operation programmes and (possibly some
additional) aid to increase ACP countries’ trading capacity as
well as to reduce the costs of the adjustment periods.
However, aid and development cooperation at the Community
and country levels should be formulated in line with EPAs and
not  vice  versa.  Finally  and  most  importantly  for  this  chapter,
what remain absent in the EC position are considerations that
would imply changes in the prevailing EU trade liberalization
paradigm. It appears as if development – the goal – is meant to
adjust to the EPA instrument and not vice versa.
EC’s development dimension - ACP’s development
disillusion
The EC’s conception of the EPA development dimension is
limited by two main assumptions. First, development in terms
of advancing the poverty reduction and sustainable
development objectives will follow if the ACP countries adopt
the trade liberalization paradigm. Second, this process can be
supported with parallel development  agenda  of  aid  and
cooperation. However, even though the development agenda
should be closely linked to  trade  policy,  the  EC  does  not
consider policy integration necessary. This  is  because  at  the
level of policy statements’ discourses the EC sees that the
interrelationship between its development and trade policy
objectives is harmonious as such.
This  approach  is  further  enhanced  by  the  EC notion  of
policy coherence for development that the EU is willing to
pursuit  within  the  limits  of  the  WTO  directed  trade
liberalisation in order to profit from the EC envisioned
synergies of trade and development policy. As a result, there is
no  need  to  call  for  policy  integration  between  trade  and
development policies which would imply fundamental changes
in both policies. Instead, the EU aims – first of all – at meeting
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the WTO compliance and to reduce “trade-distortion” rather
than policy coherence that would be based on its development
policy objectives. In this respect, the EC has made a decisive
choice  to  prioritize  its  commitments  made  at  the  WTO
framework over the UN-led processes to poverty reduction and
sustainable development. Of course this is not surprising if we
compare the status of the UN declarations with legally binding
WTO rules. However, given that the EU has made binding
commitments to poverty reduction and sustainable
development  in  its  founding  Treaty  as  well  as  in  the  Cotonou
Agreement, the issue is much more complicated. I claim that
this  prioritization  of  one  goal  to  the  detriment  of  the  others
raises fundamental questions of governance in the EU policy-
making.
In  the  light  of  the  EU  discourse,  the  EPAs  seem  more
appropriate  to  support  EC’s  trade  policy  agenda  than  the
original development goals. Therefore the EU understanding of
the development dimension is more likely to cause
development disillusionment than to advance the development
policy objectives. The challenge to the EC vision does however
emerge from three fronts. First, the debate on alternative
visions to free trade paradigm contests the basic EC
assumptions. Secondly, the development goals of poverty
reduction and sustainable development thinking challenge
EC’s one-dimensional trade-led approach. However, it is
matter of political will to promote a paradigm change.
Unfortunately, at the present this will is not sufficiently strong
due to the prevailing consensus on development and trade
goals  within  the  EC.   Lastly,  and  most  importantly  here,  the
legitimacy  of  the  EC stand  to  EPAs  is  strongly  questioned  by
the ACP partners of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This
has led to a paradoxical situation that I see as the core of the
EPA conflict. The tool that was to facilitate the achievement of
the development goals is regarded as contradictory to the very
purpose  of  the  ACP-EU  Partnership  and  the  Cotonou
Agreement  by  a  number  of  legitimate  parties  both  in  the  ACP
states and in Europe. This is a contradiction that the
European Union must face.
DEVELOPMENT OR DISILLUSIONMENT? / 112
References
Printed sources
ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 2006, Resolution on the review
of negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements,  23.11.2006.
ACP-EU 3958/06/fin.
Ayre, Georgina & Callway Rosalie 2005, “Outcomes from the World
Summit for Sustainable Development” in Governance for
Sustainable Development A Foundation for the Future, eds. Ayre G.
& Callway R., EarthScan, London; Sterling VA, pp. 14-42.
Ba, Alice D. & Hoffmann Matthew J. (eds.) 2005, Contending
Perspectives on Global Governance Coherence, Contestation and
World Order, Routledge, London & New York.
Baker, Susan 2006, Sustainable Development,  Routledge,  London  &
New York.
Bilal Sanoussi & Rampa, Francesco 2006, Alternative (to) EPAs
Possible Scenarios for the Future ACP Trade Relations with the EU,
Policy Management Report 11, ECDPM, Maastrich.
Borrmann, Axel & Busse, Mathias 2007, “The Institutional Challenge
of the ACP/EU Economic Partnership Agreements”, Development
Policy Review Vol. 25 no. 4, pp. 403-416.
COM [Commission of the European Communities] 2005a, Policy
Coherence for Development, Accelerating progress towards
attaining the MDGs. Communication from the Commission,
12.4.2005, COM (2005) 134, Final. Brussels.
_______ 2005b, Speeding up the Progress Towards the MDGs The EU’s
Contribution. Communication from the Commission, 7.10.2005,
COM (2005) 132 Final/2, Brussels.
_______ 2005c, Accelerating Progress towards Attaining the MDGs:
Financing for Development and Aid Effectiveness. Communication
from the Commission, 7.10.2005, COM (2005) 133 Final,
Brussels.
_______ 2005d, Commission Staff Working Document Trade and
Development Aspects of EPA Negotiations, 9.11.2005 SEC (2005)
1459, Brussels.
COM [Commission of the European Communities DG External Trade]
2003, Economic Partnership Agreements Means and Objectives.
[http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/december/tradoc_
115007.pdf]
COM [Commission of the European Communities DG External Trade]
2006, Global Europe Competing in the World – A Contributin to the
EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy.
DEVELOPMENT OR DISILLUSIONMENT? / 113
[http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_13
0376.pdf]
The Cotonou Agreement 2000, Partnership Agreement between the
African, Caribbean and Pacific States of one part and between the
European  Community  and  its  Member  States  of  the  other  part.
[http://www.acpsec.org/en/conventions/cotonou/accord1.htm]
Council of the European Communities/Commission of the European
Communities 1992, Treaty on European Union. Official Journal of
the European Communities, Luxemburg.
Dihm,  Martin  (Deputy  Head  of  the  Unit  in  the  DG  Trade)  2007,
presentation as reported in “The Final Meters and Beyond”? The
Conclusion of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)
Negotiations and a Development Oriented Implementation? 28.3.
2007. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin.
Dresner, Simon 2004, The Principles of Sustainability, EarthScan,
London.
Elliot, Jennifer A. 2006, An Introduction to Sustainable Development,
Third edition, Routledge, Abington.
[The European Consensus] Official Journal of the European Union
24.2.2006. European Parliament, Council, Commission: Joint
Statement by the Council and the representatives of the
governments of the Member States meeting with the Council, the
European Parliament and the Commission on European Union
Development Policy: ”The European Consensus”. (2006/C 46/01).
Http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/development_pol
icy_statement/docs/edp_statement_oj_24_02_2006_en.pdf#zoom
=125.
EP [European Parliament] Committee on Development 2005, Draft
Report on the development impact of Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs) (2005/2162 INI) Rapporteur: Luisa
Morgantini.
EP [European Parliament] Committee on International Trade 2007,
Report on Economic Partnership Agreements (A6-0084/2007)
Final, Rapporteur: Robert Sturdy.
Forster, Jacques & Olav Stokke (eds.) 1999, Policy Coherence in
Development Co-operation. Frank Cass Publishers, London.
Goodison, Paul 2007, “EU Trade Policy &  the Future of Africa’s Trade
Relationship with the EU”, Review of African Political Economy,
Vol. 34, No.112, pp. 247-266.
Grainger, Alan 2004, “Sustainable Development and International
Relations”, in Exploring Sustainable Development  Geographical
Perspectives, eds. M. Purvis, & A. Grainger, EarthScan, Bath.
DEVELOPMENT OR DISILLUSIONMENT? / 114
Haxton Eva & Olsson Claes (eds.) 1998, WTO as a Conceptual
Framework for Globalisation, Global Publications Foundations
and Third World Information Network, Uppsala.
Hoebink,  Paul  2004,  “Evaluating  Maastricht’s  Triple  C:  The  “C”  of
Coherence”, in The Treaty of Maastricht and Europe’s
Development Co-operation, Studies in European Development Co-
operation Evaluation No 1, ed. P. Hoebink. European Union,
Bryssels.
Khor, Martin 2006, Globalization, Liberalization, Protectionism: Impacts
on Poor Rural Producers in Developing Countries, in Third World
Network Report:
[www.twnside.org.sg/title2/par/vicky_ifad_paper.rev_21_april_20
06.doc]
ODI [Overseas Development Institute] 2007, Economic Partnership
Agreements: What happens in 2008? ODI Briefing Paper 23, June
2007.
OECD 1996, Building Policy Coherence, Public Management
Occasional Papers, OECD Publishing, Paris.
OECD 2005a, The Development Dimension, Policy Coherence for
Development Promoting Institutional Good Practice, OECD
Publishing, Paris.
OECD 2005b, The Development Dimension, Agriculture and
Development The Case for Policy Coherence, OECD Publishing,
Paris.
OEDC 2006, The Development Dimension, Trade, Agriculture and
Development: Policies Working Together, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Oxfam 2006, Unequal Partners: How EU-ACP Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs) could harm the Development Prospects of Many
of the World’s Poorest Countries. Oxfam Briefing Note 27.9.2006.
[Http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/bn0609_unequal_partners_epas
/download.]
Sampson, Gary P. 2005, The WTO and Sustainable Development,
United Nations University Press.
Sen, Sunanda 2005, “International Trade Theory and Policy: What is
Left of the Free Trade Paradigm?” Development and Change Vol.
36 No.6, pp. 1011-1029.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. & Andrew Charlton 2005, Fair Trade for All: How
Trade Can Promote Development. Oxford University Press, Oxford
& New York.
WCED [World Commission on Environment and Development] 1987,
Our Common Future, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
DEVELOPMENT OR DISILLUSIONMENT? / 115
Speeches
Manservisi, Stefano (Director-General DG Development) 2006,
presentation “EU as a Global Actor” 4.11. 2006. Seminar
organized by The Finnish Institute of International Affairs,
Helsinki.
Wunenburger, Jacques (Head of Unit on EPAs) 2006, presentation
“Economic Partnership Agreements” 2.10.2006. “Call for
Coherence” Conference on Policy Coherence for Development,
Working group on Development and Trade, Helsinki.
Internet websites
Call for Coherence  <http://fi.kehys.oneworld.net>
CCFA [Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements] <http://www.cape-
cffa.org>.
Eucoherence <http://www.eurocoherence.org>
Stop EPA Campaign <http://stopepa.org>.
WIDE [Women in Development Europe]
<http://eurosur.org/wide/home.htm>
116
Politics and partnership in the Cotonou
Agreement
Liisa Laakso
Introduction
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the European
Union  and  78  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP)  states
signed  in  June  2000  is  structured  on  three  pillars:  aid,  trade
and the political dimension.1 The political pillar was soon
praised as the most important innovation of the whole
partnership (Vanheukelom et al. 2006).  Although  the  main
goals of the agreement: poverty alleviation, the promotion of
sustainable development and the integration of the ACP states
into  the  world  economy,  do  not  directly  relate  to  the  political
dimension, all activities conducted in order to achieve these
goals can be linked to it. This linking, more than anything else,
relates to resources and to attempts to improve the efficiency of
aid (see Koponen & Mattila-Wiro 1996). The agreement allows
withdrawing or redirecting of funding reserved for development
activities if the principles of human rights, democracy, rule of
law or good governance are violated.
1  Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African,
Caribbean  and  Pacific  Group  of  States  of  the  One  Part,  and  the
European  Community  and  Its  Member  States,  of  the  Other  Part,
http://ec.europa.eu/development/ICenter/Pdf/agr01_en.pdf .
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Withdrawing  development  funds  from  a  state  can  be
harmful,  at  least  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  rulers.  Yet  the
concept  of  partnership  in  the  title  of  the  agreement  points
towards a mutually beneficial relationship between sovereign
states. Therefore, if the economic pressure of the EU challenges
de facto authority  in  any  of  the  ACP  states,  the  very  idea  of
partnership is also challenged.
My aim here is to look at the tension between partnership
and  the  political  dimension  of  the  Cotonou Agreement  and  its
impact on the actual implementation of the agreement.
Although only Title II (covering Articles 8-13) of the agreement
is explicitly devoted to the political dimension, the focus of this
paper is on the changing use of Article 96, that stipulates when
and  how  aid  can  be  withdrawn  or  redirected  due  to  political
reasons. I will overview the cases where Article 96 has been
used between 2000 and 2006 and look at more in detail the
case of Zimbabwe, where partnership has been particularly
contested.2 However,  before  going  to  Article  96,  it  is  useful  to
clarify the notion of partnership and its interpretations, as well
as the historical development of the political dimension of the
Cotonou Agreement.
The concept of partnership
Partnership  is  a  familiar  concept  not  only  in  the  corporate
sector, but in international relations, too. It is used to describe
the relationships between governments, NGOs, local
authorities, research institutes, multilateral organizations and
private companies. This is particularly so in the field of
development cooperation, even though development
cooperation entails highly differing power relations of donors
and recipients (see Fowler 1998, 140). In this regard, the EU-
ACP cooperation is not an exception. The concept of
2   The  analysis  is  based  on  an  evaluation  study  on  coordination  and
coherence in the application of Article 96 commissioned by the
government of the Netherlands (Laakso et al 2007a). This paper also
utilises a series of Discussion Papers by ECDPM published in August
2005 (Bradley 2005; Mackie & Zinke 2005; Mbangu 2005; Hazelzet
2005.)
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partnership is mentioned 52 times in the 100 Articles of the
Cotonou Agreement and nine times in its Annexes and thus
ranked before such issues as gender and sustainability (Raffer
2001, 3, 17). In fact, partnership has a long history in the EU-
ACP cooperation stemming from the special connections
between the European powers and their ex-colonies. The
predecessors of the Cotonou Agreement, the Lomé Conventions
(1975-2000), were internationally applauded as instigating a
culture  of  partnership  and  dialogue.  The  ACP  countries  were
entrusted  with  a  role  in  the  management  of  the  development
resources provided by the Europeans, while the European
powers secured support from their ex-colonies in the context of
the cold war rivalry. The EU/EC, however, adopted a neutral
stance  with  regard  to  political  affairs  in  the  ACP countries,  let
alone such cases as Idi Amin’s Uganda.
The concept of partnership is not easily defined. The
international solidarity movement influenced it in the 1970s
and 1980s, but since 1990s the question more often has been
about efficiency and sustainability in development cooperation
(Lister  2000,  228).  In  both  cases  the  first  connotation  of  the
concept of partnership is positive: Development partnerships
are not enforced relations. However, they are not entirely
voluntary  either.  Although  the  initial  decision  to  engage  in
cooperation might be voluntary, once that decision has been
taken, it becomes an obligation to all parties or at least
withdrawing  from the  cooperation  would  be  costly.  It  also  has
to be noted that the possibilities of countries to choose whether
they want to be donors or recipients of aid are very limited3 - as
is the alternative of remaining outside such organizations as
the  World  Bank  and  the  United  Nations,  the  most  active
generators of the partnership discourse. As far as the question
is about development needs, partners are brought together by a
certain kind of urgency; a discourse of needs and urgency is
typical in development cooperation documents, including the
Cotonou Agreement and official papers related to it.
3  China, is a significant exception. It is a developing country receiving
development aid, but also a donor - although an unconventional one in
Africa in particular.
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Furthermore, partnership is expected to be mutually
beneficial, but it is not necessarily based on equality.
Consequently the notion of partnership can justify cooperation
within unequal relations (Abrahamssen 2004, Gould 2005). An
early example is the racist discourse in Southern Africa. The
1965 Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)
was ideologically founded on partnership between African and
European populations as an alternative to majority rule.
Godfrey Martin Huggins, Rhodesian Prime Minister before UDI
and Ian Smith’s era gave an infamous description to this
partnership as one between “a horse and its rider”. It is never
easy to state whether the partnership legitimises the existing
unequal power relations or whether it strengthens the
subordinate partners (see Lloyd & Rowan, 2005). This concerns
also the relationship between political dimension and poverty
alleviation.  Without  rule  of  law,  respect  for  the  human rights
and the democratic empowerment of the poor, alleviation of
poverty is difficult. Yet inequality and poverty are not only
problems within states, but also between states. Pressure for
democracy,  rule  of  law  and  human  rights  might  promote
poverty alleviation within developing countries, while their
effect on the empowerment of poor states, and on ending
international poverty, might be the opposite.
Even though partnership is an unspecific and flexible
concept with regard to the power relations and decision making
structures, formal agreements define explicit responsibilities,
rights and obligations. Partners are assumed to have their own
identity and are accountable to their own constituencies or
stakeholders and they need to convince them of the costs and
benefits of partnership arrangements. With regard to
comprehensive agreements like the Cotonou Agreement, costs
and benefits might vary depending on the issue area in
question. Furthermore, the points of reference for different
actors, even within one party of the agreement can diverge.
There is seldom a fixed or common understanding of even the
key principles of the agreement, but dialogue and frequent
reviews of the agreement are necessary for the cooperation to
continue. The Cotonou Agreement, which lasts for 20 years,
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contains a clause allowing it to be revised every five years,
known as the Mid-Term Reviews.4 The  first  revision  was  made
in 2005. Among other things this included new stipulations to
the Article 96 as will be explained later.
The specific implications of partnership for Article 96 cases
can be approached by asking whether invoking Article 96 is
perceived as based on a common understanding or whether it
is  seen  as  a  unilateral  decision  by  one  party  (the  EU).  In
addition, we should ask whether both parties consider the use
of  Article  96  to  be  beneficial  for  their  own  interests  and
objectives. If unilaterally invoked and if benefiting only the EU,
partnership-rhetoric might indeed rather legitimise the
subordinate position of the ACP countries than empower them.
The political dimension of ACP-EU partnership
ACP-EU relations were affected by pressures to pay attention to
human rights and democracy after the end of the cold war. The
Maastricht  Treaty  of  the  European  Union  in  1992  introduced
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to EU external
action.  A  human  rights  clause  was  to  be  included  in  all  EU
agreements with third parties. Respect for human rights,
democratic principles and rule of law were listed as essential
elements of the Lomé Convention IV in 1995, providing for the
first time a legal basis to withdraw funds from an ACP country
that  did  not  respect  these  elements  (Article  336a).  EU aid  had
previously been suspended without formal procedures or a
legal basis for a few ACP countries. This had been criticised for
lacking transparency. Article 336a resulted in some two dozen
cases of aid withdrawal. For the EU they reflected sensitivity to
taxpayer concerns; for the ACP side the question was about an
erosion of the principle of partnership (Vanheukelom et al.
2006).
In 1996 the European Commission launched a broad-
based consultation process to guide the negotiations of the
4  Same five-year periods are followed in the financing that is available to
the ACP states through the European Development Fund (EDF).
PARTNERSHIP AND POLITICS / 121
successor agreement to the Lomé Convention. The results of
this process were published in the so-called Green Paper
(European Commission 1996). According to the Green Paper,
the principle of partnership had “come up against a number of
difficulties.” It had “proved hard to put initial intentions, based
on  the  principle  of  equal  partners,  into  practice”  due  to
conditionality and the EU tendency to decide for recipients “like
other donors” (1996: 39).  Different perceptions between the
ACP  and  the  EU  were  making  the  management  of  the
development resources of the EDF time-consuming and
ineffective. However, in spite of these critical notions, political
conditionality became even stronger in the Cotonou Agreement
(Raffer 2001: 16-17).
In addition to incorporating the essential elements
introduced  in  Lomé  on  human  rights,  rule  of  law  and
democratic principles, governance was added as a new
“fundamental element” of the partnership in Article 9. Also the
EU approach towards conflict prevention and security policy
was specified.  Article 11 commits the signatories to an
integrated policy of peace-building, conflict prevention and
conflict resolution. It emphasises the importance of being
engaged with conflict affected partner countries. The EU has
recognised elsewhere that isolating countries can lead to state
failure, which in turn is related to several conflict risks,
including that of terrorism. In the EU Security Strategy this is
articulated through the notion of “preventive engagement”
(Solana 2003: 2).  The Communication on Governance and
Development (European Commission 2003) further clarified the
commitment to stay engaged in “difficult partnerships.”
Following this line of reasoning would imply that the EU
respects the principle of partnership and cooperates even with
governments that are violating agreed principles. There is a
potential tension between this approach and withdrawing aid
after invoking Article 96.
Article 8 establishes the important principle of political
dialogue. The objective is “to exchange information, to foster
mutual understanding, and to facilitate the establishment of
agreed priorities and shared agendas” as well as “preventing
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situations arising in which one Party might deem it necessary
to have recourse to the non-execution clause.” By stating that
regular, comprehensive, balanced and ongoing dialogue should
lead to “commitments on both sides” it builds on the presumed
equality  of  the  partners.  Article  8  notes  that  dialogue  is  not
strictly regulated: “The dialogue shall be conducted in a flexible
manner.  Dialogue  shall  be  formal  or  informal  according  to  the
need, and conducted within and outside the institutional
framework, in the appropriate format, and at the appropriate
level including regional, sub-regional or national level.” This
makes the actual use of the instrument quite complex.
According to Vanheukelom et al. (2006, 2), during the
negotiations ACP partners were concerned about the lack of
clear  guidance  on  how  and  when  political  dialogue  on
(perceived) violations of essential elements would transit from
Article 8 into Article 96 consultations. ACP side also feared that
this would increase conditionality and be implemented
inconsistently.
As  already  noted,  Article  96  falls  outside  the  Political
Dimension (Title II) section of the Cotonou Agreement. Yet it is
closely associated with it, since it can only be invoked when the
essential elements spelt out in Article 9 have been breached.
Article 96 has a sister article, Article 97, which concerns the
fundamental element of good governance. So far this has been
used  only  once,  in  the  case  of  Liberia,  and  even  then  in
connection with Article 96.
Article 96 stipulates that if one party violates the essential
elements, a “concerned party” after having sought to resolve
their differences through the political dialogue called for in
Article  8,  may  invite  the  violating  party  to  consultations.  The
point  of  the  consultations  is  to  conduct  an  examination  of  the
situation with a view to seeking a resolution acceptable to the
parties. If no agreement is reached, the concerned party may
take  “appropriate  measures”  against  the  other  party,  which  it
deems to be abusing the essential elements. “Appropriate
measures” can be restricted to diplomatic steps or “smart
sanctions”, but can also involve the suspension or redirection
of aid or the imposition of further conditions. Appropriate
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measures can include also positive actions like supporting free
and fair electoral processes.
Although the language of the article notes that either party
can invite the other party to formal consultations and instigate
appropriate measures against it suggesting that the question is
about equal partners, its practical implementation tells another
story. Without exceptions the party using this instrument has
been the EU while the “targeted” party has always been an ACP
state.
Understanding Article 96
James Mackie and Julia Zinke (2005) flesh out the different
interpretations  given  to  the  nature  of  Article  96.  While  the  EU
wants to see the consultation procedure as an ultimate means
for resolving differences through deepened discussions, the
common perception  is  that  of  a  “sanction  article”  not  only  on
the ACP side but also in civil society. Because the provision has
been  invoked  only  by  the  EU in  response  to  violations  of  the
essential elements on the ACP side, and because there is no
case of consultations which would have led to an agreement
without appropriate measures, Article 96 looks like an
instrument  of  sanction  to  be  used  by  the  EU  against  ACP
states.
The EU and the ACP states altered some parts of Article 96
during the 2005 mid-term review of the Cotonou Agreement.
The  ACP  group  proposed  that  the  decision  to  start
consultations should be a joint EU-ACP decision. The EU did
not accept this, but agreed to add a provision for “intensified
dialogue”  under  Article  8  before  moving  to  Article  96:  “All
possible options for dialogue under Article 8” must be
exhausted before Article 96 is invoked. Furthermore, this
dialogue should be “systematic and formal” which diverges
from the tone in Article 8 which also implied informal dialogue.
It was also stipulated that representatives of the ACP Group
and  of  the  ACP-EU  Joint  Parliamentary  Assembly  may  take
part in the political dialogue. Exceptions to this requirement
were “cases of special urgency” (like coups d’état) and cases
PARTNERSHIP AND POLITICS / 124
where “there is persistent lack of compliance with
commitments taken by one of the Parties during an earlier
dialogue, or by a failure to engage in dialogue in good faith.”
In addition, the mid-term review extended the timeframe
for  consultations  from 60  to  120  days,  which  was  seen  to  be
more feasible. The idea of partnership was strengthened by the
stipulation that the Joint Council representing the EU and ACP
states can lay down additional arrangements with regard to the
stages of the consultation, benchmarks and targets.
Invoking Article 96
The Cotonou Agreement gives a rigid description of the process
of  invoking  Article  96.  This  provides  the  EU  Commission  the
purely administrative role of proposing consultations to the
Council whenever a breach of an essential element occurs. In
reality, however, the Commission implements a case-by-case
approach adjusting to the specific circumstances of each
country and Member State’s views and thus establishes a
political role for itself. The Commission is not eager to propose
consultations  if  it  is  not  clear  that  the  Member  States  would
support it. Côte d’Ivoire in 2004 has been the only case where
the Council decided against the proposal of the Commission to
start consultations. The reasons related to the very serious
situation  in  Côte  d’Ivoire  and  to  the  fact  that  the  EU  was
involved in the UN peace process there. However, also the
uncooperative attitude of the Ivoirien government eroded the
usefulness of Article 96. The threat of civil war was acute. In
such a situation it was seen that the EU had more leverage to
influence the peace process in the country by maintaining as
normal relations as possible.
There is no evidence of systematic bias or double
standards, however. The influence of the ex-colonial powers is
particularly interesting. After comparing EU reactions to almost
500 cases of human rights violations between 1989 and 2000
(mostly before the Cotonou Agreement), Hadewych Hazelzet
(2005) concluded that former colonies in general were not
shielded from sanctions, but became subject to harsher
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sanctions than countries that had not been colonies. Hazelzet
found  that  the  degree  of  human rights  violations  was  a  more
powerful  factor  than  the  interests  of  the  EU  (i.e.,  if  an  ACP
violating  country  was  a  previous  colony  of  an  EU  Member
State, or had significant trade relations or strategic importance
to the EU). As the level of human rights violations increased the
likelihood that the EU would suspend its cooperation
increased, too.
However, the Hazelzet study also showed that there was
variation among the ex-colonial relations. While former French
and  British  colonies  were  no  more  or  less  likely  to  be
sanctioned than countries that had not been colonies, the
former colonies of smaller Member States experienced
sanctions most often. Furthermore, the degree of sanctions
applied varied, being softest in the case of the former colonies
of France. Hazelzet concluded that those punished most
harshly  were  not  defended  in  the  EU Council  by  their  former
colonizers, with the exception of France and, to a lesser extent,
Britain, which made efforts to protect their former colonies
(ibid.). Partnership, thus, seems to be affected by historical
colonial links and the relative power of the EU Member State in
question.
It is important to pay attention to situations where
invoking Article 96 is not proposed in spite of severe and well-
documented violations of the essential elements; a case in point
is EU election observation mission reports about flaws in the
electoral process in Ethiopia noted by the European Parliament
(2006). From a pragmatic point of view this is not surprising, as
the commitment of the authorities of the ACP country
concerned is one of the key factors determining the positive or
negative outcome of a consultation procedure (Mackie & Zinke
2006). There is no willingness to use the instrument if
prospects of its usefulness are low. As with aid conditionality in
general the problem, of course, is that its mechanical
implementation implies that EU development aid is most likely
to be withheld from countries where such an action is least
likely  to  have  an  impact  on  the  government  (Morrissey  2004).
Governments that are violating human rights and democratic
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principles almost by definition do not feel accountable to their
citizens or the international community. In such cases the EU
approach  instead  might  be  on  attempts  to  tailor  the
cooperation so that it could strengthen positive rather than
negative development in the country in question. In this regard
partnership is indeed a significant bargaining factor in the EU-
ACP relations.
In the most unstable political situations like wars or fragile
periods of peace negotiations or peace processes, Article 96
would probably not be very useful either. An example of this is
the case of Sudan. “Silent diplomacy” can be more effective
than a consultation process that attracts public attention.
Furthermore in countries in conflict, regular EU development
cooperation has usually been decreased substantially due to
reasons of insecurity or logistical difficulties. If only
humanitarian  aid  is  left,  there  is  little  with  which  to  put
pressure on the authorities of the ACP country in question.
Member States might also consider other multilateral forums to
be more appropriate than the Cotonou framework to undertake
action. The EU can impose sanctions following UN Security
Council resolutions or support UN-led peace processes, for
instance.
As  a  consequence  the  EU  is  patient  towards  continuing
problems with regard to the essential elements in the
framework of Article 96. There are countries which have had a
poor  record  in  human  rights  and  democracy  for  a  long  time,
but  with  which  the  EU has  not  been  willing  to  invoke  Article
96. However, a sudden erosion of the political situation seems
to  rapidly  lead  to  the  use  of  the  instrument.  It  can  be  noted
that the EU has used the instrument consistently in all coup
d’état cases.
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Article 96 in practice5
Until the end of 2006, Article 96 was invoked eleven times: with
Zimbabwe, Fiji, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Central
African Republic, Togo, the Republic of Guinea, Mauritania and
Liberia. In Liberia, Article 97 was also referred to. The list
confirms the findings of Hazelzet that the former colonial
powers have not prevented their ex-colonies from being invited
to consultations. Among the consultation countries, there have
been former colonies of France, United Kingdom, Portugal and
Germany.
Ex-colonial powers, however, have had an active role in the
negotiations and have influenced the content of the appropriate
measures, the timing of consultations and other actions the EU
might take. The United Kingdom (although not alone) was
active in pressing the Commission to propose consultations
with  Zimbabwe  in  a  speedy  manner.  France  delayed  the
process in the case of Guinea. Portugal, in turn, pressed
toward the decision to send an election observation mission to
Guinea Bissau. The relative importance of ex-colonial powers
stems not only from their material and/or cultural interests,
but also from the practical fact that they have embassies in
their former colonies while most EU Members States have not.
In half the cases the reason for invoking Article 96 has
been a coup d’état. The other half consists of violations of
democratic principles alone or combined with violations of
human rights. The time span that has been needed before
normalisation  of  relations  has  varied,  but  only  in  two  cases
(Côte d'Ivoire in 2001 and Togo in 2004) this happened already
the following year. In the case of Haiti this took five years and
in the case of Zimbabwe the process is lasting even longer.
With many countries one can ask why the EU did not start
consultations before the coup d’état, when there was already
information on violations of human rights and democratic
principles. The Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau and
5  Detailed descriptions of all ten cases and the consultation process are
available in Laakso et al 2007b.
PARTNERSHIP AND POLITICS / 128
Mauritania performed poorly with regard to human rights,
democracy and rule of law already before the coup. The EU can
easily be accused of applying Article 96 only when a violation of
the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement became too
obvious, but ignoring continuous or slowly deteriorating
violations of the principles. However, in these cases the EU had
issued statements condemning the political situation and it
had  also  kept  the  door  open  for  political  dialogue.  This  means
that Article 96 has usually been considered as an instrument of
last resort instead of an instrument that could be used in order
to prevent major constitutional crises. Consultations are
initiated in a reactive manner only after flagrant breaches of
the essential elements have taken place. Zimbabwe is an
exception in this regard, but also an example that has been
particularly damaging for the ACP-EU partnership.
With regard to the outcomes of the consultations, one has
to note that the list of commitments that the ACP country will
have to comply with reflects the often complicated and
gradually developed situations. While consultations are
considered an instrument of last resort, they are – with good
reasons – conducted in a comprehensive manner. Since the
process never immediately leads to the intended outcome, the
end result is a long list of issues needing improvement before
appropriate measures (sanctions) can be lifted and relations
normalised. Even in cases of clear-cut coup d’état the
background is usually marred by political, social and economic
problems. Balancing between what is feasible and what is
desirable before relations can be normalised is not easy. Even
when desired by both parties, the exit is a delicate contest
between sovereignty (for the ACP state) and credibility (for the
EU).
Appropriate measures that are positive in nature, of
course, are different in this regard. The possibility to normalise
relations after a deep crisis or even coup d’état through the use
of Article 96 have made it a window of opportunity for the ACP
side. Increasingly there are cases where the ACP states have
actively cooperated in invoking the Article. These include
Central African Republic in 2003, Guinea Bissau in 2003, Togo
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in 2004, Guinea in 2004 and Mauritania in 2005. Guinea
Bissau  and  Mauritania  were  actually  rewarded  with  an
increase in aid in support of the democratic transition process.
Furthermore in cases of coup d’état, invoking  Article  96  has
sometimes been the first international reaction giving de facto
recognition for the new government (in spite of its illegal
character). Only in the case of Fiji did the EU not negotiate with
the  coup  leaders  or  the  interim  government  that  they  put  in
place.
Appropriate measures can also be limited to monitoring.
The most important mechanism is election observation. All
cases where Article 96 has been invoked have raised the issue
of free and fair elections. In cases of coup d’état, holding
democratic elections is a key for constitutional rule and
normalisation of relations with the EU. Without exception the
other cases (motivated by the “standard reason” of violations of
democratic principles) have also centred on electoral politics.
One could therefore expect that the EU election observation
mission  would  be  a  rule  rather  than  an  exception  during  the
period between consultations and the lifting of appropriate
measures. This, however, is not the case.
Sometimes, however, election observation has played a role
preceding the Article 96 process. In Zimbabwe, for instance, the
EU  initially  wanted  to  send  in  observers,  but  in  the  end
withdrew from the process due to conditions it could not
accept. Guinea, in turn, is a case where the EU, before deciding
to invoke Article 96, considered the possibility of election
observation and sent a mission to the country to investigate
electoral  preparations.  In  the  end,  the  government  of  Guinea
did  not  invite  the  EU to  observe  its  elections  and  the  EU also
concluded that conditions were not conducive to free and fair
elections. Election observation is, of course, meaningless if the
process can be judged not to be free and fair beforehand. In
this respect it requires at least some respect for democratic
principles.
Only the elections in Guinea Bissau (2005), Liberia (2005)
and Mauritania (2006) have been observed by the EU between
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consultations and the lifting the sanctions. The fact that these
are recent cases suggests that election observation is becoming
an instrument to normalise the relations between the EU and
an ACP state experiencing political crisis. Significantly, too, the
EU sent  election  observers  to  Haiti  and  Fiji  in  2005  after  the
normalisation of relations with these countries. Furthermore, it
needs to be noted that the EU has used other positive
measures to support the electoral process, including assistance
given to domestic observers.
In  general,  one  can  note  that  the  EU  has  become
increasingly hesitant to use Article 96 if the government of the
ACP state in question is not cooperative. Between Zimbabwe in
October 2001 and the Central African Republic in June 2003
the Article was not invoked a single time. The first two new
cases after 2002, the Central African Republic and Guinea
Bissau, were clear coups d’état.  With  one  exception  (that  of
Guinea) all of the post-Zimbabwe cases have been conducted in
a positive atmosphere: either at the ACP country’s own
initiative (Guinea Bissau, Togo and Mauritania) or with a de
facto government eager to legitimise its unconstitutional regime
by normalising relations with the EU (Central African
Republic). This conclusion is further confirmed by the fact that
while  serious  human rights  violations  and  lack  of  rule  of  law
were observed in 2004 in Côte d’Ivoire almost at the same time
as the Togo case, the former, as noted above, was dropped
without a decision to open consultations in the Council in spite
of  the  Commission  proposal.  The  latter,  at  the  initiative  of  the
Togo government, was pursued. Guinea is also a special case
as there the EU actually used consultations to find a legal basis
for the decision of one EU Member State (Germany) to block the
planning of further development cooperation with the country.
In that case the sanctions (or appropriate measures) actually
preceded the decision to start consultations. In order to
understand  the  critical  role  played  by  Zimbabwe  since  2001  it
is useful to look at that case more in detail.
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The case of Zimbabwe
EU-Zimbabwe relations started to deteriorate towards the end
of 1990s along with growing economic problems and political
tensions in the country, although the EU and Member States
had supported human rights, elections and the media as an
important part of their development cooperation for a long time.
After a majority of Zimbabwean voters rejected the government
proposal  for  a  new  constitution  in  the  2000  referendum,  the
government started to support a campaign of forceful
acquisition of the properties of white farmers. The EU
expressed criticism and called the government to hold free and
fair elections in May 2000. It also pressed the Zimbabwean
government to accept EU observers. However, even before the
EU Election Observation Mission entered the country, the EU
criticized  the  campaign  period  as  not  enabling  a  free  and  fair
election. The Zimbabwean government reacted by ruling that
certain European nationalities (including Swedes and British)
were not allowed to participate in the observation mission. This
was not acceptable for the EU, which then decided not to
observe the elections.
The  ruling  party,  ZANU(PF),  won  the  elections  and  the
intimidation of the opposition continued ahead of the 2002
presidential elections – as did the criticism of the EU. The EU
Delegation and Member States’ embassies in Harare started
discussing the possibility of a dialogue under Article 8 in
September 2000, with some Member States advocating a direct
move to Article 96. The Commission provided the proposals for
consensus  and  in  February  2001  a  request  was  made  to  the
government of Zimbabwe to start an Article 8 political dialogue.
According  to  the  EU,  Zimbabwe  did  not  live  up  “to  its
previously good reputation regarding the essential elements”
(European Commission 2001, 2). Commissioner Poul Nielson
and President Mugabe decided in Brussels in March 2001 to
conduct a dialogue under Article 8. This would have been led
by the Heads of Mission in Harare. Over the following few
months, five meetings were held in Harare, but the only subject
that  was  discussed  was  the  agenda.  At  the  end  of  June  the
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Zimbabwean government pronounced itself ready to start the
dialogue. The EU General Affairs Council noted the following
aims for the dialogue:
? an  end  to  political  violence,  and  in  particular  an  end  to  all
official encouragement or acceptance of such violence;
? an invitation to the EU to support and observe coming
elections and full access to that end;
? concrete action to protect the freedom of mass media;
? independence of the judiciary and respect for its decisions;
and
? an end to the illegal occupation of properties.
Member  States  took  an  active  role  in  determining  the  critical
approach  of  the  EU.  The  UK,  the  Nordic  countries,  the
Netherlands and Germany took a “hard line.” Sweden, which
held the EU presidency in the first half of 2001 was particularly
important. France, however, opposed invoking article 96, but
left the EU-Zimbabwe policy largely to the British. Zimbabwean
perceptions  of  the  lead  role  of  its  old  colonial  master  were
reflected in its eagerness to refer to the injustices of the colonial
past.  This,  in  turn,  appeared  to  be  something  that  neither  the
EU nor the British government were prepared to discuss within
the Cotonou partnership.
In  September  2001  a  land  reform conference  was  held  in
Abuja, Nigeria, where a number of Commonwealth countries
and the UNDP entered into an agreement with the government
of Zimbabwe. For a short while there was some optimism on
the part of the UK in particular. However, Zimbabwe’s failure to
start implementing the Abuja Agreement soon made the UK
and  the  whole  EU  tougher  again.  The  Commission  started
preparing  a  communication  to  the  Council  and  Zimbabwean
Minister of Foreign Affairs Stan Mudenge visited Brussels in
October,  but  this  did  not  help  the  situation.  A  few  days  later
the General Affairs Council considered the Commission’s
proposal and approved the opening of an Article 96 process.
According to the Commission it was “hardly realistic to expect
an early reversal of present policies” in Zimbabwe (European
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Commission 2001: 3). No effective dialogue had taken place
within the Article 8 framework.
At least partial explanation for the haste of the EU was the
forthcoming elections and its eagerness to have an influence on
the arrangements of the elections. The Council set a two-month
time limit for Zimbabwe to progress on the above mentioned
points before taking appropriate measures.
The  Zimbabwean  government  argued  that  the  real  EU
agenda  was  regime  change  in  Zimbabwe  and  that  this  was
dictated by the UK, which was already implementing sanctions
by conditioning its bilateral aid to Zimbabwe. For Zimbabwe
the EU move was unilateral and a poor example of the spirit of
partnership. This feeling was exacerbated by the inability of the
EU to be represented in the first consultation meeting in 2001
by  a  delegation  of  as  high  a  level  as  was  sent  by  the
Zimbabweans. Zimbabwe sent five ministers to the
consultations,  led  by  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  EU
delegation did not include representatives at the ministerial
level, but was led by the Spanish Ambassador and Permanent
Representative to the EU. For the Zimbabweans, the lower level
of the EU delegation indicated a lack of respect, in spite of the
EU’s explanation that it was the result of busy timetables and
the length of time taken to reach an agreed date.
There were several issues where the EU wanted to see
improvement. While a comprehensive approach was in line with
EU  development  policy,  it  turned  into  an  unworkable  list  of
wishes when used in conditioning aid and cooperation, not
least since some of the issues had been tolerated in the past
and in some issues the Zimbabwean performance had actually
improved when compared to previous years. Furthermore, as
the Zimbabweans very well knew, there were ACP countries
where the human rights situation, for instance, was worse, but
which still were not invited to consultations. However, leaving
some important issues out of the consultations would have
signalled that the EU was not concerned about them.
Zimbabwe referred to the partnership principle in the
Cotonou Agreement, the need for a deeper EU appreciation of
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the  problems  Zimbabwe  had  with  land  reform and  the  urgent
need to restore UK-Zimbabwe collaboration on the land reform
program. The EU sought access for observers and the media to
the elections in addition to a government plan on “its actions
on all points covered by the discussion” within one week. The
EU was to review the situation at the General Affairs Council
on  28  January.  Zimbabwe  sent  the  requested  letter  on  18
January. The EU subsequently noted that “essential elements”
were not respected, and announced its intention to impose
sanctions if
? Zimbabwe prevented the deployment of an EU observation
mission, prevented this mission from operating, or prevented
the international media from having free access to cover the
election;
? there  was  a  deterioration  of  the  human  rights’  situation  or
attacks on the opposition; or
? the elections were assessed as not being free and fair.
Zimbabwe invited foreign observers and an EU observer team
led  by  former  Swedish  minister  Pierre  Schori’s  arrived  in  early
February. The Zimbabweans, then, indicated that certain EU
nationalities, including Swedes, would not be acceptable.
Schori  was  unable  to  remain  in  Zimbabwe  and  had  to  leave
only  a  week  after  his  arrival,  just  before  the  General  Affairs
Council meeting of 18 February 2002. The Commission and the
Council secretariat were already preparing the papers for the
passing of sanctions against Zimbabwe. The EU, thus, was not
waiting  for  Zimbabwe’s  response,  even  though  the  aim of  the
consultations had been to try to solve the problem. The General
Affairs Council meeting resulted in an agreement to conclude
the consultations and to adopt appropriate measures, since the
human rights situation, electoral policy and rule of law in the
country had not improved.
Zimbabwe argued that there was a dispute between
Zimbabwe  and  the  EU and  wanted  to  invoke  Article  98  of  the
Cotonou Agreement which allows disputes between parties to
be submitted to the Joint Council of Ministers for settlement.
The question is about a standard stipulation in international
agreements, the use of which in this context surprised the EU.
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The dispute, however, was not solved through this mechanism
either.
The General Affairs Council’s decision to impose “smart
sanctions” against high officials of the Zimbabwean
Government (who were believed to be in a position to influence
government decisions) was a unilateral foreign policy measure.
The sanctions consisted in travel restrictions and freezing the
assets of “Cabinet Ministers, Politburo Secretaries, Deputy
Ministers, Assistant Secretaries of the Politburo and the spouse
of President Mugabe.”  The EU also forbade the sale of arms to
Zimbabwe, and the 9th EDF for the period 2002-2007 was not
signed. Every year since 2002, the EU has decided to maintain
the appropriate measures with minor changes such as the
individuals listed on the travel ban.
Aid has been directed towards social sectors and
cooperation with civil society. Relief aid has continued. In some
respects direct support to the people has exacerbated difficult
relations between the EU and the government, because the EU
is viewed as seeking to influence the constituency of a
government without involving it. The Zimbabwean government,
in  turn,  seeking  to  gain  mileage  from  humanitarian  support,
has provided it through its own structures so that it would be
viewed as government support to the people. This has irritated
the EU.
Smart  sanctions  have  made  it  difficult  for  the  EU  to
conduct dialogue with Zimbabwe. Also the dialogue between
the  EU  and  Africa  has  been  harmed  by  the  EU-Zimbabwe
dispute. The EU has tried to solve practical problems on a
case-by-case basis. For instance, it agreed to move one EU-
SADC meeting scheduled for Copenhagen to Maputo because of
the  travel  ban.  France,  in  turn,  invited  Mugabe  to  an  Africa
Summit  in  Paris,  because  it  did  not  want  to  damage  its
relations with Africa over the Zimbabwe issue. On the other
hand, a decision by the European Parliament not to allow two
Zimbabwean ministers to access their buildings resulted in the
last minute cancellation of the 4th Session of the ACP-EU Joint
Parliamentary Assembly in 2002.
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The  government  of  Zimbabwe  tells  the  public  that  the
country is under illegal sanctions (because they are not
endorsed by the United Nations). The common perception
amongst Zimbabweans is that aid has decreased as a result of
these sanctions. Although the Zimbabwean government
recognizes that the EU and its Member States are still investing
in the social sector, it does not praise the EU for excluding
humanitarian aid, aid benefiting the people and economic
relations from the appropriate measures. The government’s
view is that the measures are negatively affecting the economy.
The  UK  in  particular  bears  the  brunt  of  this.  The  smart
sanctions have also divided the Zimbabwean civil society,
including the churches and the opposition. Some believe that
sanctions should be extended if they are to be really effective.
Others believe that they are making things worse. Some argue
that  there  is  need  for  education  of  the  citizens  so  that  they
know that the economic problems in Zimbabwe are not due to
smart sanctions.
Nothing has formally prevented an Article 8 political
dialogue from proceeding. However, little dialogue has occurred
between the Member States and Zimbabwe. Some of the
ambassadors  of  the  EU Member  States  are  trying  to  promote
dialogue with government ministers, but for many Europeans
the current line of ZANU(PF) is anti-West, which makes
dialogue impossible. The views of the Member States and the
Commission differ to the extent that some Member States
argue that any Article 8 discussions need to be initiated by
Member States and such discussions have not been conducted,
while  other  Member  States  are  of  the  opinion  that  there  had
been such dialogue. The Commission, in turn, regards all of its
interaction with the Zimbabwean government as dialogue
referred to in Article 8, and has conducted preparatory
discussions for the 10th EDF also in order to enhance political
dialogue. Commissioner Louis Michel, for example, met with
Zimbabwe’s Ministers in Gaborone and again in Brussels in
2006 during the ACP Ministers of Finance meeting.
The appropriate measures have been maintained much
longer than was initially hoped and predicted among the
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Member States. In preparation for an exit strategy, the EU set
out  benchmarks  already  in  2003  according  to  which  any
positive moves on the side of the government of Zimbabwe
could be assessed. The benchmarks are consistent with the
initial concerns of the EU and are comprehensive. Although
this is an internal EU decision, the benchmarks have been
communicated to the Zimbabwean government. The feasibility
of  the  benchmarks  has  been  discussed  in  the  EU,  but  it  has
not  been  able  to  soften  its  approach  in  the  fear  of  losing  its
credibility.
In spite of being officially behind the common EU policy,
the Member States' opinions differ. This has become clearer as
the Zimbabwean crisis has deepened. Government-owned
media  in  Zimbabwe  has  exploited  opportunities  to  show  that
there are dissident voices in the EU; the new Swedish
ambassador was quoted as saying that smart sanctions have
hit the poor. A MEP was also quoted as saying that land reform
was the real issue behind the sanctions. While some
representatives of civil society (labour unions, parts of the
church and human rights groups) and the opposition see a firm
basis of the EU focus in the Cotonou Agreement, the view of
some other representatives of Zimbabwean civil society
(including the private sector) is that it was primarily the
acquisition  of  farms  that  irritated  the  UK,  and  that  in  spite  of
being comprised of Member States with different views the EU
adopted the UK position.
The EU has also attempted to coordinate its policies with
SADC. However, the SADC policy of non-interference has not
allowed its Member States to openly interfere with Zimbabwe’s
internal  dispute  and  for  SADC the  priority  has  been  to  avoid
the isolation of Zimbabwe. Many in Africa view Mugabe as a
hero, and in addition to this, as the eldest incumbent president
and  a  liberation  war  leader  he  is  not  somebody  who  could
easily be advised by other African leaders.
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Conclusions
Invoking  Article  96  for  Zimbabwe  was  a  unilateral  decision  by
the EU. The overall experience of the use of Article 96 there can
be considered negative in the sense that various stakeholders
are frustrated. The situation is also affected by the EU’s
inability to form alliances with Zimbabwe’s neighbouring
countries and Zimbabwe having become a problem in the EU-
Africa relations. The problems relate to the antagonistic and
uncooperative attitude of the government towards the donor
countries. The more difficult the situation has become, the
more evident it is that EU Member States hold different
opinions about the usefulness of the sanctions. What keeps the
EU united is a shared fear that it would lose credibility if it
changed its policy. The issue of credibility seems to prevent the
EU from radically revising its strategy even when the results
have been negative.
There is evidence of a learning process based on the
experiences of the Zimbabwe case in ACP-EU relations which
has strengthened the idea of partnership. This instigates a
move from an emphasis on conditionality and sanctions
towards positive measures aimed at normalising relations
between the EU and an ACP state that is experiencing or has
experienced political crisis. While the EU has become more
careful or hesitant in invoking Article 96 after the case of
Zimbabwe, the ACP countries, too, have learned to use the
instrument to their advantage and have come to see the
benefits of Article 96 as a window of opportunity. The exception
of the most recent cases in this regard is the Republic of
Guinea, where the government considered the consultations to
be a sanction or at best inappropriate foreign interference in its
internal affairs.
The  normalisation  of  relations  is  pivotal  after  an
unconstitutional rupture like a coup d’état. This view is
illustrated  by  the  cases  of  Fiji,  Central  African  Republic,  Togo
as well as Guinea Bissau and Mauritania where the authorities
of the ACP countries concerned were cooperative. In those
cases, one could argue, invoking Article 96 is commensurate
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with  the  principle  of  partnership.  A  positive  outcome  has
followed appropriate measures that at least to a certain extent
have empowered the government and enabled it to present its
own agenda.
For  the  EU  an  important  motive  for  invoking  Article  96
with  an  ACP  country  violating  the  principles  of  the  Cotonou
Agreement has become the assumption that the consultations
and appropriate measures eventually imposed will have a
positive impact on the situation. It is evident that the decision
to invoke Article 96 is dependent upon the perceptions the EU
has  of  the  political  will  of  the  ACP  country  to  respond  to  is
concerns. This means that the EU is not consistent when
applying the criteria of essential elements and the fundamental
element of the Cotonou Agreement. Behaviour where the EU
consciously avoids entering into a stalemate situation with
“difficult partners” reflects the objective of “preventive
engagement” mentioned in the EU Security Strategy. With
difficult  partners  it  is  better  to  look  for  other  ways  of
influencing  human  rights,  democracy,  rule  of  law  and  good
governance than Article 96.
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An aid regime at work
European aid and transnational policy export
to Nepal and Tanzania
Lauri Siitonen
Introduction
The  European  Union  (EU,  consisting  of  the  European
Community  and  the  Member  States)  is  not  only  the  leading
provider of development aid, but also the major source of
transnational policy-export. Whereas the former fact is a
consequence of the simple economics of scale, the latter can be
derived  from  the  origin  of  the  Union  and  the  character  of  its
borders. The Union is an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983)
–  even  more  than  any  national  state  –  that  is  built  on  shared
norms and values. Ignoring or violating these norms and values
would make the whole endeavour futile. The norms include
democracy, multilateralism and social responsibility, among
others (EU 2003; EU 2006). Some of the values are declared as
universal, such as democracy and multilateralism, whereas it
remains an issue of debate to what extent the norm of social
responsibility resonates beyond the borders of the Union.
Which brings us to the ‘fuzzy’ character (Christiansen et al.
2000) of the EU borders. Accordingly, the simultaneous
enlargement and exclusion have led to a continuous
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reconstruction of the ‘intermediate’ regions around the Union as
separate from the ‘inside’ of the EU and the regions ‘beyond’.
Both the intermediate regions and the regions ‘beyond’ are
targets of significant policy-export. However, since the EU lacks
a comprehensive policy towards region-to-region relations,
foreign policy initiatives tend to lack coherence. In particular,
there seems to be considerable discrepancy between the
universal norms the EU claims to promote, on the one hand, and
the  changing  nature  of  its  policies  towards  different  regions,  on
the other.
A  number  of  questions  can  be  posed:  How were  European
foreign policy norms constructed in the first place? How were
they transmitted through European development policies? How
were  the  norms  adopted  by  the  recipients  of  the  European  aid?
The aim of this chapter is to review and extend research into
these  questions.  It  starts  with  a  short  review  of  the  state  of  the
art in international democracy promotion. Thereafter the
construction of norms in European development policy will be
studied within the context of the evolving international aid
regime. Subsequently, an analysis of different kinds of European
donor states and their different development policies will follow.
Finally, a tentative discussion on the transmission and adoption
processes will conclude the paper.
Democracy promotion in developing countries:
The state of the art
With the consolidation of democracy and the democracy
promotion as an international norm, a literature on
democratization has flourished since the 1990s. Different types
of analysis are available, from broad international relations
theorizing to political theory to micro-level concerns over the
effectiveness of political aid projects (Youngs 2004: 27). As
democratization is closely linked with politics, as well as with
overall social development and security, it draws interest in
various academic fields, such as the Political Science,
Development Studies and Security Studies. However, usually
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these links have been examined separately, each field of study
focusing on its ‘own’ area of specialisation.
It  is  not  my  aim  to  present  an  overall  review  of  this
literature here (see, among others, Schraeder 2003, Youngs
2004).  Instead,  I  wish  to  pay  attention  to  two  major  flaws  that
may limit our understanding about democratization as a social
process, particularly in the developing countries. First, the focus
of  the  analysis  often  remains  on  the  democracy  promotion
projects, instead of democratization processes (Schraeder 2003:
24; Hossain et al 2003; de Zeeuw 2005).1 More often than not,
the focus is limited to the efforts of individual donor countries. In
the democratization literature, issues of flow tangent with the
larger theoretical question known as the internal-external divide:
to what extent are democratization processes influenced by
internal factors vs. external factors? This in turn leads to moral
and political questions over the legitimacy of external agents’
interventions in democratization processes.
Second, there is a bias towards certain regions, such as
Southern Europe and Eastern Europe, while the democratization
processes in more populous but less wealthy regions of the
world, such as South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa receive much
less attention. Thereby the links between poverty, extreme
inequality and persistent internal conflicts and the construction
of democratic governance are not given due attendance. As a
consequence, the two flaws may lead to misguided ideas
concerning the roles of internal vs. external factors in
democratization processes, as well as to limited understanding
about the global dimensions of such processes.
In order to overcome the internal-external divide and the
regional bias within the democratization literature, an attempt is
made  to  shift  the  focus  from  individual  democracy  promotion
efforts to democratization processes that take place in an
international environment characterised by norm guided
1  The tendency can be partly explained by externalist reasons: funding
for research on democracy promotion projects is provided by
organisations running or funding such projects.
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behaviour of the major international actors.2 What  follows  is  an
analysis of the international norm structure that guides both the
democracy promotion and democratization processes.
The construction of norms in European
development policy
The Council, the Member States, the European Parliament and
the European Commission have asserted that
Combating global poverty is not only a moral obligation: it will
also help to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and
equitable world, reflecting the interdependency of its richer
and poorer countries (EU 2006: 1).
This statement provides for at the least two possible readings,
each one corresponding to the classical determinants of the aid
policy. One refers to donor interests, such as security and
economic  gains.  The  other  refers  to  the  moral  obligation  of  the
donor states towards the less well-off states. This division has its
equivalent in the realist vs. idealist divide familiar from the
classical treatises on international politics. (Neo-)realists claim
that our politician-prince seeks security in the first place and
therefore donor interests are bound to determine aid policies.
Those  opposing  realism  usually  point  to  the  fact  that  the  aid
policy behaviour of many donor states deviates from their
expected national interests (Stokke 1989; Lumsdaine 1993;
Siitonen 2005; Hoebink and Stokke 2005). Constructivist theory
has paid attention to the possibility of foreign policies being
guided by international norms. Particularly in situations where a
state does not know its interests, international norms may
provide the state with directions and goals through norms
attached with certain identity (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 2000).
The concept of an international aid regime as the
normative guide for development policies has been proposed by a
2  Let us note that this does not in any way deny the possibility of acting
against the international norms, as exemplified by terrorism or illegal
wars, even within or by the most powerful state. It is only claimed that
most actors most of the time pay attention to the international norms
and  expect  it  of  other  actors  as  well,  which  in  turn  renders  the
existence of an international society possible.
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number of authors. Some others remain less convinced that the
sum of bilateral aid relationships would qualify as an
international regime (Ruggie 1983). Still others claim that regime
analysis  only  limits  our  vision  of  power  and  domination  as  the
basic structures of international relations (Strange 1982).
Nevertheless, the concept has been fruitfully applied in various
international issue areas. For instance, it has helped in
explaining why aid programmes were simultaneously launched
in practically all Western industrialised countries at the
beginning of the 1960s (Lumsdaine 1993). Similarly, the idea of
an  aid  regime  helps  in  understanding  the  continuity  of  the  aid
system vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the Third World
movement and the oil crises in the 1970s (Krasner 1985), debt
crises  in  the  1980s  (Wood  1986)  and  the  end  of  the  Cold  War
(Hook 1995; Wood 1996).3
Particularly since the early 1990s, donor states and
international development organisations have shown uniform
international behaviour more than ever before. Democratization
and respect for human rights were introduced as conditions for
future aid during the 1990s. The shift took place simultaneously
by almost all donor states and development organisations, thus
indicating the existence of an international aid regime. In 2000,
the declaration of Millennium Development Goals (MDG)
established further global consensus on the international
development agenda, adding poverty reduction to the
‘appropriate’ goals for development aid.4 The MDGs were adopted
by all the major international development organisations as well
as  the  donor  and  recipient  states.  In  short,  for  a  moment  it
looked like there was an unprecedented global consensus on the
‘appropriate’ goals of the development policy.
3  It is only fair to note that there are significant differences in precision
and content how the cited authors define their aid regimes.
4  The primary goal in the list of the Millennium Development Goals is to
halve  poverty  in  the  developing  world  by  2015.  For  the  MDGs,  see
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. Let us note in passing that in
1973 the then president of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, set the
goal  to  eradicate  poverty  by  the  year  2000  as  the  major  goal  of
development (Leftwich 2000: 70). This time the goal is only to halve
poverty.
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The global consensus on development policy, if there ever
was  one,  did  not  last  very  long.  In  the  name  of  the  so-called
international community, the community of donor states soon
found even more important use for their aid. With the end of the
Cold  War,  ‘new’  hazards  loomed  large  and  they  were  seen  to
challenge our own economic and political security through mass
migration, epidemics, drugs, terrorism and organised crime.
Addressing these kinds of challenges not only provided the
development policies with additional justifications (OECD 2001;
EU 2003). They also linked the aid regime with the new security
paradigm.5
Building on the idea of an evolving aid regime, the question
is how the regime succeeds in combining democracy promotion
with poverty reduction and security concerns. What follows is an
analysis of the international democracy assistance regime that
conditions interaction between international actors in the aid
relationship. In addition, the corresponding European
development policy norms will be indicated. The European
Consensus (EU 2006) will serve as the major document for the
EU development policy.
The conventional definition of an international regime
involves “implicit or explicit norms, rules and decision-making
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a
given area of international relations” (Krasner 1982). However,
the regime rules and norms are hard to differentiate conceptually
(cf. Donnelly 1986). Furthermore, because of the bilateral nature
of most aid, international decision-making procedures are hard
to find, except perhaps in the case of the EU-ACP relationship.6
Therefore the tentative international democracy assistance
regime may be better formulated in terms of principles, rules,
standards and guidelines:
5  The new security paradigm partly incorporates new elements, such as
economic, environmental and social aspects of (redefined) security to
the  old  paradigm,  partly  extends  the  scope  of  action  from  the  purely
domestic realm to the regional and even international spheres. The
analysis draws from Paris 2001.
6  The state of the matter is a consequence of the monopolistic structure
of development assistance: those states who ‘sell’ aid do not ‘buy’ it,
and those that ‘buy’ aid only seldom ‘sell’ it.
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Principles are matters of general understanding. In other
words, they are ‘nested’ in more general ‘meta-regimes’ of the
international society. They also define the overall goals of and
provide justifications for the states to act. The overall principle
and goal of democracy assistance are well captured in the
following characterisation of the international relations at the
turn of the millennium: “first, democracy’s status as the
predominant form of political governance within the Westphalian
nation-state system; and second, the emergence of an
international norm that considers democracy promotion to be an
accepted and necessary component of international behaviour.”
(Schraeder 2003: 22). Similarly, the EU has declared that its
“development policy will have as its primary objective … the
promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for
human rights”. (EU 2006: 8).
Previous analyses have found three further general
justifications for democracy promotion: promotion of human
rights, the development imperative and the idea of democratic
peace (Hakovirta 2000). Human rights are clearly a meta-regime
in the sense that, unlike in the case of democracy, there are
international agreements that define the contents of the (civil
and political) rights and the obligations of the states vis-à-vis
them. The dominant Western understanding is that democracy is
the best guarantor of human rights, especially civil and political
rights. The correlation between the two is clear although far from
perfect. However, this is partly a vicious circle, insofar as both
democracy and human rights are understood in the liberal sense
and thereby one necessitating the other (Hakovirta 2000: 193).
Let us note that the EU acknowledges “the essential oversight
role of democratically elected citizens’ representatives,” which
comes rather close to the democracy in the liberal sense (EU
2006: 3).
The development imperative is perhaps less well
established, yet constitutes a widely shared understanding
among the states and international organisations.7 The
7  The development imperative is the corollary of what Juhani Koponen
has coined as developmentalism, or “that complex of ideas, discourses,
ways of action, institutions and other structures that has grown around
AN AID REGIME AT WORK / 149
relationship between democracy and development has been the
subject of systematic inquiries at least since the 1970s (Sorensen
1988: 64-92). The correlation between the two is contended and
partly ambiguous, depending on the definitions of the concepts.
In the MDG, the development imperative was reformulated as
poverty reduction. Similarly, another primary objective of the EU
development policy is defined as “the eradication of poverty in
the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the
MDGs”. (EU 2006: 8)
Finally, democracy promotion is justified with the Kantian
vision of democratic peace. Notwithstanding some contrary
evidence, the idea has been presented as the contribution of the
international politics to public policy (Siverson 2000).
Furthermore, democratic peace also serves as a meta-principle in
the US and EU defence strategies. In the EU development policy,
it is stated that “EU action for development … is in the interests
of wider peace and stability …” (EU 2006: 7).
Rules are standards of behaviour in terms of rights and
obligations. In the issue area of democracy assistance, the first
rule sets that democracy promotion is considered an accepted
and even necessary component of international behaviour of the
states. Yet, general customary law does not as such make any
obligation for states to be democratic.8 European democracy
promotion commitment was made in a 1991 Development
Council resolution and then incorporated into mainstream
foreign policy through the Maastricht treaty(formally, the Treaty
on European Union) in 1992 (Youngs 2004: 2).9 The second rule
the  notion  of  development  during  the  last  years  or  so  and  that  has
involved a multitude of national, international and, increasingly, local
actors. Koponen 1999: 2.
8  See UN: Agenda for Democratization, para 21. According to Skordas
(2003:335-337), “However, this does not mean that ‘democratic
governance’ does not exist in general international law. It exists as a sui
generis legal-political general principle.” Furthermore, it “has a firm
political foundation in the activities of international organizations and a
certain customary basis, at least in the broader Euro-atlantic region,
Oceania and Japan.”
9  A similar pledge to provide assistance for elections and other
democratic institutions was made by the OECD, the Council of Europe,
the Commonwealth and the Organization of American States (ibid.).
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concerns the respect for human rights, which is considered a
sine qua non for any contractual relationship. Accordingly, all
the EU agreements on trade or aid with the third countries have
since 1992 contained a clause stipulating that human rights are
an essential element in the relations between the parties.10 The
third rule draws from the general aid regime and maintains that
donor states consider it their right to choose the recipients of
their aid and to set the conditions for the future aid. In general,
recipient states have no right to claim for assistance. For the
continuation  of  aid,  they  have  the  duty  to  show  their  overall
commitment and will to promote democracy and good
governance. In the name of the principle of ownership of
development by the partner countries, the EU considers
developing countries to “have the primary responsibility for
creating an enabling domestic environment for mobilising their
own resources, including coherent and effective policies.” (EU
2006: 3).
Standards set prescriptions for the policies in terms of
clearly defined targets. They are met to the extent that the policy
targets are met. The standards concerning the civil and political
rights are probably most clearly defined, those concerning the
economic, social and cultural rights tend to be less so.
Accordingly, the organisation of regular, fair and equal elections
is  a  clearly  defined  standard.  Instead,  participation  in  the
elections is less clearly defined, since low participation may be a
consequence of political or social reasons; from arbitrary
prevention to negligence to various social and economic
hindrances (illiteracy, marginalization etc.)
As for the amount or share of assistance allotted to
democracy promotion, no standards are set. During the 1990s,
democracy assistance increased faster than the Commission’s
total aid budget. However, in relative terms, it represented only
about one per cent of EC development assistance by the year
2000 (Youngs 2004: 31). Nor is the allocation of such aid to
different kinds of recipients prescribed in any way. Donors
10  See http://www.europa.eu/pol/rights/overview; cf. the Cotonou
Convention, Art.13 §1.
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usually make these decisions by themselves. Collectively, they,
however, expect the recipients of aid to follow certain common
standards. Accordingly, recipient states are expected to
participate in political dialogue with the donor states, as well as
regularly show development in democracy, human rights and
good governance. The dialogue is usually restricted to these
issues and the criteria are nonnegotiable. Should a recipient fail
to fulfil to meet the conditions, the continuation of assistance
will be discussed and, unless a satisfying outcome can be
secured, assistance terminated.
Guidelines define desirable policies and practices. In order
to say whether policies are in accordance with the guidelines, the
longer-term tendencies towards (or away from) the desirable
practices have to be examined. Indicators of democratic
development are many and no overall agreement on the
‘quantity’  or  ‘quality’  of  democracy  has  been  made.  At  least
following criteria tend to be popular: democratic institutions
(elections, political parties, parliament etc.), popular
participation, civil and political rights, etc. International
organisations, such as the International Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), have developed more or less
sophisticated means for measuring democracy, but these have
not been given official status.11
Altogether, there seems to be a quasi-global consensus on
democracy  promotion  as  an  international  norm that  guides  the
foreign policies of the states that identify themselves with the
international society. The interesting character of the tentative
regime is that the three principles that the regime is justified on
have a very different status. Human rights are taken as a sine
qua non for any democracy in the liberal sense. Less human
rights automatically means less democracy. Instead, insofar as
democracy is seen as conducive to development, there is not
necessarily a similar element of reciprocity here: Does less
development affect the quantity or quality of democracy?
Furthermore, insofar as poverty reflects the lack of development,
the question is whether poverty frames the types of democracy.
11  For the IDEA, see http://www.idea.int/
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Similarly, there is no automatic reciprocity between peace and
democracy either. If democracy adds to the possibility of peace,
does lack of peace affect the character of democracy? Ceteris
paribus, how does a fragile peace influence the possibilities of
democracy?
When  returning  to  the  argument  stated  above  –  that
international norms may provide states with directions and goals
through  norms  attached  to  a  certain  sense  of  identity  –  the
question is how the norms under examination mould the identity
of  the  EU.  The  expectation  is  that  at  least  for  the  European
Community, international norms offer a clearly defined
international  identity  and  thereby  goals  for  action.  For  the
member states, too, the norms may add to their international
identity, either directly or as a member state. In the following the
identities and corresponding goals will be scrutinized.
On different European donors and approaches
Let us start with the notion that EU’s external relations are
based on a ‘dual system’ (Youngs 2004: 28-30). Trade policy is
within the Commission’s exclusive competence. In contrast, the
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), established
in 1993, is intergovernmental, with decision making by
consensus. Development assistance, in turn, incorporates the
dual system with part of the ‘European aid’ being channelled
through the Commission, but member states retain their
sovereignty over bilateral aid programmes. Accordingly, we can
speak of common European approaches to poverty and
democracy both at the level of the community and the member
states, whereas any approach to stability expects
intergovernmental consensus (See below Table 1.)
Furthermore, there are different kinds of European donor
countries and European approaches: the Community and the
Member States, the Member States vs. the ‘other’ Europe
(Norway, Switzerland); large vs. small European states; those
with or without a colonial history; northern vs. southern
Europe.  Such  distinctions  may  serve  in  analysing  how
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international norms are formulated in development policies
and transmitted as policy-export to the recipients of aid.
When focusing on aid, the major international norms
partly draw from the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)
and are closely linked to the donor community’s commitment
to provide increased funding for development. The EU is
committed to provide assistance to developing countries at the
target level of 0.56 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) by
2010 and 0.7 % by 2015. Furthermore, at least “half of this
increase will be allocated to Africa, while fully respecting
individual Member States’ priorities in development
assistance.” (EU 2006: 5).
Table 1: Major actors, issue areas and possible European approaches
Issue area Major actors Official EU goals
Terms of trade12 Commission
Aid
Commission
Member States
Poverty reduction
Democracy
promotion
Security Member States Stability
The EU claims to be the leading source of development
assistance, providing over half of the world’s aid (EU 2006).
This claim, however, needs some clarification. The EU consists
of the European Community and the Member States.
Correspondingly, ‘EU aid’ consists of Member States’
contributions that are channelled either through the
Commission, bilaterally or through other international
organisations. The annual volume of official development
assistance (ODA) that is channelled through the Commission is
only  equivalent  to  the  annual  volume  of  ODA  from  a  large
12  Poverty reduction as a goal of EU’s trade policy is discussed by
Stocchetti, this volume.
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Member State.13 The  volume of  ODA from the  Member  States
varies considerably, even when the twelve new Member States
are excluded. In 2005 the ‘old’ fifteen Member States
contributed, on average, US$3,700 million (or 0.44 as a per
cent of GNI),.14 Whereas France, Germany and the UK each
contributed to over $10,000 million; Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Luxembourg and Portugal each provided less than $1,000
million.
In addition to the huge differences in scale, the allocation
of  bilateral  aid  significantly  differs  from one  Member  State  to
another. When excluding debt cancellation to Iraq (usually
counted as ODA), the top ten recipients of ‘real’ assistance
varied immensely between the Member States. In this
connection,  however,  it  may  be  well  placed  to  focus  on  the
poverty  orientation  of  the  aid.  For  practical  purposes,  the
poverty  orientation  of  an  aid  programme can  be  defined  both
quantitatively, in terms of aid to poor countries (least developed
countries, or LDCs, and other low-income countries, or LICs)
and qualitatively, as aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.15 The share of
ODA to LDCs varied between 80 percent (Portugal) and 20
percent (Austria), with the EU average falling at 39 percent of
all  aid.  There  was  much  less  variation  in  aid  proportions
destined to LICs, which comes as no surprise given the much
larger  number  of  countries  in  this  group.  In  both  cases,  aid
from the average EU country was consistently more poverty-
oriented than the OECD donors’ average.16
13  In 2005, the net ODA of the Commission was 7,555 MEUR, compared
with  that  of  Germany  at  8,112  MEUR  or  France  at  10,025  MEUR.
Source: OECD (2007).
14  In current terms (ibid.).
15  Both definitions can be debated. For a discussion on poverty orient-
tation  as  an  aid  regime  norm,  see  pp.  78-79  and  83-84  in  Siitonen
(2005).
16  The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD comprises
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, the
United States, and the 15 ‘old’ EU member states as well as the
Commission. OECD aid averages 35% to LDCs and 20% to LICs,
against the EU averages of 39% to LDC and 24% to LICs (OECD 2007).
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Similarly,  the  share  of  aid  to  Sub-Saharan  Africa  varied
strongly, from 88 percent (Portugal) to 6 percent (Greece), with
the EU average being at 47 percent of total ODA. Since most of
the countries in this region belong to the group of LDCs there
is strong overlap between the two aid policy norms. Let us
note, however, that the average EU country allocates almost
half  (47  percent)  of  its  aid  to  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  against  the
OECD average of 33 percent (OECD 2007).
Insofar as comparative aid data indicates any genuine
poverty orientation in European aid policies, the possibility of
social responsibility could be confirmed. There are, however,
obvious historical and geopolitical reasons for the European
countries to strengthen their relations with Africa, particularly
for the former colonial powers and the countries of southern
Europe. Therefore a comparison of the aid policies of two
European non-Member States of the EU, Norway and
Switzerland, is justifiable.
As far as their contribution to development financing is
concerned,  Norway  is  known  as  the  world  leader  and
Switzerland can be categorised as an average donor. They both
allocate aid to LDCs and to Sub-Saharan Africa at the same
level as other European countries. For example, in Nepal,
Norway was the sixth and Switzerland the seventh largest
donor. In Tanzania, Norway came as the eight and Switzerland
the twelfth (out of 22 OECD/DAC member states). This simple
comparison gives further evidence to the poverty orientation of
European aid.
There is, however, a particular phenomenon among the
European donor states; the significant difference between small
and large donors. There is long-term evidence confirming that
small donors on average were more generous towards the Third
World than donors in general (Hoadley 1980; Siitonen 2005).
That is, of course, in relative terms (ODA as a percent of donor
Gross National Income (GNI)). In absolute terms the smaller
donors, by definition, are seldom able to provide similar
quantities of aid as the larger ones. The correlation between
the donor size (GNI) and the ODA/GNI was clearly negative
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over the two past decades. Against all odds, variation in donor
size (GNI) explained poverty orientation even better than
variation in donor wealth (GNI per capita). With a closer look, it
comes clear that it is particularly the northern European small
donors that largely explain the tendency. Then again,
smallness as such does not suffice in explaining aid behaviour.
Accordingly, there is growing evidence in favour of the
claim that domestic structures may help explain variation in
foreign policy behaviour, particularly in the case of
development policies (Stokke 1989; Lumsdaine 1993; Noël &
Thérien 1995, 2000; Siitonen 2005). Among the domestic
structures that best explain variation are the institutional
attributes of the welfare state and a closely related variable,
cumulative partisan strength (i.e. the number of years a leftist
political party has been in government). Correspondingly, there
are three ideal solutions for combining democracy with
inequality and poverty: liberal, statist and equalitarian.17 In the
liberal solution, the state is expected to encourage market and
subsidise private welfare schemes (as in Australia, Canada and
the US). In the statist solution, the benefits are attached to
class and status (with Austria, France, Germany, and Italy as
examples). Finally, the equalitarian solution is based on
universalism and extends the benefits also to the middle
classes (with the Scandinavian countries as primary examples).
The idea is that domestic solutions may help in explaining and
understanding how problems are perceived and the solutions
transmitted abroad. The question is, whether such differences
help in explaining variation in the means and ways of policy-
export.
European approaches to democracy promotion
The EU has a double role in a sense that whereas it is a major
source of transnational policy export, the Union itself is
characterized by the changing nature of its policies towards
17  The solutions correspond to what Esping-Andersen (1990) has named
as liberal, corporatist and social democratic welfare-state regimes.
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different regions. These identities, in turn, correspond to
different values and norms, such as democracy and human
rights, social responsibility and multilateralism as well as
stability. Some of the values, such as human rights and
democracy, are declared universal and considered reciprocal
with each other. Others, such as development or stability, are
seen either as instrumental to democracy or sometimes as the
outcomes of democracy.
As  noted  in  the  introduction,  there  seems  to  be  a
considerable discrepancy between the universal norms the EU
claims to promote, on the one hand, and the changing nature
of its policies towards different regions, on the other.
Furthermore, European approaches to democracy promotion
mean different  things  in  different  regions.  From an  analytical
point of view, the different approaches can be presented as a
continuum of policies, from the least to the most coercive:18
1. Democratization by persuasion: classic diplomacy as
well as the provision of foreign aid to non-associated
countries and the threat of withholding aid and other
economic sanctions
2. Democratization by association: political conditionalities
to the potential applicant countries and associated
countries
3. Democratization by force: indirect (covert and
paramilitary) and direct military interventions
The method of persuasion is the least coercive and contains
various means, from technical advice to diplomatic persuasion
and pressure to economic rewards and punishments. As such,
it comes close to what Liberalism stands for: rational choice by
rational  actors.  The  idea  is  that  the  rational  leaders  of  states
concerned should accept political changes as the cost of
rewards  that  Europe  will  offer.  Europe  is  only  committed  to
assistance and support for democratic development as long as
the conditions are met. Otherwise the method works according
18  The continuum draws partly from Schraeder 2003: 26; partly from
Hossain et al. 2003:  18-22.  An  alternative  way  is  to  present  the
methods as a dichotomy between ‘positive’ and ‘coercive’ approaches,
as in Youngs 2004: 21-26.
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to the logic of exclusion: neither promises for additional aid,
nor memberships are on offer.
The  method  of  persuasion  is  being  mainly  applied  to  the
developing regions that have been excluded from potential
association and membership of the EU: developing countries in
Asia (excluding the Mediterranean countries) and Latin
American countries (excluding the Caribbean countries).
The method of association offers the same means as the
method of persuasion plus the possibility of association or
membership. It is more coercive in a sense that in addition to
pressure and economic punishments, the method also includes
the threat of loss of associate or candidature status. The logic
of enlargement expects an applicant state not only to change
its political system but also to adopt European policies in
various areas of social life (environment, education etc.).
Elements of this form of policy export are gradually included in
associative relations as well. However, since the applicant
states are given the equal rights of membership, this method
can be considered more equalitarian than liberal. Similarly, the
associated states are given a clear commitment for continued
assistance and, at least in principle, the option to collectively
negotiate on the conditions of assistance.
Whereas membership in the EU is clearly defined, the
number of possible candidates for membership remains
disputable.19 Indeed,  “the  external  borders  of  the  European
Union (EU) are becoming increasingly difficult to delineate as it
exports policies to states beyond its own membership”
(Christiansen et al. 2000: 389). The method of association is
being used most coercively towards potential applicant
countries such as Turkey. It also applies to the ‘near
neighbourhood’ of the EU: Eastern European countries
between  the  EU  and  Russia,  the  Near  East  and  the
Mediterranean countries.
Furthermore, policy export affects the associated ACP
(African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries. Political conditions
19  For the moment, membership is limited to ‘European’ states, the
definition of which, however, remains a politically disputed matter.
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were first included in the Lomé IV (1990-2000) convention,
which set respect for human rights as the condition for the
continuation of the association. The Cotonou convention of
2000 (for the years 2000-2020) added political dialogue and
further political conditions (Holland 2002:197; for the
background, see Laakso, this volume; also Grilli 1993).
Democratization by force is the most coercive method and
may include various forms of military intervention. In its
extreme mode, it encompasses military occupation, political
settlement and usually some sort of aid package.20 It  is  most
clearly  linked  with  power  politics  and  thereby  also  to  the
colonial history of European powers: Historically ,colonial
domination was justified by a promise to address ‘tropical
anarchy’ in southern countries (Sampson 2002). Today, the
fear  of  anarchy  is  again  being  used  as  justification  for
‘humanitarian interventions’ in the South. Such interventions
may combine peace-keeping operations, humanitarian aid and
civilian crisis management, including democratization.
European Rapid Reaction Force was created by the end of
2003 to intervene in humanitarian and peace-keeping
operations.  So  far  the  Force  has  been  deployed  only  once
outside  Europe,  to  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo.  The
currently planned operation in Darfur, Sudan, is likely to be an
even larger operation.
All in all, the simultaneous logic of enlargement and
exclusion  in  different  parts  of  the  world  contribute  to  the
different roles and identities of the EU. The inside of the Union
is dominated by democratic peace. Towards the ‘outside’
regions various methods are being used, depending on the
status of the region. The ‘intermediate’ regions tend to be an
object of more coercive methods; at the same time attention is
being paid to the institution building and thereby to prevailing
inequalities and poverty in the countries concerned. In
20  Historically, we know at least two cases, Germany and Japan, which
were democratized by force (Burnell 2000). The more recent cases,
Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq, have proved to be much more challenging
and, at least so far, much less successful examples.
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contrast, the regions ‘beyond’ are treated either with
association or persuasion. The expectation is that in both cases
the opening of the market and good governance will take care
of inequality and poverty. Finally, the most coercive methods,
such  as  cutting  all  aid  or  democratization  by  force,  would  be
applied only to states where stability is at stake and therefore
the  approach  is  one  of  maintaining  the  status  quo.  A
comparison of different approaches to two recipient countries,
one  with  an  associated  status  and  another  without,  may
provide further evidence to the matter.
Norm transmission and adoption in Nepal and
Tanzania
In  order  to  analyse  the  role  of  European  aid  in  norm
transmission, it appears fruitful to make the distinction
between norm transmission and norm adoption. A norm has
been transmitted when the prescriptions embodied in a norm
become part of the domestic political discourse; it has been
adopted only when the prescriptions have made constitutive
effects on the state practices. (Cf. Checkel 1999). The question
is how different modes of norm transmission concerning
democracy and poverty reduction contribute to the adoption of
international norms and, thereby, to the possible consolidation
of democracy. Two recipient countries of European aid, Nepal
and Tanzania, will serve as examples.
By the size of their populations, Nepal (27 million) and
Tanzania (38 million) are middle-sized nations (see Table 2).
Population  growth  is  very  rapid,  however,  with  the  population
having  almost  doubled  in  both  countries  during  the  last  two
decades. In geographical terms, Nepal is a rather small
whereas Tanzania is middle-sized. Economically both are
relatively small and poor economies and categorised by the UN
as least developed countries (LDCs). Human development was
ranked low in both countries, around 0.5, which corresponds
to a ranking around 150 (out of 177 countries in 2006).
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Table 2: Nepal and Tanzania compared , 2004
Nepal Tanzania
Population
(thousands)
26,591 37,627
GDP (US$ billions) 6,7 10,9
GDP per capita (US$) 252 288
Average Life
Expectancy (in 2004)
62 46
Adult Literary Rate
(%) (in 2004)
49 69
Human development
index /Rank
0.527
/138
0.430
/162
Source: UNDP 2006.
As recipients of ODA, Tanzania is far more successful in
attracting foreign aid funds than Nepal. For each Tanzanian,
aid accounted for $39.30 in 2006, whereas the average
Nepalese only received $15.80. The European Union accounted
for over half (53.7%) of all the ODA to Tanzania from the OECD
area over the years 2001-2005. The UK (15%) and the
Netherlands  (7%)  contributed  most,  with  Japan  (6%)  as  the
third largest donor. During the same period, Nepal received
almost  half  (41%)  of  all  ODA  from  the  Commission  and  the
member states. Japan (18%), Germany (12%) and the UK (12%)
were  among  the  leading  donors.  Accordingly,  the  EU  can  be
said  to  be  the  leading  source  of  development  aid  in  both
countries.21
Tanzanian democratization is a major example of the aid
regime  at  work.  The  common  understanding  is  that  already
before any donor state or international organisation formally
set democracy as a condition for future aid, the government
was prepared to lead the country to multi-party democracy. In
1992, after almost three decades of a single-party authoritarian
21  Figures calculated from the data in OECD (2007).
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rule,  the  ruling  party  CCM  (Chama cha Mapinduzi) readily
accepted that it was time to introduce pluralist democracy in
the country. Since then, three multi-party elections were held
(in 1995, 2000 and 2005). In the mainland Tanzania, the
elections were considered peaceful and relatively fair and free.
So  far,  the  leading  party  CCM  has  managed  to  gain  a  clear
majority in all the votes. (Hossain et al. 2003: 84 ff.)
In  contrast,  the  autonomous  island  state  of  Zanzibar,
which was united with mainland Tanganyika in 1963 to
become the United Republic of Tanzania, offers a different view
to the aid regime. The major opposition party, the Civic United
Front (CUF) has consistently refused to recognize election
results. After mass demonstrations and violence in 2001 that
led to over 20 people dead and emigration to the neighbouring
Kenya,  the  EU cancelled  aid  to  Zanzibar.  The  fear  of  Islamists
taking over power in an independent Zanzibar seems to have
effected the decision. Aid was, however, again resumed after an
agreement between CCM and CUF was brokered in 2001. Still,
the political situation continues to be fragile.
As  an  ACP country  Tanzania  is  a  signatory  state  of  the
Cotonou  Convention.  And  the  EU  is  represented  by  the
Commission  and  the  member  states.  During  the  1980s,  the
donor countries pushed hard to convince the Tanzanian
government  to  accept  an  agreement  with  the  World  Bank  and
to give up its policy of socialism and self-reliance. Under
pressure, and conscious of the economic setbacks and the
related growing discrepancy between socialist policies and
actual practices, the government accepted the agreement and
started liberalising the economy. This experience was a major
lesson for the elites, who found themselves increasingly
dependent on foreign assistance.  It also gives a clue to why the
elites were so ready to introduce multi-party democracy.
The Nepalese democratization began 1990 as a classical
bottom-up revolt against the traditional ruling elite that lost
much of its credibility. The process, however, turned into
political instability and civil war in 1996 and has resulted in
more than 13,000 deaths in ten years. The conflict reached the
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level of civil war although it was consistently called a ‘Maoist
revolt’ by both the government and the donors. Most donors,
however, see the conflict in Nepal as being inherently political
in nature. The Maoists have been successful in incorporating
the striking inequalities and the cause of ethnic minorities into
their struggle (Hossain et al. 2007).  The  war  has  only  recently
ended.
After February 2005, when the King of Nepal dissolved
his government and resumed absolute power, most donors
remained in the country but declined to make new
commitments. With a cease-fire and the formation of an
interim government  in  early  2007  consisting  of  the  old  parties
and the Maoists, Nepal has a new opportunity for democracy.
The donors, however, have taken a reserved attitude and
continue to try to keep stability and the status quo.
Conclusions
This  study  set  to  ask  how  the  European  Union  combines  its
role as the leading provider of development aid with its role as
the major source of policy-export. The focus was on two
recipient countries; Tanzania with an associated status and
Nepal without. The tentative outcomes of analyses of the two
case countries are as follows: In the case of top-down
democratization, as in the mainland Tanzania, the European
approach to norm transmission was liberal at the best. Except
for some technical aid, no serious attempt was made towards
institution building, which could respond to the prevailing
inequality  and  poverty  that  can  threaten  the  consolidation  of
democracy. In the case of bottom-up democratization, as in
Zanzibar and Nepal, the European approach focused mainly on
stability and thereby only strengthened the status quo. In both
examples, the ‘bottom-up’ represents the ‘wrong’ type of
political forces (the Islamists in Zanzibar, the Maoists in Nepal);
both of these, however, successfully raise the issue of
inequality. Therefore, although democracy as a norm has been
fairly successfully transmitted, the possibility of norm adoption
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depends on how the problems caused by growing inequalities
can be solved.
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Msitu wa Angai: Haraka, haraka, haina
baraka!
Why does handing over the Angai forest to local
villages proceed so slowly?1
Irmeli Mustalahti
Introduction
Various terms are used to describe the transfer of the
management of natural resources from government authority
to  local  people.  In  the  literature,  “community  forestry”  and
“participatory forestry” seem to be the most common terms for
people’s participation in forest management. In Tanzania,
participatory forest management (PFM) is considered as an
overall term for participatory forestry models. The central
issue in Tanzania is that local people participate in developing
objectives, plans and rules for the use and management of
their village forests or co-management forests. Co-
management refers to joint forest management (JFM) in which
local people manage forest areas on behalf of, or together with,
the central government or local government authorities (White
and Mustalahti 2005).
In  the  early  1990s,  PFM  in  Tanzania  was  piloted  on
unreserved land where village communities gained jurisdiction
over forest resources through the declaration of village land
1  This paper is based on my PhD thesis (Mustalahti 2007) and is part of
an umbrella research project under the Institute of Development
Studies  in  Finland entitled  ‘Does  Finnish  Aid  Matter?’  I  would  like  to
thank Professor Juhani Koponen for supervision and comments
throughout  my work  on my PhD thesis.  It  was  a  great  experience  to
work  with  his  research project.  I  would  also  like  to  thank PIPS,  Lindi
Region, Liwale District Council and Angai villages.
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forest reserves (Wily and Dewees 2001). Assisted by the
governments of Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden  and  international  NGOs,  a  large  number  of  PFM
projects were implemented in various parts of the country.
Inspired by these pilot projects, a massive body of policies and
legislation in support of PFM was enacted from 1995 to 2003.
These included the 1995 Land Policy, the 1998 Forest Policy,
the 1999 Land Acts, the 2001 Forest Programme, and finally
the 2002 Forest Act (URT 1995; 1998; 1999a; 1999b; 2001;
2002). Tanzanian forest policy and legislation has been
renowned  for  being  very  supportive  of  PFM  (Wily  2001;  Wily
and Dewees 2001).  From 2003 onwards, the implementation
of  PFM  has  progressed  under  a  national  forest  programme
(NFP).  The  programme currently  targets  50  out  of  Tanzania’s
114 districts with funding from Government of Tanzania and
the  World  Bank,  Denmark,  Finland  and  Norway  but  also
increasingly supported by NGOs and the private sector
(Blomley  and  Ramadhani  2006).  It  is  estimated  that  3.7
million hectares, corresponding to approximately 10 per cent
of the total forest area, was under some form of PFM by 2006
(Blomley 2006).
PFM  has  progressed  swiftly  in  many  areas  where  the
forest resources are of relatively low value (Blomley and
Ramadhani 2006; Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005; Wily and
Dewees 2001; Iddi 2002). However, the process has been
much slower in areas with high value forest resources
(Mustalahti and Lund forthcoming). In spite of this positive
development towards PFM, handing over valuable forest
resources to village councils is still problematic and seems to
proceed very slowly. The Angai forest in Southern Tanzania is
a clear example of this. While I worked with the Angai villages,
my Tanzanian counterpart, a senior forester used to say:
“Haraka, haraka, haina baraka”. This means that rushing
does  not  bring  blessings  to  anything  you  do.  Dondeyne  et  al
(1998) also conclude that there are no short cuts to sound
forest management, and that villages in the Angai area need
long-term technical assistance from the district
administration.
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However, there seems to be little incentive and
motivation to ensure capacity in sound forest management,
and this obstructs the implementation of PFM. In Tanzania,
PFM implies a transfer of the right to tax forest resources to
the village level, and financially constrained districts resist this
transfer (Mustalahti and Lund forthcoming). Indeed, a benefit-
sharing regime for areas with valuable timber is disputed (Wily
and Dewees 2001). This paper aims to analyse why a benefit-
sharing regime for the Angai area has not be put in place, and
why the handing over of valuable resources to the village
councils proceed so slowly.
Conceptual framework
PFM seems to have difficulties in sustaining local people’s
participation; several obstacles still exist at the local and
national levels that make it difficult for the local people all over
the world to participate in natural resource management,
secure their rights in decision-making, gain access to land
tenure and valuable natural resources, and ensure markets
and investment opportunities related to natural resources
(Brown et al. 2002; Larson 2003; Walker 2004; Taylor 2005;
Hyakumura and Inoue 2006). Mayers and Bass (2004) argue
that, through the decentralisation of forest management, the
central-level problems are merely displaced to local level, and
bureaucracy is transferred from the central level to the sub-
national level. Participatory and decentralised forest
management  cannot  guarantee  the  rights  of  the  local  people
without developing various aspects of governance. Even if
devolution occurs, the transfer of powers is often meaningless,
as it (a) only encompasses marginal policy areas, (b) does not
include financial provisions necessary for local government to
actually fulfil its obligations, or (c) after a short period is
followed by deliberate attempts to re-centralise rights to
resources and revenues (Nhantumbo 2000; Schackleton et al.
2002; Larson 2003; Ribot 2003; Ribot et al. 2006).
While Tanzania is renowned for its progressive approach
to people’s participation in forest management, it is also
MSITU WA ANGAI / 171
recognised how challenging it is to implement PFM which calls
for local people’s access, rights and participation, as well as to
upscale and sustain these frameworks nation-wide after
phasing out external funds from donors (Mustalahti 2006;
Mustalahti 2007; Blomley 2006; Blomley and Ramadhani
2006; Lissu and von Mitzlaff 2007; Lewis et al 2000) It is
argued that ‘participation’ is a politically desirable and
ambiguous development idea and is often unimplemented
because the idea calls for contestation (Mosse 2001).
According to Chambers (1989), a first step for people to claim
their rights is information and then encouragement through
advocacy organisations and the judicial system.
I  approach  this  investigation  by  looking  at  history  of
contestation, advocacy organisations, and the legal recognition
of people’s right over the natural resource in Angai area. The
empirical study included participant observation methods: In
2000-2001, I was working in the area as a development worker
and observing day-to-day activities in Angai area. Participant
observation in anthropology aims at understanding people’s
lives. In contrast, a ‘participant’ in participatory research
refers to people’s involvement in the research process. In the
case of Angai, through participatory research and participant
observation  methods  I  aim at  both.  In  the  beginning  I  was  a
development worker, later on a researcher and observer; in the
future I would like to continue participatory action research in
the area. In the Angai area, an action-oriented research
approach originates from the forest boundary demarcation
process  in  2001  (see  below).  The  idea  was  that  during  the
process, through which villages obtain legal management right
to the forest areas, long-term research in the same area could
observe the impact of PFM on the sustainability of the forest
management activities. It is currently unclear whether funding
will be available to continue the action research process in the
area.
History of the Angai process
Liwale District, in Southeastern Tanzania, is one of the less
populated  parts  of  the  country.  Over  50%  of  the  district  is
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under the Selous Game Reserve. In 1988, district population
density outside the game reserve was less than three persons
per square kilometre (Dondeyne et al. 1998). Forests and
wildlife are the most important natural resources in Liwale.
Out  of  the  37  800  km²  of  Liwale  District,  Angai  forest  area
covers 1 388 km² of mostly miombo woodland with some high-
value timber resources, such as Brachystegia and
Julbernardia and Pterocarpus angolensis, locally  known  as
mninga. Mninga is heavily logged in some areas and is already
depleted, and loggers have moved on to mtondo (Julbernardia
globiflora). Also mpingo (African  Black  Wood, Dalbergia
melanoxylon) is heavily logged in the area.
In  the  Angai  area,  each  of  the  13  villages  has  a
population of roughly 1,000 - 3,000 people and the
surrounding villages are located more then ten kilometres from
Angai forest. Use of the land close to the villages is very
intensive, based on shifting cultivations and permanent fields
of cashew trees together with food crops. People use forest
products, such as firewood, timber and non-timber products,
in their everyday life, and for example the name Angai means
poisonous roots, which people are still using during food
shortages. The roots are collected in the forest and need to be
boiled with water several times in order to get poison out. After
that  the  root  will  be  dried,  and  used  in  a  way  similar  to
cassava, mainly as flour for local porridge.
In  1993,  the  District  Council  of  Liwale  proposed  to
gazette Angai forest as a Local Government Forest Reserve
(LGFR). The motivation of the district authorities for creating a
forest reserve was to generate additional tax revenue. This is
in step with the Tanzanian policy, which encourages District
Councils to generate income. If the area becomes a LGFR,
under the jurisdiction of the District Council, the Council
would  receive  the  part  of  the  tax  revenue  now  paid  to  the
central  government.  The  intention  of  the  District  Council  was
to increase the share of tax revenue collected from the timber
dealers who are licensed by the district authorities to harvest
in the forest. In 1994, the Liwale District Council approached
the  Rural  Integrated  Project  Support  (RIPS)  programme to  get
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assistance to establish a LGFR. RIPS, a development
cooperation programme between the Governments of Tanzania
and Finland, operated in Lindi and Mtwara Regions since 1988
until 2004. During the final phase of RIPS, the main purpose
of  the  programme  was  to  facilitate  the  institutionalization  of
participatory approaches and democratic principles in the two
regions. RIPS supported the idea of improving sustainable
forest management in Liwale District, and was willing to assist
on  the  condition  that  instead  of  simply  setting  up  the  LGFR,
RIPS could support the 13 village councils to come more
involved in sound forest management. RIPS argued that
people’s participation in forest management could improve the
incentives for local villages to protect forests and trees, and
thus prevent the degradation of forest resources (Johansson
1996).
During the years between 1994 and 2000, there were
various  steps  towards  PFM  in  Angai  area.  There  has  been  a
misunderstanding of interests between the district authorities
and the villagers, and until 2000 the district authorities
reverted to their original idea of establishing a LGFR. Various
meetings, including interviews with check-point guards and
lumber-jacks were edited into a video, “Msitu wa Hangai”, the
forest  of  Angai.  RIPS  used  this  and  other  short  participatory
videos in national, regional, district and village level in order to
report all the discussion and agreements during the Angai
process. This was recognised to be very powerful tool to get
people at different levels commit themselves to the process and
agree the decisions.
A brief history of the events since 1993 has been the
following. In 1995 workshops and meetings were held by
facilitators from Lindi region, Liwale district and RIPS in order
to reach a consensus between 13 villages and the district
authorities concerning who should manage the Angai forest. In
1995, it was agreed that four villages (Ngunja, Ngongowele,
Nahoro and Nangano) could be selected as case study villages
to  start  the  pilot  project.  The  aim of  the  pilot  project  was  to
introduce  the  PFM  model  to  the  area,  and  to  ensure
sustainable use of the natural resources and clear system of
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collecting  the  local  taxes.  In  Ngunja  and  Nahoro,  the
facilitators carried out livelihood analyses which show how
important the forest is for the villagers and how people benefit
from both timber and non-timber products (Dondeyne et al
1998).  In  Nahoro  and  Nanagano,  villagers  also  carried  out  a
forest inventory and drew up forest management plans in
collaboration with scientists from Naliendele Agriculture
Research Institute. Later on, the forest management plans
were presented in a workshop. The plans contained a five-year
timber-logging rotation scheme based on 8 blocks. During the
workshop villagers and district authorities discussed but could
not reach a consensus on how the revenue should be split
between the District Council and the villages. However, the
parties decided to continue negotiations between the different
stakeholders.
In  1997,  meetings  held  in  the  villages  of  Likombora,
Mkunya,  Mihumo,  Ngongwele  and  the  villages  said  that  they
do not agree with any decisions that would make Angai forest
a LGFR. Also, the Village Natural Resource Committees
(VNRC) in all the 13 forest villages said that they were not able
to collect taxes from all of the logging operations because of
intimidation by high-ranking district officials. Problems had
also arisen as a result of a border dispute between Nahoro and
Lilombe, and villagers claimed that a businessman had
avoided paying the tax to either of the villages. Villagers were
also complaining about the District Council’s decision to
reduce the amount of tax levied on sawed planks from 100 Tsh
to 60 Tsh.
In 1998, the following points were agreed upon by Liwale
District Council and RIPS: (a) a letter will be sent to all 13
villages explaining the process and options in working towards
the  Angai  forest  management  by  villagers,  (b)  a  summary  of
logging license procedures will be send to the 13 VNRCs with a
sample of the all papers involved in the process, (c) if and
when Village’s General Assembly meetings are held, the
district forest officer will ask for an invitation and will tape the
discussions on the Angai forest, (d) the district forestry officer
will report weekly to the district natural resources officer of all
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the extension activities in Angai villages, and (e) a standard
system of village receipts will be instituted in the Angai
villages. However, none of these activities were implemented by
District Council, and in 1999, the district authorities turned
back to their original idea of establishing a LGFR.
In 2000, RIPS hired a new development worker, the
author  of  this  paper,  for  two  years.  The  main  target  was  to
facilitate the PFM activities, particularly in Angai forest, and to
build up capacity and practices under the local government in
Liwale  District  Councils.  My  main  task  was  start  a  fresh
dialogue between the village, district, region and national
levels  in  order  to  work  out  the  best  future  option  for  Angai
forest management. The first step was for a group of
participants from the villages, district, region and RIPS to take
part  in  National  Forest  Programme  workshops  in  Mtwara
Region. Later on representatives from the Ministry of Forestry
and Beekeeping came to visit Liwale and took part in Angai
workshops organised in Liwale District. During these
workshops the district authorities and villages reach a
consensus.
In September 2000, the decision was to establish an
Angai Villages Land Forest Reserve (AVLFR), managed by the
13 villages with collaboration of district authorities. A number
of actions were agreed upon during discussions and different
meetings. All 13 villages had a village meeting about the village
land title deeds and management arrangements of Angai
forest, and the minutes of meetings were copied to the district
authorities. Later on, representatives of villages, members of
each Village Councils and VNRCs, organised a meeting with
the district authorities and agreed on future arrangements,
e.g., the demarcation of 13 villages. Finally, the villages
applied  for  the  demarcation  of  the  AVLFR,  and  for  legal  land
certificates for village lands of 13 villages.
At the end of December 2000, Liwale District Council
approved the villages’ proposal concerning a Village Land
Forest Reserve and issued the villages’ land certificates. The
District Council also appointed representatives from the
MSITU WA ANGAI / 176
Forestry and Beekeeping Division at Lindi Region and RIPS to
advise the District Technical Staff during demarcation and
other activities. The village governments together with their
village councillors and ward officers were responsible for
agreeing upon and marking boundaries between the villages.
The farmland boundaries between the different villages were
clear to village governments, but the main areas of conflict
were found during the boundary process in the forest. Working
in the forest was also dangerous because of wild animals and
the  risk  of  malaria,  and  the  dry  season  was  too  short  to
demark all the boundaries. The regional survey team started
the  boundary  process  in  2001  but  due  to  their  limited
manpower could not carry it out on time.
Finally, the actual survey and mapping was done by the
Ministry  of  Land  and  Ministry  of  Natural  Resources  and
Tourism. After the survey and mapping, i.e., from 2004, Liwale
District council has continued to establish the AVLFR in
accordance  with  the  Forest  Act  No  14  of  2002  and  the  Land
Act  No  4  of  1999  with  financial  and  technical  support  from
RIPS (2001 – 2003) and later from the National Forest
Programme’s  Coordination  Unit  Support  Project  (NFP)  (Kaale
2005).  Villages  with  their  own  forest  management  area  that
constitute  the  AVLFR are:  Nahoro  (32  727  ha  of  forest  under
VLFR),  Nangano  (4  046  ha)  ,  Kibutuka  (4  652  ha),  Kiangara
(1,572 ha), Kitogoro (8,578 ha), Mtawatawa (11,531 ha),
Mikunya (2,159 ha), Liwale B (6 737 ha), Likombora (19,694
ha), Mihumo (12,947 ha), Ngongowele (7,333 ha), Nguja (6,008
ha)  and  Lilombe  (20,786  ha).  The  total  land  area  of  the  13
villages  is  479,131  ha  most  of  which  is  under  miombo
woodlands. The total population of the 13 villages in 2002 was
22,843 people and the average forest area per person
considering the AVLFR alone was over 6 ha as compared to the
average national figure of less than 1 ha of indigenous forest
per inhabitant (Kaale and Simula 2004).
For several years, the main debate concerned the
distribution of tax revenues between the district and village
levels. In Angai, under the auspices of a non-PFM benefit-
sharing arrangement, the central government could receive a
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royalty of TSh 25-50,000 per felled tree, the District could
receive TSh 205 for every piece of timber produced in the
forest, while the villages received TSh 60 per piece of timber, a
rate which was earlier fixed by the Districts. When the 13
Angai villages finally got certificates for their VLFRs in 2005,
central government and the district lost all rights to such
levies. According to local forest experts and calculations based
on  field  observations  in  the  area,  0.7-1.0  m3/ha  of  timber
could be harvested per annum on a sustainable basis in
Angai. Based on interviews and transect walks in the forest, it
is  estimated  that  half  of  the  1,388  km²  of  Angai  could  be
allocated  to  timber  production,  implying  that  a  maximum  of
68,885 m3 of saw logs could be harvested on a sustainable
basis. Using average royalty rates and estimates of costs
related  to  harvesting  and  transportation,  we  come up  with  a
potential annual profit of approximately USD2 million (USD30
per m3 of sawn log).
Because of an earlier lack of technical and political
support from the District Council, RIPS advised the 13 villages
to establish a local advocacy organisation. During a workshop
in 2001, representatives from 13 villages established a union
between 13 villages accordingly and invited representatives of
the District Council to be its partner.  In order for the union,
later  on  called  MUHIMA  (Muungano wa hifadhi ya msitu wa
Angai, Union of the Angai Forest Reserve), to  start  its
operation, the roles and responsibilities of MUHIMA needed
clarification. Capacity building was also necessary. There are
several issues which need to be taken care of. For example,
where and how often meetings should be organized, how
villages will finance the meetings and transportation, to whom
and how MUHIMA will report, etc.? During the village meetings
in  2001,  it  was  agreed  that  the  constitution  should  go  to  the
Village Assembly Meetings for feedback. Also the Liwale
District Technical Staff was to provide their comments before
sending  it  to  a  lawyer  and  the  full  District  Council  for
approval.  The  registration  was  to  be  undertaken  after  all
comments  were  combined  and  the  final  draft  of  the
constitution  was  ready.  To  date,  the  union  has  not  been
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registered, and according to interviews in 2005, MUHIMA only
convenes if the District Council calls a meeting and covers the
meeting allowances.
The next step is that the 13 villages, in collaboration
with the District Council, should prepare a forest management
plan  for  the  AVLFR,  in  which  sustainable  levels  of  logging  for
each village will be established. District and central
government authorities have not allowed the village Councils
to reap any benefits before having prepared a thorough
inventory and forest management plan. The District estimates
that  such  an  inventory  would  cost  TSh  180  million
(USD180,000), which cannot be financed by the District or the
villages in their current situation. One straightforward
solution  might  be  to  allocate  a  smaller  area  to  the  villages  so
that they could harvest enough timber to pay for the inventory
and  management  plan  for  the  limited  area.  In  July  2007  this
alternative was discussed in a workshop between village
participants and district representatives. Nonetheless, future
activities are still quite unclear for both the villages and the
District Council, and they are expecting technical and
financial support from the Ministry of Natural Resources and
Tourism and donor organisations.
Key findings
Unlike  many  other  parts  of  Tanzania,  AVLFR has  the  unique
advantage of existing valuable forest resources. In most other
areas the main task is to create forest resources through
restoration efforts. However, the past 13 years have passed
without reaching the goal of economically sound and
sustainable PFM in the area. Experiences from Liwale show
that in spite of a relatively conducive legal framework and
political support, administrative discretionary powers deployed
against PFM constitute a massive constraint on
implementation. Sub-national administrations seem to have
few incentives and little capacity, both of manpower and
finances, to ensure information and benefits in participating
villages, and this obstructs the implementation of PFM.
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In  the  case  of  Angai,  the  district,  region  and  national
levels invested little of their time and financial resources
during the past 13 years, nor did they provide extension
services in PFM, except in the periods where pressure and
payments from donor projects existed. Instead, the district
administration obtained additional funds through timber
royalties, as well as through non-reported revenue-collection
which is often considered more or less normal. During 2000
and  2001,  when  I  worked  with  the  Liwale  District  it  was
obvious that district technical staff, councillors and villagers
were entangled in various patron-client relationships with
traders  of  forest  products.  A  crucial  problem  in  Tanzania  is
that in remote districts, civil servants do not always report
timber royalties. This is justified by the claim that these un-
reported payments compensate their low salaries and extreme
working conditions. Lindi Region is among those regions with
serious corruption cases related to natural resource
management. Some cases have been more silent and hidden,
while others have received national publicity through
newspaper articles and reports related to illegal logging issues
during 2006 and 2007 (Milledge et al 2007). Liwale had it own
case after I finished my working period with the Angai process:
The Liwale District Forest Officer suddenly disappeared, and
later  on  there  were  rumours  that  he  had  taken  the  un-
reported royalties and gone to Europe with me.
In  2005,  during  my  last  visit  to  Angai  villages,  VNRCs
were not satisfied with the Angai process. The PFM process
had aimed at developing an effective forest management model
in the Angai area. However, it seems that PFM has not been
effective way to protect the forest resources and promote
improvements in local livelihoods. This is because the
legalisation of boundaries and the establishment of a Villages
Land Forest Reserve in the area have entailed been a lengthy
process, and have been highly dependent on the quality of the
local government’s institutional capacity. The District Council
did not have the technical and financial capacity to provide the
needed services for the villages.
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The difficulty is to implement the laws, regulations and
guidelines,  and  to  support  PFM  at  the  lowest  level  of
government through community-driven processes facilitated
by sub-national administration. The way the PFM proceeds in
Tanzania indicates that where forests have less commercial
value and deforestation is more visible, the government and
districts have been more concerned with the increasing
participation of local people in the forestry sector, and are thus
ready to fulfil the objectives of PFM. In those areas where
valuable forest resources are still available, the benefit-sharing
agreements have run into bottlenecks. Economic benefits are
fundamental with regard to participation in the management
and protection of forests; poor people simply cannot afford to
spend their time on forest protection if the net economic
output is negative, and they would rather utilise forest areas
for agriculture and harvest the valuable timber illegally.
It can be questioned whether PFM decreases or increases
rural poverty. For example, in case of Angai, villagers were
required  to  invest  time  and  labour  in  many  meetings,  in  the
boundary demarcation process, and in forest protection and
management operations while tangible incentives remained
scarce. Villages are legally entitled to utilise forest resources
and collect fines and fees from the extraction of forest
products from the AVLFRs. However, as the example of Angai
has shown, the utilisation of forest resources is complicated. A
village may have legal rights to a resource but still cannot
utilise it due to the prerequisites for utilisation, such as forest
inventories and management plans which needs external
technical and financial capacity.
In Tanzania, district administrations seem to lack
incentives, motivation as well as human and financial
resources to promote capacity and ensure benefits in
participating villages. The consequence of this is that the
districts neither invest their limited time and financial
resources, nor do they provide extension services in PFM. The
only exception is in the cases where pressure and payments
exist from NGO and donor projects. This obstructs the
implementation of PFM. The risk is that local communities do
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not have access to information and the needed capacity to
legally access and control natural resources.
Villages might benefit from timber resource by providing
labour  and  getting  wages  from  illegal  timber  operators,  but
this does not mean that they are participants with decision-
making  rights  and  the  ability  to  affect  sound  forest
management and protection. In case of Angai, villages lack the
capacity to carry out technically sound forest management
and they do not have ability to control the resources in their
locality. The district administration has continued to oversee
forest management and enforce the license-tax system related
to  forest  products  trade.  In  order  to  tackle  this  problem,  the
Liwale District Council is still seeking external funding to
improve extension in the Angai villages. In the Angai case, the
local institution, MUHIMA may serve as an extension provider
in  the  long-term  although,  at  the  moment,  they  still  require
long-term capacity building in order to strengthen the union.
In order to ensure facilitation and extension during PFM
processes, contributions from donors have been crucial, but
not always sustainable. In Tanzania, the Forestry and
Beekeeping Division (FBD) has highlighted the fact that a high
level of donor dependence is a barrier to effective up-scaling of
participatory forestry and the long-term financial
sustainability of activities (URT 2003).  Their view is that
improved revenue generation and retention procedures are
needed and villages should accept increasing responsibility for
financing PFM, and for the long-term costs of managing village
forest resources.  The basic idea is that PFM could reduce the
costs of forest management for government. However, it has
been also recognised that establishing a VLFR in Tanzania
currently consumes so much time, skills and financial
resources that District Councils are not able to facilitate and
finance boundary demarcation processes, forest inventories
and management planning through district budgets (White
and  Mustalahti  2006).  In  most  cases,  there  is  still  a  need  for
external facilitation and financial support, which originated
from central government or donors.
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An increase in both central government and community
contributions  will  be  central  for  the  sustainability  of  PFM.  In
Tanzania, only a small share, 10% of the revenue from timber
export, is collected annually, and these funds have the
tendency to remain in the national treasury (Milledge et al
2007).  It  is  also  commonly  known in  Tanzania  that  royalties
from natural resources disappear on the way to the treasury,
or before the funds are supposed to be distributed to local
governments or communities. The result is the unfortunate
reality that very little extension and facilitation is carried out
in  PFM  areas  without  donor  funds.  For  example,  in  Angai
villages the extension activities have been only carried out
during  periods  of  donor  funding.  During  my  interviews  in
Liwale, district authorities emphasised that the District
Council has very limited financial resources to carry out
extension and facilitation related to natural resources
management.  The  reality  is  that  distances  in  the  Angai  forest
area are so long that just travelling to the villages consumes a
lot of financial resources from the District Council.
Even external financial support for the forestry sector
cannot always solve extension and human resource problems.
In  Liwale,  in  spite  of  financial  support  from different  donors,
the Forestry and Beekeeping Division was for several years
unable  to  appoint  professional  foresters  to  stay  in  Liwale  and
facilitate PFM activities. There were several reasons for this,
such as infrastructure conditions in the district. There is now
a new Bachelor-level forester in the district, but working
conditions are still hard. In Liwale, there is a high risk of
malaria, and the water and food situation is still difficult in
some periods of year. In these conditions it is hard to expect
that government officers and their families would be willing to
stay there permanently. Often key factors influencing PFM
may lay outside of forest sector. The implementation of health
sector programmes, government investment plans for rural
areas, and government salary policies may be more important
for the nation’s forests than donor support or specific forestry
policy and legislation.
MSITU WA ANGAI / 183
Conclusions
Long-term national government and donor commitment is still
needed to assist communities build local advocacy
organisations that can assert the rights and ability of local
villages. Short project periods do not support the
institutionalisation of PFM in local communities. After all the
donor funding in PFM, national and local governments have
difficulties to ensure long-term technical support. In these
conditions, PFM may take several years to begin producing
concrete results in village livelihoods even when valuable
resources are available.
PFM requires people to change from shifting cultivators
to forest managers who see themselves as responsible for the
local resources and actively claim access to information and
benefits from the resources. Rural people in Tanzania are
slowly beginning to demand extension services, to express
their dissatisfaction towards District Council services, and to
mobilise their own efforts to protect and utilise natural
resources  in  a  sustainable  way.  In  Angai,  it  might  be  still  too
early  to  judge  the  PFM;  local  communities  need  time  to
develop local institutions and their capacity.
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Popular dissatisfaction and the erosion of
political support in Mtwara and Lindi Regions
Bernadeta Killian
Introduction
This  chapter  is  about  political  support  for  the  Tanzanian
government  among  the  people  of  Mtwara  and  Lindi  regions.
Mtwara and Lindi are two of 26 regions of the United Republic
of Tanzania. The two regions are located in the southern part of
the  country  and  they  are  usually  referred  to  as  ‘the  South’.
According to the 2002 national population census, Mtwara and
Lindi are home to about two million people of different ethnic
groups  including  the  Makonde,  the  Makua,  the  Yao  and  the
Mwera.1  About  90  percent  of  the  people  in  each  region  are
engaged in small-scale agriculture. Like other regions in
Tanzania, over the past decade, Mtwara and Lindi have
undergone profound political and economic reforms after three
decades of one-party rule and socialist experimentation. During
periods of one-party rule as well as during the new era of multi-
party  politics,  Mtwara  and  Lindi  have  formed  a  strong  and
predictable support base for the incumbent regime.
Mtwara and Lindi regions are among the least developed
areas  in  the  country.  Hence,  the  ‘South’  typifies  not  only  the
regions’ geographical location but also their economic
stagnation. According to the 2006 Poverty Status Report, some
1  For discussion about the history of the peoples of Southern Tanzania,
see Koponen (1988) and Liebenow (1971).
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of the districts in Mtwara and Lindi regions have the highest
rates  of  under-five  mortality  per  1,000  live  births  in  the
country,  i.e.,  1  child  in  4  dies  before  reaching  the  age  of  five  (
Status Report, 2006: 19).  According to the household budget
survey conducted in 2000/01, more than half the population in
Lindi  region  (53%)  and  38  percent  in  Mtwara  are  below  the
basic needs poverty line (Poverty and Human Development
Report 2005: 55). In addition, districts with the lowest literacy
rates  in  the  country  are  also  found  in  Lindi  and  Mtwara
(Poverty and Human Development Report, 2005:59). Many
years of poor communication infrastructures resulted in the
isolation of the regions from the rest of the country thereby
affecting their economic potential.
The low level of development is reflected in the state of
public opinion of the people in the South. In general terms, the
Southerners are regarded as being politically passive,
inattentive citizens and an uninformed public. Over the recent
years however, the emergence of multi-party competitive
politics accompanied by improved communications in media,
telecommunications and transportation seem to have
transformed the state of affairs. All this has provided an avenue
for people in the regions to express their concerns and
discontent towards their government. Yet questions remain;
Given the socio-political and economic changes, what is the
level of people’s satisfaction with their government? To what
extent do Mtwara and Lindi continue to constitute a social and
political base for the incumbent party, Chama cha Mapinduzi
(CCM)? Is there a connection or disconnect between popular
satisfaction/ dissatisfaction and the level of political support?
These are the questions that this chapter sets out to address.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section
presents an analytical discussion on public opinion and
political support. This will be followed by the presentation of
findings drawn from surveys in 2004 and 2006, followed by
some conclusions.
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Public opinion and political support
The tradition of gauging citizens’ opinion and attitudes towards
various  political  phenomena  is  beginning  to  take  root  in
Tanzania.  As  a  result  of  the  fundamental  socio-economic  and
political changes that have taken place for over a decade now,
public opinion is increasingly recognized as politically
important. It should be recalled that the political atmosphere of
a single-party system did not provide a conducive environment
for examining citizens’ political attitudes, opinions and
orientations. The repression of opinions that accompanied state
monopoly of the media, made it difficult to rigorously assess
citizens’ sentiments toward their political system.
However, things have changed in recent times. The
liberalization of the economy since the mid-1980s has opened
up new opportunities as well as new challenges, thereby
shaping people’s values and attitudes. The pluralist political
system introduced in 1992 has brought in its wake freedom of
speech and association. The emergence of opposition parties
coupled with flourishing independent media has provided the
public with information on policy choices and alternatives. In
addition, competitive multi-party elections have significantly
enhanced the role of public opinion in policy-making. As a
result, public opinion studies are now on the increase largely in
response to the ongoing democratization process (Bratton et al.,
2005; Killian, 2001, 2005a, 2005b; Chaligha et al., 2002;
Mukandala & Killian, 1996; Mushi & Mukandala 1997)
Why is it important to assess citizens’ opinions and
attitudes towards political phenomena? It is widely
acknowledged that citizens’ support for a political system plays
a critical role in determining the structure and performance of
political institutions. In democratic politics, citizens’ attitudes
may either enhance or undermine the legitimacy of political
processes. Indeed, citizens’ dispositions toward authority “drive
to  the  very  heart  of  what  democracy  is  all  about”  (Diamond,
1993:12). It is therefore imperative that citizens’ opinions and
attitudes toward their political system be periodically assessed
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in  order  to  ultimately  determine  the  extent  of  support  for  the
political system as a whole.
The process of opinion formation has been a contested
area among social scientists. Traditional public opinion
research has tended to regard the public as being uninformed
and uninterested in politics (Campbell et al 1960, Converse
1964). This view is increasingly being challenged by new
research findings. Hutchings, for instance, points out that in
fact, “under the right circumstances, voters are surprisingly
well informed on the issues that they care about”, and indeed,
collective public opinion is often informed and influential
(Hutchings, 2003: 2, 6-7) Also, there are marked variations
among the public in terms of their levels of political interest
and political knowledge. This is largely due to the fact that for
many ordinary people keeping informed is a costly undertaking.
As Converse correctly puts it, “it takes information to get
information” (Converse 2000: 334) Thus, political and economic
literacy  is  important  for  ordinary  people’s  ability  to  form  and
express  their  opinion  and  in  enabling  them  to  make  a
connection between their life satisfactions and their support for
a new political regime (Bratton et al., 2005: 34)
Zaller, moreover, points out that in the process of opinion
formation, two main elements are critical: information to form a
mental picture of the given issue, and a predisposition to
motivate some conclusion about it. That is to say, “every
opinion is a marriage of information and predispositions”
(Zaller 1992: 6). Information about some aspect of public affairs
can be derived from elite discourse, e.g., politicians,
government officials, journalists, activists, experts and policy
specialists, media, etc., or from family or friends. However,
many people tend to have little desire to comprehend all the
information that goes their way beyond their personal
experience, and hence they are likely to focus on selective
issues that matter most to them and those that relate to their
interests, values and motives. As Zaller correctly argues, “for
citizens are more than passive receivers of whatever
information that comes their way. They possess a variety of
interests, values, and experiences that may affect their
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willingness to accept or resist persuasive influences” (Zaller
1992: 22) Zaller further argues that when there is no variation
in elite discourse, the members of the public are most likely to
adopt the dominant elite position as their frame of reference in
forming  their  opinion.  But  when  there  is  a  sharp  divide  in
general ideological or partisan predisposition in elite discourse,
public opinion will reflect the differences with the most
politically informed attentive members of the public mirroring
most sharply the ideological divisions among the elite.
Having  formed  an  opinion  about  an  issue,  how does  this
translate into political support? The concept of political support
is more complex than it sounds and has generated heated
debates among political scientists (Almond & Verba 1965;
Easton 1965, 1975, 1976; Converse 2000; Muller & Jukam
1977; Rogowski 1983). Debate has focused on various themes
including challenges of deriving meanings out of public opinion
surveys in general as well as the complexities of making
distinctions between attitudinal versus behavioural support,
incumbent versus system support, as well as on the indicators
and measurement of political support. This chapter applies the
most widely used conceptualization of political support
developed by David Easton. Easton (1975) makes the
distinction between ‘specific’ and ‘diffuse’ support. Specific
support is more performance-based as it relates to people’s
evaluations of “what incumbent political authorities do and
how  they  do  it”  (ibid.:  437).  In  this  case,  citizens  can  be
dissatisfied with the political authorities and discontent with
the policies and their living conditions.2 Yet,  as  Easton  points
out, at times, political discontent is not always, or even usually
a signal for fundamental political and social change. Diffuse
support entails generalized attachments of citizens to the
political system which are “more fundamental in character
because they are directed to basic aspects of the system” (ibid.).
Diffuse support “consists of a reservoir of favourable attitudes
2  According to Easton (1975: 438), political authorities include all public
officials from chief executives, legislators, judges, local and central
government administrators, policemen as well as institutions such as
legislatures and courts.
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or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to
which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as
damaging  to  their  wants’  (Easton  1965:  237).  In  this  case,
people  can  rate  the  performance  of  Parliament  as  very  poor
(specific support) while not demanding fundamental changes in
the political regime or constitution (diffuse support). Based on
this understanding, this chapter confines itself to the ‘specific’
type of political support as expressed by people’s evaluations of
the performance of the incumbent executives including the
President and the cabinet, as well as institutions such as local
government, courts, the legislature, the Police force and the
Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB)
This article uses two separate data sets collected in two
opinion polls carried out in September 2004 and October 2006
in  four  selected  districts  in  Mtwara  and  Lindi.  It  should  be
pointed  out  that  both  opinion  polls  were  conducted  in  all  26
regions in the United Republic of Tanzania. The surveys were
conducted by Research and Education for Democracy in
Tanzania (REDET), a programme of the Department of Political
Science at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. The nation-wide
sample for each survey consisted of 1,300 respondents
randomly drawn from different walks of life. For the purpose of
this chapter, only data from Lindi and Mtwara regions are used
for analysis. Comparisons between Mtwara, Lindi and other
regions in Tanzania Mainland will be done only when deemed
necessary to make a certain argument more evident. Moreover,
as the study deals with people’s evaluations of political
authorities and institutions, comparisons are restricted to
regions on the Tanzanian mainland (excluding Zanzibar) as
they all share similar political institutions and processes.
Nachingwea  (Lindi)  and  Mtwara  urban  (Mtwara)  were
randomly selected districts in the 2004 opinion poll. Mtwara
rural (Mtwara) and Kilwa (Lindi) were randomly selected
districts for the 2006 opinion poll. In both surveys, the sample
was randomly drawn using a three-level multistage sampling.
The levels include districts, villages/streets, and respondents.
All the levels were randomly selected. In each district, 50
respondents were randomly selected from randomly selected
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villages (for rural settings) or streets (for urban settings). The
data is analyzed by using cross-tabulations. It is equally
important  to  point  out  that  these  surveys,  though  at  times
conducted in the same districts, have used different samples.
Hence, any comparison must be tentative, while enabling us to
observe the general patterns and trends of people’s opinion and
their orientations toward the political system.
People’s satisfaction/dissatisfaction and political
support
People’s evaluation of incumbent government performance (2004)
The 2004 opinion poll asked respondents to express their level
of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the incumbent
government and its institutions.3 As Table 1 shows, the rate of
people’s satisfaction with the government performance in both
regions was remarkably high.4
Table 1: People’s Evaluation of the Government Performance (2004)
(Percentages and actual number of respondents in brackets)
Region Satisfied Somehow
satisfied
Not
satisfied
Don’t
know
Total
Mtwara
64.0
(32)
24.0
(12)
8.0
(4)
4.0
(2)
100
(50)
Lindi
90.0
(45)
2.0
(1)
4.0
(2)
4.0
(2)
100
(50)
Tanzania
Mainland
69.0
(722)
20.0
(209)
9.2
(96)
1.9
(20)
100
(1047)
Sixty-four percent and 90 percent of respondents in Mtwara
and Lindi respectively reported that they are satisfied with the
3  The question was stated as follows; “How do you evaluate the
performance of the government in power? Are you satisfied, somehow
satisfied or not satisfied?”
4  The rate of people’s satisfaction is demonstrated by the percentage of
those respondents who reported that they are ‘satisfied’ with the
performance of the incumbent government.
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government in power. Indeed, Lindi’s rate of satisfaction was
the highest among all the regions in Tanzania Mainland. This
high rate of popular satisfaction among the respondents in
Lindi  and  Mtwara  toward  the  government  can  largely  be
attributed  to  the  progress  that  was  made  at  that  time  in  the
construction of the Dar-es-Salaam-Lindi-Mtwara road and the
completion of the Benjamin Mkapa Bridge over the Rufiji river.
The construction of the bridge commenced in 1998 during
President  Benjamin  Mkapa’s  first  term  in  office.  It  was
completed in August 2003. The completion of the bridge
marked the most visible contribution of the Mkapa’s presidency
to the South.5  The 2004 survey asked the respondents to
mention the most important legacy of the outgoing President
Mkapa  who  was  finishing  his  term  in  2005.6 Of  the
respondents in Lindi, 71.5 percent, and of respondents in
Mtwara, 55.3 percent mentioned that they would remember
President Mkapa for improvements in the roads and
particularly the Rufiji Bridge. Thus, the high rate of satisfaction
might have been a result of President Mkapa’s commitment to
solving the persistent problem of the poor road network in the
South. Since independence, the people of Mtwara and Lindi
had been demanding a government intervention in constructing
the Dar-es-Salaam-Lindi-Mtwara road, but without success.
Promises were made but not fulfilled.
As a result of this major infrastructural development,
President Mkapa, who originally comes from Mtwara, secured
an overwhelming victory in both regions in the 1995 and 2000
elections. In the 1995 elections, President Mkapa secured 81
percent and 83 percent of the total presidential vote in Mtwara
and Lindi respectively. Likewise, in the 2000 elections,
5  The  Mkapa Bridge,  which  is  the  longest  in  Tanzania,  is  believed  to  be
the second longest bridge in Africa after the Nile bridge in Egypt. The
bridge stretches for about 970 meters over the Rufiji river. The total
cost is estimated at US$34 million. The government of Tanzania
contributed about 24 percent of the total cost. Other financial support
was  received  from  OPEC,  Japan,  Saudi  Arabia  and  Kuwait
(www.zana.gov.zm).
6  The question was stated as follows: “For what legacy will Tanzanians
remember President Mkapa?”
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President Mkapa secured 89.7 percent and 82.2 percent of total
presidential votes in Mtwara and Lindi.
Moreover, even with the high rate of satisfaction towards
the  incumbent  government  and  clear  political  support  for  the
ruling party, 86 percent and 73 percent of respondents in Lindi
and Mtwara respectively acknowledged that there are
unresolved socio-economic and political problems which still
call  for  the  government’s  attention.  In  the  same  opinion  poll,
the respondents were asked to mention one major persistent
problem that the government had yet to solve. Water shortage
was  cited  as  the  main  problem by  half  of  the  respondents  in
Lindi region. On the national average, Lindi has the highest
number  of  people  with  no  access  to  safe  water.  In  Liwale
district for instance, only 8 percent of the population have
access to improved water supply. This is far below the national
average of rural households with access to improved water
which stands at 42 percent (Poverty and Human Development
Report,  2005:  68).  Poor  access  to  higher  education  was  the
problem ranked second among Lindi respondents. There are
only a few secondary schools in Lindi and while Lindi is among
the  regions  in  the  country  that  are  doing  well  in  the
performance of standard seven graduates, the existing
secondary schools cannot cater to their numbers (Poverty and
Human Development Report, 2002: 53)
In  the  case  of  Mtwara,  corruption  was  the  problem cited
most frequently, by about 23 percent of the respondents. This
was followed by a lack of credit/loans (11%). Variations in the
ranking  of  the  identified  problems  may  partly  be  explained  by
the fact that Nachingwea district is largely in a rural setting
compared  to  Mtwara  urban.  A  list  of  all  the  problems
mentioned is shown in Table 2.
Thus, despite the high rate of satisfaction with the overall
government performance as indicated in the 2004 opinion poll,
there were other pending socio-economic and political of great
concern to people of Lindi and Mtwara. With the completion of
President Mkapa’s term, campaigns for the 2005 elections
could  have  provided  the  opportunity  for  people  of  Lindi  and
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Mtwara to re-examine their political choices in response to
their needs. The election results of 2005 may shed some light
on the extent of political support for the government among the
Southerners. Equally revealing are people’s evaluations of the
newly-elected President Kikwete and his government as
indicated in the October 2006 opinion poll.
Table 2: Persistent problems the Government has yet to solve (2004)
(Percentages and actual number of respondents in brackets)
Problems Mtwara Lindi
No problems 27.3
(12)
14.0
(7)
Corruption 22.7
(10)
2.0
(1)
Water shortage 2.3
(1)
50.0
(25)
Poor health services 2.3
(1)
2.0
(1)
Poor access to higher
education —
20.0
(10)
Poor primary education —
2.0
(1)
Unemployment 9.1
(4)
4.0
(2)
Poor roads 9.1
(4)
—
Lack of credits/loans 11.4
(5)
—
Poor marketing of crops 6.8
(3)
2.0
(1)
Unnecessary
contribution
2.3
(1)
—
Lack of agricultural
inputs
2.3
(1)
2.0
(1)
Human rights violations 2.3
(1)
2.0
(1)
Unfulfilled promises 2.3
(1)
—
Total 100
(44)
100
(50)
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While  it  is  perhaps  too  early  to  make  firm  conclusions,
both the 2005 election results and the 2006 survey findings
tend to indicate some signs of a declining level of political
support toward the incumbent government among the people of
Mtwara and Lindi.
The 2005 elections and people’s evaluations of the Government
in 2006: Signs of Erosion of Political Support?
Political support for the incumbent government seems to have
declined  both  in  Mtwara  and  Lindi.   As  Table  3  shows,
although President Kikwete received a comfortable victory in
Lindi and Mtwara over his opponents in the opposition,
compared to the 2000 elections, the share of CCM’s
presidential votes in the 2005 elections declined in the two
regions.
Table 3: Presidential election results in the 1995, 2000 and 2005
elections in Mtwara and Lindi (results in percentage)7
R
e
g
i
o
n
Year CCM CUF Chadema
NCCR-M
(1995)
TLP
(2000&
2005)
UDP other Total
1995 81.1 3.5 - 13.8 1.6 100
2000 89.7 7.7 - 0.9 1.7 100
M
t
w
a
r
a 2005 79.09 16.64 2.07 0.51 - 1.69 100
1995 83.2 5.5 - 9.2 2.1 100
2000 82.2 14.9 - 1.0 1.9 100
L
i
n
d
i 2005 73.99 22.9 1.59 0.32 - 1.2 100
Source: Compiled from Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee
(TEMCO) Reports, Tanzania National Election Commission Reports
7   CCM  =  Chama  cha  Mapinduzi  (Revolutionary  Party);  CUF  =  Civic
United Front; Chadema = Chama cha Maendeleo na Demokrasia (Party
for Democracy and Development, Tanzania); NCCR-M = National
Convention  for  Construction  and  Reform  –  Mageuzi/Change;  TLP  =
Tanzania Labour Party; UDP = United Democratic Party.
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The Civic United Front (CUF) seems to be increasing its share
in Mtwara and Lindi. CUF’s presidential candidate, Ibrahim
Lipumba, seemed to have made significant inroads by
increasing  his  votes  in  Mtwara  from  3.5  percent  in  1995  to
about  17  percent  in  2005.   Similarly  in  Lindi,  CUF’s
presidential votes rose from 5.5 percent in 1995 up to about 23
percent in 2005.
Parliamentary election results also show a declining trend
of  the  level  of  political  support  toward  the  incumbent  party,
CCM, in Mtwara and Lindi. Although CCM has been able to
retain all of the constituencies in Lindi and Mtwara in the 2005
elections, the percentage of total parliamentary votes has
declined. As Table 4 indicates, CCM’s total share of
parliamentary votes in Mtwara declined from 84 percent in
2000 to about 76 percent in 2005. Likewise in Lindi, the
percentage of votes declined from 78.5 percent in 2000 to about
71 percent in 2005. Compared to the 2000 elections, CUF’s
total parliamentary votes in the 2005 elections increased four
times in Mtwara and doubled in Lindi.
Table 4: Parliamentary Election Results in 2000 and 2005
(results in percentage)
Year CCM CUF Chadema TLP NCCR-M UDP other Total
2000 84.0 4.1 3.6 1.1 4.9 2.1 0.2 100
M
t
w
a
r
a
2005 75.7 16.2 2.8 0.9 3.8 - -
2000 78.5 13.3 3.1 0.4 0.7 4.0 - 100
L
i
n
d
i 2005 70.7 25.8 2.2 0.8 - - 0.6 100
In certain constituencies in Lindi, the opposition party, CUF
was  able  to  wage  stiff  competition  against  CCM candidates  in
the 2005 elections. CUF demonstrated its electoral strength in
Kilwa South (41.5%), Mchinga (40.4%), Liwale (42.6%) and
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Lindi urban (39%). In Mtwara, CUF secured significant amount
of votes in Tandahimba (23%), Mtwara rural (18%) and Newala
(17%). Also, the NCCR-M candidate received about 30 percent
of votes in Mtwara urban constituency. Clearly, although the
opposition parties are still far below the incumbent party in
terms of votes’ share, they seem to be expanding their electoral
base  in  the  South,  an  area  that  is  traditionally  known to  be  a
CCM’s stronghold.
A  year  after  the  2005  elections,  REDET  carried  out  an
opinion poll assessing people’s evaluations of the performance
of President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete’s government. President
Kikwete  came to  power  as  the  most  popular  candidate  in  the
new multi-party competitive elections, defeating his opponents
by  obtaining  over  80  percent  of  votes  cast  in  the  Union
presidential race. In general, the majority of Tanzanians seem
to  have  placed  a  great  deal  of  hope  in  President  Kikwete  for
dealing with social, political and economic problems.
The  coming  of  President  Kikwete  to  power  marked  the
fourth CCM’s administration since independence.8 Whereas the
level of popular satisfaction with President Kikwete’s
government has remained more or less the same in Mtwara, it
has significantly declined in Lindi. Table 5 shows that, whereas
in 2004, 90 percent of the respondents in Lindi reported that
they were satisfied with the government performance, only 58
percent  had  the  same  view  in  2006.  In  Mtwara,  the  rate  of
popular satisfaction with the government performance has not
changed substantially from 2004 (64%) to 2006 (63%). What is
most striking is that while the respondents in Lindi and
Mtwara seem not to be extremely thrilled with the performance
of President Kikwete’s government, the rate of satisfaction in
other regions remains very high. The incumbent government’s
performance received high satisfaction rates in such regions as
Tabora (92%), Kagera (90%), Mwanza (86%), Kigoma (86%),
Dodoma (84%), Mara (82%), Tanga (80%) and Iringa (80%).
8  Julius Nyerere (1961-1985), Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985-1995), Benjamin
Mkapa (1995-2005), Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete (2005-Present)
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Table 5: People’s Evaluation of President Kikwete’s Government
Performance (2006)
Region Satisfied Somehow
satisfied
Not
satisfied
Don’t
know
Total
Mtwara
63.3
(31)
20.4
(10)
6.1
(3)
10.2
(5)
100
(50)
Lindi
58.0
(29)
32.0
(16)
8.0
(4)
2.0
(1)
100
(50)
Tanzania
Mainland
68.7
(718)
22.9
(239)
6.5
(68
1.9
(20)
100
(1045)
In both regions, moreover, people’s evaluation of government
institutions such as the cabinet, the police, Prevention of
Corruption  Bureau  (PCB),  the  judiciary,  local  government  and
parliament seem to be rather low. The satisfaction rate of each
of these institutions is below 35 percent. Thus, the respondents
may have been satisfied with President Kikwete himself rather
than with his cabinet and other institutions.
Table 6: People’s Evaluation of President Kikwete’s Cabinet Perfor-
mance (2006)
Region Satisfied Somehow
satisfied
Not
satisfied
Don’t
know
Total
Mtwara
24.0
(12)
34.0
(17)
14.0
(7)
28.0
(14)
100
(50)
Lindi
8.4
(4)
30.6
(15)
12.2
(6)
49.0
(24)
100
(50)
Tanzania
Mainland
34.9
(364)
36.6
(382)
7.9
(82)
20.7
(216)
100
(1044)
When asked about the performance of President Kikwete’s
cabinet, only 24 percent and 8.4 percent of respondents in
Mtwara and Lindi respectively reported that they are satisfied
with the cabinet performance (see Table 6). More revealing is
the  fact  that  almost  half  of  the  respondents  in  Lindi  did  not
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have  an  opinion  on  the  performance  of  Kikwete’s  cabinet.  The
most  popular  answer  among  the  respondents  was,  “I  don’t
know”. Yet, they expressed their opinion on the functioning of
other government institutions.
Regarding the performance of the courts, a significant
percentage of the respondents in Mtwara (41%) and Lindi (39%)
were not satisfied with the performance of the courts in their
areas (Table 7). Delays in court proceedings and alleged
corruption  may  have  been  a  reason  behind  the  low  rate  of
satisfaction. Indeed, corruption was cited as number one
problem by the respondents in Mtwara in the 2004 opinion
poll.
Table 7: People’s Evaluation of the Performance of the Judiciary
(2006)
Region Satisfied Somehow
satisfied
Not
satisfied
Don’t
know
Total
Mtwara
20.4
(10)
20.4
(10)
40.8
(20)
18.4
(9)
100
(49)
Lindi
12.2
(6)
20.4
(10)
38.8
(19)
28.5
(14)
100
(49)
Tanzania
Mainland
25.0
(261)
33.0
(344)
31.0
(324)
11.0
(115)
100
(1044)
Overall, the success of the PCB in combating corruption is yet
to be seen. It is estimated that Tanzania loses approximately 20
percent of its entire budget to corruption every year, equivalent
to  the  total  funding  allocated  by  the  government  to  the
education sector in 2006 (Haki Elimu, 2007).  As Table 8
shows, the majority of the respondents interviewed reported
that they are not satisfied with the performance of the PCB. In
fact, Mtwara ranked third in the rate of dissatisfaction with the
PCB after Dar-es-Salaam (58%) and Kilimanjaro (52%). Also, a
significant percentage of respondents in Lindi and Mtwara
seem not to know much about the PCB.  People’s assessment of
POPULAR DISSATISFACTION IN MTWARA-LINDI / 202
the police force and the parliament is also low (see Tables 9 &
10 in annex). About 39 percent and 28 percent of the
respondents in Lindi and Mtwara respectively said that they are
not satisfied with the performance of the police force.
Respondents were also asked to evaluate the performance
of their local governments. Since 1999, reforms in the local
government  have  been  under  way  geared  at  promoting  good
governance based on political and financial accountability,
democratic procedures and public participation.
Table 8: People’s Evaluation of the Performance of the Corruption
Prevention Bureau (2006)
Region Satisfied Somehow
satisfied
Not
satisfied
Don’t
know
Total
Mtwara
8.0
(4)
10.0
(5)
48.0
(24)
34.0
(17)
100
(50)
Lindi
12.5
(6)
2.1
(1)
43.8
(21)
41.7
(20)
100
(48)
Tanzania
Mainland
18.6
(194)
22.6
(236)
34.7
(362)
24.1
(251)
100
(1043)
Changes in the legal and institutional framework have been
effected in regional and local administration. Various Local
Government Acts of 1982 were amended in February 1999
through Act No. 6 of 1999 to give effect to new centre-local
relations. The amendments stress good governance calling for
democratically elected local leaders and enhanced transparency
in the conduct of council affairs as well as greater
accountability of the councils to the people. Councils have
become critical players in the implementation of pro-poor
policies under the ongoing poverty reduction strategies.
Legal and institutional changes notwithstanding, the
findings seem to indicate that majority of the respondents are
not very pleased with their local governments. Table 11
indicates that 40 percent of the respondents in Mtwara
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expressed their dissatisfaction with local government. In fact
compared to all regions in mainland Tanzania, Mtwara had the
highest percentage of respondents who reported that they are
not satisfied with local government performance. In Lindi,
about 47 percent of the respondents reported that they are
somehow satisfied, and 24.5 percent said they are not satisfied.
Table 11: People’s Evaluation of the Performance of the Local
Government (2006)
Region Satisfied Somehow
satisfied
Not
satisfied
Don’t
know
Total
Mtwara
34.0
(17)
12.0
(6)
40.0
(20)
14.0
(7)
100
(50)
Lindi
26.5
(13)
46.9
(23)
24.5
(12)
2.0
(1)
100
(49)
Tanzania
Mainland
43.2
(449)
37.4
(389)
15.6
(162)
3.9
(40)
100
(1040)
Indeed, it is striking to note that peoples’ satisfaction with the
performance of the ruling party is comparatively lower in Lindi
and Mtwara than in other regions in mainland Tanzania.
Overall,  about  62  percent  of  the  respondents  in  mainland
Tanzania reported that they are satisfied with the performance
of  the  ruling  party.  When  data  is  disaggregated  by  regions,
Lindi,  Mtwara,  Ruvuma  and  Mbeya  turned  out  to  have  the
lowest rates of satisfaction in the Mainland. Only 46 percent in
Mtwara and 44 percent in Lindi expressed their satisfaction
with the performance of the ruling party. The rates are even
lower  in  Mbeya  (10%)  and  Ruvuma  (34%).  Yet,  in  all  other
remaining regions in mainland Tanzania, respondents’
satisfaction with the performance of CCM stands above 50
percent. The highest satisfaction rate was recorded in such
regions  as  Tabora  (88%),  Mwanza  (84%)  Mara  (84%),  Kagera
(84%), Tanga (78%), Arusha (76%) and Morogoro (72%).
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Do people’s assessment of the incumbent government and
its institutions affect the way people identify themselves with
the ruling party in Mtwara and Lindi?  Self-identification data
from the 2004 and 2006 opinion polls indicate that the number
of the respondents who identify themselves as members of
CCM is declining. Indeed, the number of those who identify
themselves as members of opposition political parties and non-
members is rising. Tables 12 and 13 (in annex) represent these
trends. Whereas in 2004, 78 percent of respondents in each
region  of  Mtwara  and  Lindi  reported  that  they  belong  to  CCM,
in  the  2006  opinion  poll,  70  percent  in  Mtwara  and  only  44
percent in Lindi said that they belong to CCM (see Figure).
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Conclusions
The findings clearly seem to indicate that there are some
changes in the political orientations among the people of
Mtwara and Lindi regions. Whereas the overall national
electoral  performance  of  the  opposition  parties  is  on  the
9  ‘Other’ includes the percentage of those respondents who said they
belong to opposition political parties as well as those who said they are
not members of any political party.
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decline, ironically, they seem to be expanding their electoral
base in the South. However, compared to other opposition
parties, it is CUF that seem to be favored by a significant
segment of the electorate in Mtwara and Lindi. This trend may
be partly attributed by the relatively low level of satisfactions
with the performance of the incumbent government among the
people of these two regions. Perhaps, the people in ‘the South’
are beginning to make a connection between their life
satisfactions and support for a political regime. Only time will
tell.
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Appendix
Table 9: People’s Evaluation of the Performance of the Parliament
(2006)
Region Satisfied Somehow
satisfied
Not
satisfied
Don’t
know
Total
Mtwara
26.7
(12)
24.4
(11)
22.2
(20)
26.7
(12)
100
(45)
Lindi
20.4
(10)
40.8
(20)
16.3
(8)
22.4
(11)
100
(49)
Tanzania
Mainland
40.7
(421)
39.5
(408)
10.0
(103)
9.9
(102)
100
(1034)
Table 10: People’s Evaluation of the Performance of the Police Force
(2006)
Region Satisfied Somehow
satisfied
Not
satisfied
Don’t
know
Total
Mtwara
18.0
(9)
34.0
(17)
28.0
(14)
20.0
(10)
100
(50)
Lindi
18.4
(9)
22.4
(11)
38.8
(19)
20.4
(10)
100
(49)
Tanzania
Mainland
27.6
(288)
34.3
(358)
30.8
(321)
7.3
(76)
100
(1043)
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Table 12: Membership in Political Parties (2004)
Region CCM CUF Chadema UDP
not
member
other
parties
total
Mtwara
78.0
(39)
2.0
(1)
10.0
(5)
2.0
(1)
8.0
(4)
-
100
(50)
Lindi
78.0
(39)
6.0
(3)
2.0
(1)
-
14.0
(7)
-
100
(50)
Tanzania
mainland
73.2
(762)
5.9
(61)
1.7
(18)
0.5
(5)
15.4
(160)
3.3
(35)
100
(1041)
Table 13: Membership in Political Parties (2006)
Region CCM CUF Chadema UDP
not
member
other
parties
total
Mtwara 70.0
(35)
4.0
(2)
2.0
(1)
— 24.0
(12)
—
100
(50)
Lindi 44.0
(22)
32.0
(16)
—
2.0
(1)
22.0
(11)
—
100
(50)
Tanzania
mainland
72.3
(756)
4.4
(46)
2.9
(30)
0.7
(7)
18.5
(194)
1.1
(12)
100
(1046)
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Social forms of culture in development
Helena Jerman
Recent anthropological studies have shown that individual
accounts of the past demonstrate how the social permeates the
personal (Hautaniemi et al 2006; Cole 2001; Skultans 1998,
2001; cf. Tonkin & Whitehouse 1995). This makes social
memory a complex but necessary site for studying the
dialectics of individual and social processes. More specifically,
social practices through which informants enact their
memories combine elements between history and memory.
With  Jennifer  Cole’s  (op.cit.: 8) pithy comment, “What is
remembered as ‘tradition’ is perhaps the most ‘modern’
construct  of  all”  I  will  take  the  reader  to  a  small  village  in  the
Coast  Region  of  Tanzania.  But  first,  some  additional
background that are important for the context of this essay.
A multitemporal perspective
This  essay  links  my  ongoing  work  (Jerman 1997)  to  an  earlier
culture research project in Tanzania, called Jipemoyo.1 This
1 Jipemoyo, “to give oneself heart” (1975-1981), was the first culture
research project conducted between the Tanzanian government (The
Ministry  of  National  Culture  and  Youth)  and  a  foreign  academic
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earlier project aimed to realize the development potential of the
residents of the western Bagamoyo District in the Coast Region
of Tanzania, encouraging villagers to take initiative in solving
their  own  problems  by  utilizing  their  own  resources.  In  this
process, past and present were intertwined. Within Jipemoyo,
my study on the development of ethnicity (Jerman 1997)
applied a multitemporal approach considering the ways in
which, for example, events, concepts or persons are perceived
(by informants or various archives) at any given time (cf.,
Macdonald 2002). Pursuing these ideas, I am presently
involved in a study on the negotiation process of identity
focusing on social memory, mobility and belonging in a new
context: the Russian Finnish borderland (Jerman 2006).
Juxtapositioning the development of ethnicity in a
Tanzanian context with crossing the Russian-Finnish border
together with informants, concretely and mentally, is
methodologically powerful. Representing complex
configurations of time, space and long series of events,
fieldwork in Tanzania as well as fieldwork ‘at home’, have
convinced me that what is relevant in ethnographic research is
what  people  themselves  find  important  and  that,  notably,  it
cannot be identified in advance. The researcher has to follow
informants. This has recently been strongly emphasized by a
number of anthropologists doing ethnographic research (e.g.,
Johannes Fabian, George Marcus, Judith Okely, Sharon
Macdonald 2004). Hidden structures have to be detected, and
this is one of the methods to do it.
During the early 1980s there was a debate among
anthropologists and historians focusing on nationalism and the
nation-state as historical inventions or constructions (Gellner
1964; 1983; Anderson 1983). These discussions were also
linked  to  a  debate  on  the  invention  and  the  imagination  of
‘tradition’ (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983; Ranger 1993). Further,
the  notion  of  culture  had  been  undergoing  “some  of  the  most
radical rethinking since the early 1960s” (Dirks et al. 1994: 3).
institution (the Academy of Finland). On methodological questions of
the project and its various parts see Jipemoyo 1981.
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The Russian anthropologist Nikolay Girenko’s path-breaking
article (1983) on the dynamics of cultural changes in East
Africa  during  the  19th and 20th centuries challenged
conventional definitions on culture, which identified cultural
differences or similarities with social differences or similarities.2
All this added important aspects to the ethnicity debate
initiated  by  Fredrik  Barth  whose  definition  of  an  ethnic  group
stressed its essence as a form of social organization. In his
important contribution, Barth (1969) stressed that ‘ethnic’
groups must be studied not as isolated communities but in
relation  to  one  another.  Suggesting  that  the  present  role  of
ethnicity  in  the  African  context  is  different  from  what  it  was
during colonialism and the pre-colonial period, Girenko posed a
relevant question (to Barth as well as to other researchers
dealing with ethnic processes). He asked: ‘What are the social
forces behind ethnic boundaries?’ i.e., what are the social and
cultural implications of these phenomena in different
contexts?3
Approaching this question pertaining to African pre-
colonial, colonial and independence history Girenko’s idea of
culture  as  a  phenomenon  came  to  form  the  backbone  of  my
study on the development of ethnicity in Tanzania.
Conceptualizing culture as a system of historically developed
material  and  perceptual  forms  in  which  life  is  enacted,  I
explored how externally assigned identities are perceived,
contested and negotiated in relation to their own contexts. This
demanded an analysis of the relationship of the social and the
cultural, i.e., the ways social forms of culture survive over time
and how they are perceived. In this process it was important to
distinguish between the social and cultural as relatively
independent phenomena, which however, are inconceivable
2  Girenko elaborated, however, on this theme already in 1977 when
writing on aspects of the ethnic development in Unyamwezi in the 19th
century  (Girenko  1977).  It  bears  noting  that  a  critique  similar  to
Girenko’s appeared in the West in the 1990s; see, for example,
Friedman 1994.
3  Seminar at the African Sector of the Institute of Ethnography of the
Academy of Sciences in Leningrad (April 1980; Cf. Girenko 1977: 76).
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without one another. Finally, considering the problematic task
of interpreting cultural phenomena, my ethnographic material
required diachronic analysis as emphasized by both Girenko
(1986) and the historian Juhani Koponen (1986).
Introducing notions of change into the analysis provided
the basis for a multitemporal approach. A constructivist
perspective (see Young 1993) enabled me to assess the
historical and cultural context of the development of ethnicity
within  a  Tanzanian  context.  In  my  view,  this  approach  to
culture  as  a  form or  forms  in  which  relations  between  people,
between people and things, or between society and nature are
exercised is useful when trying to find a way to understand
development as a bridge between historically developed cultural
forms.
Jipemoyo based its work on a participatory research
approach. The research team recognized that ‘researched
people’ are active producers of knowledge.4 Such an approach
was designed principally to study local enactments of culture in
relation to the social, political and economic changes taking
place  in  the  country.  The  Arusha  Declaration  published  in
1967 implied, in the words of president Julius Nyerere’s that
“we are Tanzanians and wish to remain Tanzanians.” Tanzania
was the society that should form the basis from which the state
building had to take the first steps to independence (Nyerere
1967: 18). Hence, the construction of a specific Tanzanian
national identity took place within a definite social space: the
links between the present and the past of a national collectivity
was crucial.
Attempts at villagization, i.e., urging people to form village
settlements on a cooperative basis had started already prior to
the Arusha Declaration. Now, however, it was explicitly given a
more convincing ideological motive stressing people’s own
responsibility for setting up villages “of their own free will (to)
live together and work together for their common good”
(Nyerere 1974: 37). The most intensive phase of the
4  On participatory research as an ethnographic method see Donner and
Nasoro 1979.
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villagization process took place during 1973-1976. The
implementation process from 1973 onwards allowed the
regional  authorities  the  right  to  determine  in  which  areas
people should live. People who had formerly lived in scattered
settlements were gathered into new or old extended villages.
However, the government’s plans to reshape Tanzanian
society ignored existing social organizations and traditional
systems of services. This meant that, from above, there was a
stark demarcation line between the traditional and modern.
Administrators interpreted the reasons to resistance by the
villagers as traditionalism and not as a possible reaction to
directed development (Anacleti 1996: 72; Swantz 1997: 36; cf.
Swantz 1987: 6-7). This was in contradiction with Julius
Nyerere‘s ideas according to which the nation had to use the
traditional  system  and  was  to  be  built  upon  its  three
fundamental principles,5 which permeated the customs, the
manners and education of the people (Nyerere 1968: 337-340).
The Tanzanian historian A.O. Anacleti suggested that research,
for  instance,  into  the  ways  people  during  this  time  were
adopting and organizing patterns of land ownership would have
helped to increase the social and economic acceptability of
villagization. Evidently, 20 years after villagization, people were
returning to their old homesteads and re-creating their own
structures. The sociologist Sam Maghimbi (1995) has shown
that there was no empirical evidence for Nyerere's
interpretation of traditional African villages as cradles of
freedom, equality and unity, thereby justifying ujamaa.
Villagization and before
Ever since pre-colonial times with its longstanding exchange of
people and goods between the coast, the islands and the
hinterland, the societies of Jipemoyo’s research area had
undergone transitions in many ways. Interestingly, when
describing the development of his country, a local elder
5  These were, in short, love, i.e., respect and obligation; common
property; and obligation to work (Nyerere 1967: 8-9).
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illustrated these transitions by drawing five lines in the sand in
front of his house. These lines symbolized peoples who in the
history of the area had confronted each other. Commenting
upon each line which symbolized his own people, the original
inhabitants of the area, followed by the Arabs, Indians, Baniani
and the Europeans (in this order) he succeeded in describing
invaders and immigrant groups using superior technology and
who in this way had forced the inhabitants to reformulate their
identity. In other words this man’s presentation contained
political, economic and social implications attached to activities
of  different  groups  of  people.  With  hindsight,  it  is  possible  to
speculate that had the villagization process been introduced
and carried through by invaders or immigrant groups, the man
would have drawn a line for it.
Much  has  been  written  about  the  failure  of  the ujamaa
policy, which ultimately manifests the difficulty of transferring
concepts from one context to another (Swantz 1997: 36). Apart
from this, I wish to call attention to the commendable main aim
of the villagization process: to improve the living conditions of
the people by centrally providing services like health, education
and  water.  The  fulfilment  of  a  basic  need  like  water,  for
example, was a most essential task in the Jipemoyo research
area, specifically in Miono village. For long periods there was
only water which officially had been condemned as unsuitable
for human consumption, mainly because of its being very
saline. Also wood was scarce because of dense population: to
find  a  bundle  of  wood  demanded  a  walk  of  about  five
kilometres.  Obtaining  firewood  had  formerly  taken  place  in  an
ecologically sustainable way allowing for reproduction of
forests.
An episode and its implications
Villagers in the western Bagamoyo District seemed to use
different  forms  for  their  community’s  continuity  in  order  to
preserve  it.  I  will  now  make  an  attempt  to  show  that  these
forms, rituals, for example, are cultural manifestations of
belonging, be it ethnic, local or national. At the same time the
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enactment of cultural forms (directly observable or percepted)
encompass specific aspects of the ongoing social process, the
rapidly developing society. Leaning on my field notes I will
relate  an  experience  from  the  Miono  village  in  the  Bagamoyo
District in 1977.
“In the afternoon of the same day, when walking in the village
we met Juma Nasoro. He was a local specialist in ngoma and
traditional medicine. He said that “he had been called to come”
and asked us to come with him to come and look at the snake,
the  one  that  had  killed  a  man  in  the shamba, field. Now
another  man  had  killed  it.  Juma  had  told  me  earlier  that  he
had a gift of ‘calling’ the snakes. Some days ago he had tried to
‘call’ snakes after the calamity but the ‘killer’ had not come to
him, only some other snakes.
“We  followed  Juma  and  on  our  way  he  told  us  the
following  story:  A  man  from  a  nearby  village  had  gone  to  his
field, and the shed there, in Juma’s words: “alipofika, shamba,
kibanda”. Children were playing nearby the kibanda. Then the
man saw the snake. When the snake saw the man it stood up.
The  height  of  it  was  equal  to  the  man.  The  man  took  a  long
stick (as long as himself) and beat the snake three times. Two
times the snake rose as high as the man but at the third time
and the third beat the man succeeded in killing the snake.
“When we reached the courtyard of the TANU office the
dead snake was on the ground.6 About sixty people were
gathered around it, men, women and children, all wanting to
see the black snake. The head of the snake was cut away and
fastened with a cord to a long stick and the cord was also tied
to the corpse of the snake. An elder, mzee, began to measure
the length of the snake by walking step by step alongside it.
He repeated this many times, counting his steps every time
and saying:  nane na kasoro,  eight  and  a  half.7 The  crowd
agreed upon this. He had big feet.
“After this people made room for Juma Nasoro.
Squatting, he started attentively to examine the snake with his
hands and he said: “it is dangerous. It has sumu, poison”.
6  As the events unfolded during the following moments that afternoon I
asked Juma Nasoro for permission to fetch my camera from our house
and take some pictures to which he consented.
7  This makes about two and a half metres.
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Picture 1. Juma Nasoro, local specialist in traditional medicine, music and
dance, demonstrating the snake to people in Miono village. Photo Helena
Jerman 1977. JPA.
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Picture 2. The procession on its way to the bomba, well. Photo Helena
Jerman 1977. JPA.
Picture 3. Juma Nasoro extracting the poison bags of the snake. Photo
Helena Jerman 1977. JPA.
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Then he took the snake and the stick and walked, followed by
the crowd, to the market place and he stopped in front of the
shop.
 “In reply to my question why the head of the snake had
been  cut  off  Juma  answered  that  it  was maana yetu, their
way,  and  that  he  would  tell  me  afterwards  what  that  means
specifically. After a while the measuring of the snake started
again...
“After this Juma showed where the sumu of the snake
was, pointing to a point halfway on the body. Then he opened
the mouth of the snake and showed its fangs. During this
demonstration a mzee beside me lamented: ‘Babu yangu
umekufa’ indicating that this snake had killed his father…
“Now  Juma  took  the  snake  again  and  started  to  walk
slowly, with dignity. The crowd was now dispersing but all the
children and a few elderly persons followed Juma in a
procession. He walked towards the closely situated bomba, the
well,  and  stopped  for  a  while.  Next  he  reached  the  house  of
Mzee Ramadhani. In the village this house was commonly
called the utafiti (research) house being the residence of the
Jipemoyo researchers who rented it from mzee.
“He stopped again and showed the snake to the people
surrounding him and to new passers-by. Then the procession
continued with Juma first, the villagers next and in the end of
the line my colleague Kitolero and myself. When, after a while,
we reached the hospitali, the local dispensary, Juma stopped.
Again  he  exhibited  the  snake  to  the  people  around  him.  He
stood  there  for  a  few  seconds,  immobile  and  after  that  he
continued his path, followed by the villagers towards his
house. When we reached it, a new phase of the event
commenced. Juma forbade the children to be near the snake,
which he laid on the ground and the children gathered around
it.  Juma  indicated  the  danger  of  the  work  he  intended  to  do
next.”
I will briefly round up the last phase of this event without going
into the details of the subsequent occurrences. A deeply
concentrated Juma Nasoro proceeded now meticulously with
specific procedures, which comprised, among many other
things, the extraction of the poison bags. From time to time he
addressed the surrounding persons with various warnings but
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he also involved us with some information. I also asked him a
few questions about the procedure and what seemed vital items
in the ritual. In all his replies to me he added: maana yetu, our
meanings (of that).8 He  told  us  when  he  was  ready.  It  was
obvious that he wished us to leave the place. A third phase was
about  to  begin,  but  obviously  it  was  meant  only  for
professionals: two of Juma’s colleagues, i.e., specialists in
traditional medicine, arrived to his house at that very moment.
What  can  we  learn  from  this  episode?  There  was
something  that  I  had  failed  to  notice,  despite  my  full
participation in the event. I was so immersed in Juma’s doings,
including  the  accompanying  rituals  that  I  became  blind  to
some important contextual implications of the event. Only
much later, and thanks to my colleague, ethnomusicologist
Philip  Donner,  when  he  read  my  detailed  notes  and  called  my
attention  to  what  I  had  written  down,  did  I  realize  the  role  of
the three important elements of the event i.e. water, education
and health.
The three key elements of the new postcolonial society of
Tanzania, symbolized here by the water pump, the researchers’
house  and  the  dispensary,  thus  played  a  major  role  in  the
event. Bearing in mind that a change in the cultural content
(the social process) does not always presuppose a change in
cultural form, I will conclude with some suggestive comments.
The main actor of the event, the local specialist in traditional
medicine, music and dance, showed that development could be
seen as a process in which villagers participate creatively. He
did  this  by  juxtaposing  old  and  new forms  of  culture.  As  key
symbols for the new society the bomba, the utafiti house and
the hospitali represented the new system whereas Juma
Nasoro’s enactments of local social and cultural practices
embodied local knowledge. In other words, what we interpret
here as culture is the combination of elements between history
and the embodied nature of social memory. More specifically,
8  Acknowledging my interest in the endeavour he, while showing the
bowl with the poison, also expressed his own wish to explain to me
some of the meanings of the procedure and the items the following day.
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culture is a cross-section of the social dynamics with the social
permeating the personal.
It is possible for cultural forms to withstand pressures of
change and adapt to new conditions without losing their
significance to people. Arguably, forces of development,
whoever or whatever they are, have to relate to peoples’
conceptualizations of their social reality (cf., Swantz 1995:
135).  Evidently,  forms  of  culture  are  slow  to  change  in
comparison to their content. Forms or system(s) of forms from
past  times,  enabling  the  continuity  of  culture,  are  not  in
contradiction  to  cultural  forms  of  the  present  as  long  as  they
are compatible with a new socio-economic reality. An
adaptation to socio-economic transformations can, however, be
difficult  and  result  in  a  break-down  of  a  cultural  system.
Alternatively old cultural forms will be unreceptive to
innovations and loose their function. After thirty years it
remains a task for new empirical research to investigate if the
dynamic social and cultural practices encountered at the time
of Jipemoyo,  are  compatible,  or  not,  with  change  within  this
social context.
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Neo-Pentecostalism in Tanzania
Godly miracles, Satanic interventions or human
development?
Päivi Hasu
Introduction
A global wave of Pentecostalism has been sweeping across all of
Africa during the past few decades.1 This Christianity is now
attracting the urban middle class, the young and the relatively
well educated as well as the rural poor across the continent.
The world wide estimate is presently over 500 million
Pentecostal-charismatic Christians (Robbins 2004: 117).2
Though Pentecostalism's dramatic expansion has left almost no
part of sub-Saharan Africa unaffected, the extent of its growth
varies across the region. Many of Africa's most populous and
politically significant countries reflect this trend. According to
the  estimates,  more  than  20  per  cent  of  the  population  of
countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, South Africa,
1  The fieldwork on which this essay is based was conducted in June -
July  2007.  I  thank Professor  Juhani  Koponen for  his  support  and for
offering  me the  opportunity  to  air  my thoughts  during  the  time when
we were  both  doing  field  research in  Tanzania.  I  also  want  to  express
my gratitude  to  my assistant  Mr.  Geoven Festo  Rwiza,  who with  his
local knowledge made this study possible. This study was funded by
the Finnish Cultural Foundation (Suomen Kulttuurirahasto).
2  The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life,
http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=140, accessed on 1.10.2007
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Kenya, Zambia and Uganda are Pentecostal-charismatic.3 In
Ghana and Nigeria, the growth has been particularly dramatic.
Throughout the world, Africa included, 1980s and 1990s
witnessed a complex, globally expanding web of Pentecostal
networks whereby flows of people, preachers, money, ideas and
images circulate with growing speed and intensity. Simon
Coleman has suggested that the globalisation of Pentecostal-
charismatic Christianity has three key dimensions: It refers to
the use of mass communications media in disseminating its
ideas, images and other media products across the world. It
refers to an organization that promotes internationalism
through global travel and networking, conferences and big
churches that function like international corporations. There
also tends to emerge a global meta-culture of Pentecostal praxis
that transcends locality and displays striking similarities in
different parts of the world (Coleman 2000: 65-69). This
Christianity that also purports to address questions of
prosperity is now flourishing in the declining African
economies.
A scholarly discussion of the connection between the
Pentecostal form of Protestantism and the neoliberal, capitalist
economy has been taking place during the recent years. This
essay touches upon several themes derived from the works of
Max Weber: Religious ideas of the Pentecostal form of
Protestantism, rationalism and (dis-)enchantment, charismatic
leadership, and neoliberal economy. It is about religion and
market economy in Tanzania; the way that Pentecostal ideas of
prosperity and the existence of demonic forces are articulated
in the present-day neoliberal economic setting. Pentecostal
Christianity and its prosperity gospel are here interpreted in
the Geertzian spirit, as a model for and model of lived reality.
Religious beliefs and ideas inform the ways that economic
circumstances are perceived, interpreted and acted upon in
specific social and historical contexts. Furthermore, lived
reality gives rise and shapes religious beliefs and ideas (Geertz
3  For Tanzania, no statistics are available.
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1973: 93). This discussion is situated in the wider context of
globalization and locality.
In Tanzania, there have been two important trends since
mid 1980s that have contributed to the rising popularity of the
Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity; the intensification of
Muslim activities and the economic reforms of the country.
Tanzania is one of the world’s poorest and most highly indebted
countries. The neoliberal policies of structural adjustment of
the 1980s and early 1990s sought to dismantle the regulation
that was seen to constrain market forces in many postcolonial
African economies (Gould and Ojanen 2003: 29). The
Structural Adjustment Program and the liberalization of the
economy have resulted in increased unemployment and a
lowered quality and availability of social services. This has
taken place in the context of marked poverty (Munga 1998: 37).
In 1999, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank
announced that SAPs would be replaced by poverty reduction
strategies (PRSP).  Since  2005,  the  country  has  followed  the
development  frame  of  National  Strategy  for  Growth  and
Reduction  of  Poverty  (MKUKUTA)  to  promote  growth  and
reduce poverty.
Whereas earlier forms of popular Christianity helped
African peasants and labour migrants come to terms with the
demands of capitalist imperialism, contemporary
Pentecostalism responds to another kind of socioeconomic
context and enables African adherents to come to terms with
neoliberalism. Furthermore, as David Maxwell has
demonstrated, there are areas of congruence between
neoliberalism and Pentecostalism: Key traits of the Pentecostal
character such as the sense of personal destiny, self-worth,
self-reliance and positive attitude help the adherents to operate
on the unpredictable markets that require entrepreneurial
initiative, self-motivation, and flexibility with which to face
insecure living (Maxwell 2005: 28). Maxwell explains the
prevalence of Pentecostal doctrines not in terms of false
consciousness but as a means of enabling the adherents to
make  the  best  of  rapid  social  change.  He  suggests  that  for
some, the doctrines bring about social mobility. For others,
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they provide codes of conduct which prevent them from falling
into extreme poverty and destitution. For all they provide a
pattern  for  coming  to  terms  with,  and  benefiting  from,
modernities' values and institutions. Pentecostalism appears to
offer its adherents the chance to change their responses to the
limiting conditions that the neoliberal structures create
(Maxwell 1998: 351; 2005: 28).
One  way  of  changing  the  responses  to  the  limiting
conditions emerges from the way that conversion and becoming
saved transform individuals and restructure families. For many
of the African poor struggling with the effects of the neoliberal
economy this popular religion appears, for instance, to restore
the nuclear family as a defence mechanism. There is often the
emphasis on changed character; notions of fidelity, hard work,
teetotalism and peaceful temper are intended to re-socialize
converts  by  drawing  them  away  from  the  world  of  sin  into  a
family-orientated life (Maxwell 2006: 201). The new codes of
conduct  among  the  saved  often  result  in  an  all-round
betterment and better managed household economy in the form
of more regular income and improved family relations. Often as
well, the believers benefit from the material support of the
fraternal networks of fellow believers. The ethos stresses coping
and avoidance of extreme poverty.
Theologically, the shared elements in the broad variety of
the Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity are baptism of Holy
Spirit and the charismatic gifts of the individual believer such
as speaking in tongues, healing and prophecy. Pentecostals
describe their churches as ‘full Gospel’, meaning that believers
are filled with the Holy Spirit in a way that was promised to the
early Christians in the books of the New Testament; that is they
have access to miraculous power, the gifts of the Spirit,
including  rites  of  healing  and  casting  out  demons  (Brouwer et
al 1996: 5).
Many of the charismatic churches and ministries are
characterized by prosperity gospel, also called faith gospel or
health and wealth gospel according to which a true believer has
the right to health and wealth, and can obtain these blessings
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by a positive confession of faith. Another, equally important
and frequent feature of African charismatic Christianity is its
well developed demonology and the deliverance prayers and
practices. The emphasis put on these aspects varies from one
church to another. I will here discuss the ways that prosperity
gospel and the concerns over demons get an expression in the
Tanzanian realities, through discourse on godly miracles,
workings of Satan and the agency of human beings.
Prosperity gospel is a theological idea commonly shared
by  many  of  Africa’s  Charismatic  churches.  It  has  it  that  God
has  met  all  the  human  needs  in  the  suffering  and  death  of
Christ  and  that  every  Christian  should  share  the  victory  of
Christ over sin, sickness and poverty. A true believer has the
right  to  the  blessings  of  health  and  wealth  and  these  can  be
obtained through a positive confession of faith. Material
success is the sign of God’s blessings. Several American TV
evangelists contributed to the development of this idea. A. A.
Allen taught that God is a rich God and that those who want to
share in his abundance must support God’s servants. Oral
Roberts added the idea of seed faith; one prospers through
planting a seed in faith and the return of that will meet all the
needs (Brouwer et al. 1996: 26-27, 171; Gifford 2001: 62).4 In
Africa, these teachings are being applied and modified in a
radically different kind of context. They find resonance in the
traditional African religions and preoccupations about material
wellbeing.  The  approaches  to  faith  gospel  in  terms  of  the  local
and the global have ranged from analysing the homogenising
influence of the American originated gospel to the analysis of
the more local, African born concerns (eg. Brouwer et al.;
Maxwell  1998).  The  growing  influence  of  prosperity  gospel  has
implications for the formation of capitalist attitudes and
activities (Maxwell 1998: 350).
Besides prosperity gospel, the second central feature of
Pentecostalism is its concern for demons and spiritual warfare.
4  Some of the best known published works of the American prosperity
evangelists are for instance: Kenneth Copeland, The Laws of
Prosperity, 1974; Gloria Copeland, God’s Will is Prosperity, 1978; and
Kenneth E. Hagin How God Taught me about Prosperity, 1985.
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In African cultures, belief in spirits, witchcraft and spiritual
agency is widespread. Correspondingly, a highly developed
demonology has evolved in the modern Pentecostal
Christianity. Daily life is seen to be dominated by an ongoing
struggle between God and the local, demonic territorial spirits
(Brouwer et al. 1996: 169; Robbins 2004: 122). Success and
advance can be blocked by demons that maintain some power
over the Christians and prevent advancement. An important
feature in understanding affliction is therefore the emphasis on
the existence and activity of demons. Satan is perceived as the
ultimate cause behind the existence of evil. Physical calamity
and sin are desired and designed by Satan but God can also
allow or permit misfortunes (Munga 1998: 112-113).
Deliverance by prayer is designed to rid believers of demonic
influence.
Several scholars have suggested that Pentecostal-
charismatic culture has a unique characteristic of at once
preserving its distinctness from the cultures into which it
comes into contact and yet, engaging those cultures on their
own terms. Its forms are similar in many parts of the world and
yet it is diverse in its content; it is local and global at the same
time. Generally, Pentecostalism tends to preserve indigenous
spiritual ontologies by preserving people’s beliefs concerning
the  reality  and  power  of  the  spiritual  worlds  from which  they
have broken away (Robbins 2004: 128). It is the very struggle
against  local  culture  that  proves  how locally  rooted  it  is.  It  is
de-territorialized  and  local  at  the  same  time  because  it  is  an
uprooted local culture engaged in spiritual warfare with its own
roots (Casanova 2001: 437). Authors have thus used
Pentecostal-charismatic culture to support both theories that
construe globalization as a process of homogenization and
those that understand it as a process of indigenizing
differentiation.
It is perhaps then for these reasons that charismatic
Christianity so effectively deals with people’s concerns; it takes
local beliefs, perceptions and existential concerns seriously and
is able to deal with them. Pentecostalism appears to be able to
contain the occult much better than established mission
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churches. While the latter prefer not to talk about the powers of
darkness in public, or even regard them as superstitious
figments of popular imagination, Pentecostal-charismatic
churches take seriously the threat of such powers. By taking
such forces and powers seriously the Pentecostal and other
charismatic churches have moved close to the experience of
many Africans, closer than the white missionary churches ever
could with their denial of the existence of such agency (van Dijk
2000: 11).
New Pentecostal churches in Dar es Salaam -
Efatha
The number of new Pentecostal churches has increased also in
Tanzania. Although Pentecostalism appeared in Tanzania in the
early decades of 20th century  in  the  form of  Holiness  Mission,
Assemblies of God, Swedish Free Mission and ELIM Pentecostal
Church,  it  was  first  during  1970s  when  it  started  spreading
more rapidly. As the consequence of the challenge presented by
the Pentecostal churches, Charismatic revival has been allowed
to exist also within protestant denominations such as the
Lutheran church. A distinction is usually made between the
older Pentecostal churches and the new Charismatic churches
and ministries. Today, there are a number of big, relatively new
Pentecostal churches and ministries in Dar es Salaam. For
instance, Full Gospel Bible Fellowship, located in Mwenge, is
lead by Bishop Zachary Kakobe, Assemblies of God, Mikocheni-
B  is  lead  by  Pastor  Dr.  Gertrude  Rwakatare,  and  Word  and
Peace Organization (Wapo Mission) is founded and managed by
Bishop Sylvester Gamanywa. These and many other new and
independent churches tend to form loose associations for co-
operation and networking, often also internationally.
One of those new churches is Efatha, an independent,
vibrant and rapidly growing church located in Mwenge, Dar es
Salaam. As do most Pentecostal churches, also this one leans
heavily on the personality, vision, and charisma of its founder
and  leader,  Josephat  Elias  Mwingira,  who  wants  to  be
addressed as Apostle and Prophet. He is a charismatic leader
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and claims to have direct connection and communication with
God.  Efatha  church  –  Efatha  meaning  to  be  opened  –  was
established by Mwingira in 1996.5 Before becoming saved he
was, among other things, in Tanzanite mining business at
Mererani mining community outside Arusha, and in 1992 while
at Mererani, he got the calling from God. He is Catholic by his
background  but  studied  later  at  the  Mwika  Lutheran  Bible
School in Kilimanjaro. That is where he also started revivalist
fellowships. His first service took place in 1994 and he then
gathered about 150 people. In December 1995 God gave him
the  permission  to  leave  the  Lutheran  Church  and  Efatha
Ministry was officially registered in May 1997.The church in
Dar es Salaam was started in 2003 with 50-60 people. In 2005
there were over 10,000 people and there are over 300,000
estimated  followers  now in  the  whole  of  Tanzania.  Efatha  has
started churches also in Kenya, Zambia and Malawi. The
organization is carefully planned according to Mwingira’s
vision, and he uses both spiritual and financial advisors to
support  him.  A  registered  company,  Efatha  Foundation,  was
established to administer the investments. Efatha runs various
projects and owns vast areas of agricultural land in different
parts  of  Tanzania.  The  large  plot  in  the  middle  class  area  of
Mwenge where the main church is located is by itself enormous
in its financial value.
The church has three aims: to heal Christians through
prayer, to deliver people from physical and spiritual disorder,
and to prepare the church for the end times. According to
Mwingira’s testimony and visions, he was taken by an angel to
the  heaven  to  go  and  see  Jesus  and  God  (Mwingira  2005).  He
was given a nine point program of how to implement the given
tasks. He was to start a Bible school to educate religious
leaders. He was to arrange services to deliver people from the
powers of darkness, witches, witch doctors, ancestral
sacrifices, as well as all sorts of harmful traditional practices.
He was to have healing services with a holistic approach to
5   In  Mark  7:  34,  ephphatha,  the  Greek  form  of  a  Syro-Chaldaic  or
Aramaic word, means "be opened" in the sense of being delivered.
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healing; to treat social problems, even those affecting the entire
country as well as illnesses and other crises of individual
people such as problems in marriage, family, income and
health.  He  was  also  to  teach  the  word  of  God.  He  was  to
prepare singers, choirs and people able to perform prayers. He
was to start schools and thereby educate new generations of
saved leaders. This would take place at all levels from nursery
schools to universities. He was to start new churches and
places of worship. He was to conduct seminars and meetings as
well as start new services of various kinds such as hospitals,
radio programs, TV programs and production of publications of
different kinds.
Efatha  has  been  broadcasting  on  three  different  TV
channels throughout Tanzania. In June 2007, however, the
church  officially  launched  a  TV  station  of  its  own,  Trinity
Efatha  Network  Television  (TRENET),  after  a  few  years  of  fund
raising. This station is now second religious station in the
country after Agape TV Network. On the same week the church
inaugurated  a  bank  of  its  own although  the  license  was  then
still to be delivered by the government. The church also intends
to launch a weekly newspaper as well as a radio station.
Furthermore, the future visions include a university, hospital,
airport and a phone company. When I interviewed Josephat
Mwingira in June 2006 he proudly presented the first sketches
of  a  ten  storey  office  building  that  Efatha  is  intending  to
construct.
Mwingira takes pride in announcing that Efatha does not
rely on foreign aid, donations or funding but that all the funds
are raised among its own Christians. The sums of the weekly
collections, tithes and offerings, are not publicized but the
general understanding is that they is not below 15 million
shillings (over €8,000) and can be up to 50 million (almost
€30,000) on a good week. Christians have also purchased
shares  of  Efatha  Foundation  with  a  rumoured  estimate  of  are
as high 15 billion shillings. The principle of giving in order to
receive is of supreme importance at this church. Constant
emphasis is placed on the need to work hard and be successful
in  order  to  be  able  to  make  donations.  One  of  Mwingira’s
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leading  ideas  is  to  bring  up  Christians  to  hard  work  and  self-
reliance:  “I  have  managed  to  raise  Tanzanians  to  hard  work
and economic self reliance”. Mwingira thinks of himself as a
skilful  manager  of  the  economy:  “I  am an  economist”.  On  the
competitive religious market successful churches are
sometimes criticized for their ways of making money.
According to its program, Efatha organizes conferences
and seminars. One such occasion was organized in June 2007,
and  the  week  culminated  in  the  launching  of  the  TV  station
and the bank. Two cabined members, the Minister for Labour,
Employment and Youth Development, Hon. Capt. John
Chiligati,  and  the  Minister  for  Lands,  Housing  and  Human
Settlements Development, Hon. John Magufuli honoured the
occasion with their presence. During the week international
guests taught and preached to both leaders and lay Christians.
The main speakers were Dr. Mensa Otabil, a famous Ghanaian
religious superstar, Dr. Tayo Adeyemi, Nigerian born leader of
the New Wine Church in the UK and pastor Randy Morrison, a
Trinidad-originated leader of the Speak the Word Church
International in Minnesota, USA. It may not be accidental that
there was not one white preacher present. The overarching
theme  of  the  week  was  the  empowerment  of  the  Tanzanian
Christians  and  their  way  away  from  poverty  to  prosperity.
Although some of the central areas of Efatha are prayer healing
and deliverance, prosperity teachings and the teachings on
giving in order to receive are of greatest importance as are
issues of empowering the Christians. At Efatha, deliverance is
to  be  understood  broadly  aiming  at  a  general  well  being  and
prosperity in life. The appearance of Mensa Otabil is by itself a
strong indication of the importance of these matters at Efatha.
Furthermore, one may ask whether there are radically new
winds blowing in Tanzania in terms of the economic ideology of
the charismatic churches.
A Ghanaian visit
Mensa Otabil is a Ghanaian religious leader in his 50s; one of
the most prominent Pentecostal leaders on the African
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continent. He is also a business man, a business consultant
and the Chancellor of the private university Central University
College that he has founded. He started his International
Central Gospel Church in 1984 in Accra and draws about 7000
people on Sunday services, which are popular among the
educated urban middle and upper middle class. He has
extensive media activities and is a popular speaker on TV.
Apart from being a churchman and the head of several
hundred churches, he is also a business consultant. He is a
board member of several Ghanaian and international
companies including companies dealing with pharmaceuticals
and computers: “I train business men. Not just Christian
business men. I teach some of the top business men in West
Africa.  I  run  a  consultancy  for  them.  I  train  their  top
management  staff  from  banks  to  mining,  to  multinational
companies”.6 Otabil  has  the  other  one  of  his  two  doctorates
from  the  Oral  Roberts  University  in  Tulsa,  USA.  Apart  from
Oral  Roberts,  another  one  of  the  early  influences  on  him was
Kenneth Hagin, one of the founding personalities of prosperity
teachings in USA. Otabil has published several books, one of
them titled “Four Laws of Productivity”. There he presents the
four principles of prosperity: be fruitful, multiply, replenish the
earth and subdue it.7 I his book “Beyond the Rivers of Ethiopia:
A  Biblical  Revelation  on  God’s  Purpose  for  the  Black  Race”  he
instils  pride  on  the  black  people  who,  according  to  him,  are
inclined to regard themselves as inferior to whites (Gifford
2004: 113). These were the key references of his teachings in
Tanzania.
Otabil is passionate about African development. People
should have zero tolerance for underdevelopment because
6  In 2003 Otabil established his own consultancy company, ‘Otabil and
Associates’, which develops, organises and markets leadership training
seminars and workshops for several large banks, Unilever and other
multinationals (de Witte, forthcoming)
7  Behind these ideas lies the African Pentecostal concern over
”Dominion Theology” that also Otabil underlined while speaking in Dar
es Salaam. According to this theology, there is the need and right for
believers to exercise domionion over earth’s resources for the benefit of
humanity (Larbi 2002: 157).
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underdevelopment is man-made and not God-made; it is man-
made, self-inflected and self-imposed. It will not be rectified by
tithing, anointing with oil or by God’s miraculous intervention.
It is caused at least partly by deep seated values and practices,
and will be rectified only when Africans themselves address
them (Gifford 2004: 130-131). Otabil’s thinking appears to be
rather radical in the context of Tanzanian Pentecostal
Christianity. He gives very little space to demonic forces in
interpreting and explaining the emergence of poverty and
underdevelopment. In his mind, underdevelopment is caused
by human decisions and actions – rightly so, many might say.
Accordingly, the Ghanaian problems are not the results of
demons, witches or ancestral spirits and curses. Neither are
they caused by slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism or the
International Monetary Fund. Those problems cannot be solved
by anointing or godly miracles and interventions. According to
Otabil, the problems of underdevelopment are partially caused
by deep-rooted cultural values and practices. They can be
solved only if Africans themselves take the problems into their
own hands (Gifford 2004: 130-131). Otabil emphasized human
agency, cultural factors and the significance of human labour
in creating development and prosperity. Actually, during the
seminar at Efatha, Otabil's friend and fellow preacher pastor
Randy Morrison placed the perplexing but simple question in
front  of  his  Tanzanian  audience:  “Why  do  you  give  so  much
credit  to  Satan  for  your  (business)  failures?”  This  is
revolutionary in the Tanzanian charismatic context where godly
miracles on one hand and the satanic agency on the other, are
significant aspects in conceptualising human fortunes and
misfortunes.
Otabil’s teaching in Dar es Salaam was based on the book
of Genesis. As he said, the first thing that one learns from that
book is that God is a working God; his work produces results,
he  is  a  producing  God,  he  is  a  creative  God,  he  is  a  God  who
does things. And man has been created as his image, as a
working  and  creating  man.  According  to  Otabil,  Africa  is  the
most continent anointed and Africans pray most, more than
any other people on earth. They are most anointed but Africa is
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also  the  poorest  –  why?  How do  you  develop  the  nation?  How
do you develop the national economy?
The answer is: Switch on the light and you can see clearly, you
can start solving problems. Light represents knowledge and
understanding. If you do not know and understand you can not
solve the problem. Don’t be ignorant; do not let anybody make
you ignorant!
I am fed up with underdevelopment! I believe God created
us for something better. We will see strong business men. We
are not going to sit here and only receive investors from outside.
We will also see Africans to invest. The days of small business
are gone. You will see big money; you will see millions of dollars!
--- Get ready! You are going to see a new story in Africa. The old
picture is gone and the new picture is there! You will see
churches do things that you never thought churches would do.
Preachers doing things you did not think preachers would do. --
-  Many  of  us  Africans  have  grown  up  in  an  atmosphere  of
poverty and scarcity. Atmosphere of little thinking. Atmosphere
of inferiority complex. People who have been raised in
abundance they do not have the sense of scarcity. You have to
ask  God  to  change  your  environment  for  you  from  scarcity  to
abundance! If you have spirit of scarcity you may become
envious and you do not want anybody to get ahead. People do
not want to see others to be blessed.
The inferiority complex must change. Africans think that
we do not deserve much. It started from the past before the
white people came with our own forefathers. They did not value
the life of others. They made us believe we were nothing. But
then the white men came and the colonialism. And we were told
we are nothing. The white men left. Then we got independence
but our leaders told us we can have nothing. From past to the
present we have been reduced in value. When a black man sees
the white man he instantly thinks the white man is wiser. That
is why the government goes to foreign consultants. We are ready
to see foreigners to become kings rather than our own people.
When god raises a leader among us we want to bring him down.
In that atmosphere nothing grows.
Most black people do not invest their money in the future.
They spend and waste their money fast. They throw their money
away. If you are going to be rich you must save and invest! To
save and to invest are the two important principles of
prosperity. But most Africans do not have savings and
investments. They have nothing behind them. We depend on
others to do things for us. That must change! In Africa there is
the environment of dependency!
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God  has  brought  you  into  an  atmosphere;  a  new
atmosphere is being built in this house. It is not the atmosphere
of the old Tanzania. It is not the atmosphere of scarcity but of
abundance!  Some  of  you  will  have  more  money  than  your
government. Your government will borrow from America but you
will  give  to  America.  You  will  start  banks  and  own  hotels,
airlines and universities! You have so much ability inside you!
You have businesses, books, hotels, airplanes, shipping lines,
computer businesses consultancies, hospitals sitting inside you.
As God created so will you create; new companies, businesses,
investments, franchises! You will invest in Hong Kong,
Australia, Europe. Get ready! Your business will not end in
Tanzania; it will go out of Tanzania! Not just to Kenya but also
to Uganda because the God is bigger than East Africa. Break the
fear,  be  bold,  be  strong,  stand  out  for  God  and  see  him  do
mighty  things  for  you!  He  will  change  the  atmosphere!  In  this
church I sense that this is a new atmosphere. God has brought
you into the new. Forget about the old! In the past it was illegal
to be prosperous in Tanzania. Those days are gone for ever!
The way you think determines the things that you attract.
Poverty is not in our pocket but in our mind. If you are poor in
you mind you will attract poverty around you. There are people
in Tanzania and the only thing they see is poverty because they
are poor themselves. Poor people attract poverty around them.
And you attract of your kind. We are on African continent. It is a
poor continent. The poverty is not on the ground but it is in the
people. All over Africa the condition is almost the same: poverty,
poverty, poverty; country after country among the black people.
When  other  people  come  -  whether  Indian,  Arabs  or  white
people - they come and they create wealth. And we live in the
same land but we create poverty! The problem is not the land or
the geography. The problem is the atmosphere of the people!
The understanding of the people makes them what they are. If
things do not change in your mind you can live in the midst of
prosperity but still create poverty!
Godly miracles, satanic interventions
or human development?
There are several areas of interest in Otabil’s teachings in Dar
es Salaam. First, he refutes or at least plays down many
principles of Pentecostalism such as the agency of demons and
the possibility of miracles that still today remain so prevalent in
the Tanzanian Pentecostal Christianity. Second, He places an
emphasis on detrimental cultural factors on one hand and the
NEO-PENTACOSTALISM IN TANZANIA / 237
empowerment and black consciousness on the other in
explaining and interpreting (under-)development. And third, he
speaks about the significance of human labour, rationalism,
disenchantment.
In Tanzania, most Pentecostal preachers focus on health
and wealth through divine intervention, miracles, seed-faith,
prayer and spiritual power. Mensa Otabil, however, takes
matters  further  than  what  the  Tanzanian  public  is  used  to  by
contesting many of those principles. In his work on the
Ghanaian Pentecostalism, Paul Gifford has also looked at
Otabil’s message in quite some detail. Otabil generally refutes
many features common to charismatic Christianity: there is no
space for oil, there is no anointing, no healing, no witches, no
demons, no prophetic gifts, and little stress on the miraculous
(Gifford 2004: 119). People do not become failures through
witches, wizards or demons; they become failures because of
choices made by themselves or on their behalf. In his teachings
human responsibility replaces demonic control. Human beings
are not victims of circumstances; human beings are products of
choices (Gifford 2004: 121).
Otabil has made culture the prime focus of his theology
and his criticism of the emergence of underdevelopment. But at
the same time, he is a passionate advocate of empowerment
and black consciousness. He is critical of some of the African
cultural practices and suggests that they hinder development
or may even be the cause of underdevelopment. Otabil has
listed strongholds, people’s assumptions, desires,
understanding  and  values  that  are  part  of  what  is  generally
labelled as culture. They include such features as inferiority
complex, tribalism, cultural stagnation, idolatry and fetishism,
village mentality, ideas of leadership and apathy (Gifford 2004:
125; also de Witte, forthcoming). In Tanzania, he specifically
addressed the inferiority complex and to some extent, wrong
and  negative  leadership.  Otabil  differs  from  many  other
charismatics  in  his  commitment  to  the  mental  liberation  of
black people in the world, to true independence, freedom, and
self-esteem and he has become particularly well-known for his
brand  of  Black  consciousness  to  the  point  that  Larbi  has
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termed his thinking as “African-Pentecostal liberation theology”
(Larbi 2002: 155). De Witte has argued that what makes
Otabil’s  particular  vision  on  modernity  so  powerful  is  his
synthesis of concepts that are commonly thought to be
incompatible: He brings together cosmopolitanism and African
identity by bridging the perceptual gap between being African
and being modern and developed.8 He also integrates spiritual
power and rationality: in order to be successful, you need both
(de Witte, forthcoming).
Otabil,  like  Mwingira,  draws  from  many  of  the  themes
discussed by Max Weber in his writings on Protestantism and
the spirit of capitalism (2004)  such  as  the  premises  of  a
neoliberal economy, the meaning of work, investment,
rationality and the (non-)existence of magic and miracles.
Furthermore, they both embody charismatic leadership, in both
the theological and sociological sense. That is what Weber
described  as  a  type  of  authority  not  based  on  traditional,
inherited  power  or  on  rational-bureaucratic  power,  but  on  an
extraordinary personal quality and a special gift of grace. In her
careful analysis of Otabil’s work and activities, Marleen de
Witte has demonstrated that Otabil creates himself as the
embodiment  of  his  message  and  that  that  for  a  large  part  his
charisma is constituted by conscious self-presentation, PR
strategies, stage performance, and protocol (de Witte
forthcoming). And Mwingira is a quick learner.
Otabil insists that development comes from hard work
and not from miracles. As de Witte has so lucidly illustrated, he
focuses on success, achievement, self-development and
personal improvement; success comes through human agency.
His preaching presents an intriguing mix of born-again ideology
of personal transformation, African consciousness and self-
development discourse characteristic of management and
consultancy literature (de Witte forthcoming). Otabil and
Mwingira  seem  to  be  different  from  many  other  religious
8  De Witte has an excellent discussion on Otabil’s project of creating
distinction and charisma, and presenting himself as a cosmopolitan in
her dissertation manuscript, chapter two: Mensa Otabil: Marketing
charisma, making religious celebrity.
NEO-PENTACOSTALISM IN TANZANIA / 239
leaders  Tanzania  who  do  not,  in  the  same way,  counsel  their
people to work hard, plan and order their lives properly. Quite
the contrary, their messages tend to centre around the words
and phrases “miracle” and “in the name of Jesus”.
It  is  a  widely  held  perception  that  many  of  the  new
churches do little to encourage work ethic (Gifford 2004: 158).
Otabil also places considerable emphasis on the importance of
education, knowledge and information as the source of light in
solving human problems: “We have to attack ignorance and
illiteracy as though they were the devil himself. Don’t hide
behind  binding  ignorance  and  casting  it  out  in  Jesus’  name.
You cannot cast out ignorance in the name of Jesus. You cast
out ignorance through education” (Gifford 2004: 122). In
Otabil’s teachings one can recognize a sense of work,
entrepreneurship and business in particular, as 'callings' to be
done well. Christians should have the will to work hard and not
spend  the  income on  light-heartedly  but  to  invest  part  of  the
income in their other income generating activities and their
future. And yet, at the same time there is the aspect of showing
off one’s wealth. As Meyer has suggested, it is the strong
emphasis on becoming prosperous and showing off wealth
distinguishes Pentecostalism from early modern ascetic
Protestantism (Meyer 2004: 460).
Weber’s studies attempted to explore one phase of the
emancipation from magic, a phase when people began to rely
more on scientific investigations as the way to truth (Weber
2004[1930]).  This  was  ultimately  to  result  in  a  decline  of  the
use  and  belief  in  magic,  God,  and  myth,  and  a  rise  of
secularization. Weber used the word rationalization in different
ways. Rational action is based on the most efficient means to
achieve a given end. He also used the term rationalization in a
more general sense as the opposite of enchantment. An
enchanted world is one filled with mystery and magic.
Disenchantment, then, refers to the process of emptying the
world of magical or spiritual forces. Both secularization and
disenchantment have been taken to refer to the narrowing of
the religious or spiritual elements of the world. For Otabil,
naturally, disenchantment it is not about secularization.
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Rather, those ideas refer to playing down the agency of demons
whereas spirituality still remains. In order to be successful, one
needs both spiritual power and rationality. No matter what
Mensa Otabil was intending to convey to his Tanzanian
audience about rationality and knowledge, contemporary
Tanzania remains unlike early modern Europe; (dis-
)enchantment, charisma and magical thinking are very much
part of one and the same picture.
Conclusions
In this essay I have discussed three central areas that have
featured in the study of contemporary Pentecostalism in Africa:
the question of localization of a global movement; Pentecostal
theological principles of prosperity gospel and demonology,
which feed, finally, into the question of Weberian themes of the
relationship between a certain kind of Protestantism and
neoliberal economy, of rationality and disenchantment.
The world has witnessed a globally expanding web of
Pentecostal networks. Evangelization, the most important
activity of Pentecostalism, is reflected in the social organization
and the movement of globetrotters; flows of people, preachers,
money, ideas, images and other media products circulate with
growing intensity in the global Pentecostal networks. The
organization promotes internationalism through travel and
networking, conferences and churches that function like
corporations. The Pentecostal praxis that transcends locality
displays striking similarities in different parts of the world.
Some scholars have maintained that Pentecostalism replicates
its doctrines, organizational characteristics and rituals
wherever  it  goes.  And  yet,  there  is  something  more
fundamental to the simultaneous global and local dimensions
of Pentecostalism. Conversion and becoming saved connotes a
complete break with the past. Pentecostalism struggles against
the  local  culture  and  ontologies  by  virtue  of  its  notion  of
continuous warfare whereby the local spiritual entities come to
represent the demonic. It is the very struggle against local
culture that proves how locally rooted Pentecostalism can be.
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This  paradox  raises  the  question  of  continuity  and  rupture  in
Pentecostalism.
Godly miracles on one hand and the workings of Satan on
the other are an essential element of the Tanzanian charismatic
Christianity. They are recurrent themes in the testimonies of
Christians. Human life, well being and prosperity are perceived
in terms of miracles and the satanic interventions. It seems,
however, that new winds are blowing in Tanzanian Pentecostal-
charismatic Christianity as some of the religious leaders are
trying to build a new mindset with their Christians; a mindset
that in many ways reflects the Weberian themes of the
Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. The Ghanaian
religious superstar, Mensa Otabil, emphasized empowerment,
human agency and the significance of human labour in
creating development and prosperity. In those teachings
human responsibility and disenchantment replace demonic
control. Development comes from human labour, not from
miracles. Themes of empowerment and black consciousness,
being African and cosmopolitan at the same time, are heavily
present. Integration of spiritual power and rationality is
necessary; reason, knowledge and scientific thinking are vital.
But in many other cases the messages provided by religious
leaders centre around such words and phrases as ‘miracle’ and
‘in the name of Jesus’.
Contemporary Pentecostalism is a highly successful
popular religion. Its success is based on a set of ideas and
practices that address adherents’ existential concerns for
meaning and empowerment. Pentecostalism offers adherents
the chance of changing their responses to the limiting
conditions that the economic macro-structures create. It offers
hope and lived solutions in the struggles against intensifying
poverty, marginalization and insecurity, problems that arise
out of structural conditions. The religious rhetoric and
neoliberal principles of market economy, ideas of prosperity
and the markets are articulated in the present Pentecostal-
charismatic Christianity in Tanzania (Hasu 2006). Pentecostal-
charismatic Christianity and prosperity gospel are models for
and models of people’s lived reality. Religious ideas inform the
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ways that contemporary economic circumstances are
interpreted and acted upon in the neoliberal setting.
Furthermore, the lived realities of Tanzanians give rise to and
shape their Pentecostal beliefs and ideas about salvation and
success. The African economies conform to the rules of a global
network of business and finance. Global capitalism fuses hope
and hopelessness, possibility and impossibility, and the
neoliberal age emphasizes a privatized and an individual rather
than a communal sense of salvation and prosperity. For the
majority, there remains the sense and the experience of
impossibility, hopelessness, even despair, that emerges from
the failed promises of affluence and success. That is the view of
the global economy of consumer capitalism from the misery of
the margins.
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Social resilience, urban poverty and
sustainable livelihood in megacities of the
South
Marja Järvelä
Introduction
Rapid urbanisation has been one of the most conspicuous
features of social development during recent decades.
Simultaneously, the urban population of the world has shifted
from  the  first  world  dominance  to  third  world  dominance.
Currently,  more  than  60%  of  all  urban  dwellers  live  in  the
Third World (Porter & Sheppard 1998, 429). Also, the
population growth rate in “megacities”1 of  the  South  is
startling.  For  example  in  Lagos,  Nigeria  the  population  was
1   A megacity is usually defined as a recognized metropolitan area with a
total population in excess of 10 million people
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megacity). I use the concept of megacity
throughout this article with some reservations. The critical question is
whether the term is appropriate to describe and associate with the
highly controversial reality experienced especially by the urban poor of
these cities. However, in relation to the overall size of these urban
agglomerations (many of them rapidly increasing their population) this
notion  seems to  be  more  powerful  and up to  the  point  than referring
only to large cities (see more about the issue e.g.  Castells  1996, 403-
404).   To  some  extent  I  will  use  the  notion  megacity  and  large  city
alternatively.
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about 300 000 in 1950, while today there are more than 10
million  inhabitants  and  their  number  is  expected  to  double  in
two decades. Globally, there are currently 20 cities with
population  more  than  10  million,  most  of  them  in  the
developing world. However, it is important to recall that
predominantly developing countries are among the late
urbanizing areas and Africa in particular (Torstensen et al.
2001).
Even  if  it  is  plausible  that  urban  population  in  the  large
cities  of  the  South  will  still  increase  remarkably  in  the  near
future, there are reasons to doubt the highest estimates
presented at international experts’ forums (see e.g., Cohen
2006; Drakakis-Smith 1995). Arguably, the metropolises of the
South are concentrations of wealth and power in their regions -
and some of them even in the world scale. However, an
important  part  of  the  population  in  these  cities  is  living  in
alarming poverty and, therefore their growth may encounter
limits in case the disadvantages of growth clearly and
permanently exceed the benefits (Porter & Sheppard 1998: 443;
Kuvaja 2007). In these cities urban poverty is striking not only
in terms of lack of sources for sustainable livelihood but also in
the multiple manifestations of deficient social and physical
infrastructure (Cohen 2006; Järvelä & Rinne-Koistinen 2005).
For example the scarcity of water sources and the daily
expenses of acquiring safe water display an increasing
limitation  to  the  quality  of  every  day  life.  Furthermore,  the
pollution  of  the  local  water  resources  and  the  inadequate
hygiene facilities all add to the vulnerability of health situation
(e.g.,  Hope  &  Lekorwe  1999).  It  has  been  estimated  that  one
third of the world population lives in slums. This imposes a
huge challenge to urban policies, especially in development of
housing, employment and infrastructure. Thus, rural to urban
migration becomes less tempting because only few of the
migrants  have  a  fair  opportunity  to  attain  the  “good  life”  in
their urban destination (Porter & Sheppard 1998: 443).
From the everyday life perspective rapid urbanisation
implies a considerable social transition in Third World
societies. In terms of social order one may speak of turbulent
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disorder in social values, norms and patterns of action as they
all need to be adapted to new urban circumstances that are
also in flux (Järvelä 2006).  In developing countries everyday
life has traditionally been organised through local communities
having social and cultural patterns of their own as well as a
structure of local leadership. In urban areas, where mobility is
an important trait, community life increasingly acquires some
hybrid characteristics in the meaning of combining a variety of
traditions  brought  in  by  different  migrants  as  well  as  by  the
more permanent local dwellers. In low income housing areas
new elements of community survival strategy and self-help are
being organised through adopted and modified social roles of
gender, ethnicity and kinship. Urban case studies reveal that
women are often in key role in organising new patterns of self-
help practices in the very challenging everyday circumstances
to secure as much as possible health and shelter for their
families (Järvelä & Rinne-Koistinen 2005).
This paper seeks to conceptualise community resilience in
view of the undertakings of local people in view of their pursuit
to secure sustainable livelihood and viable living environments
at urban premises. The author claims that the current state of
defining and analysing urban poverty circumstances from the
local community perspective still leaves a lot to be desired. In
social sciences urban poverty has been documented through
both striking statistics and impressive narratives, but less
analysed theoretically and comprehensively in the context of
everyday life as perceived and experienced in local community
by urban dwellers. In view of the Millennium Development
Goals, Habitat II blueprint and Local Agenda 21, it is pertinent
to also try to conceptualize the multitude of development
interventions performed under the rubric of poverty reduction
and sustainable development from the empowerment
perspective of “squatter citizens” (Mitlin and Satterthwaite
2004).
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Several years ago, I worked with a Finnish research
network ENHICA2 that made considerable efforts at defining
community and social sustainability in urban (and rural)
circumstances, mainly in West Africa (see Järvelä & Kuvaja
2006). While detecting a feasible conceptual understanding of a
local development cycle, the research team argued that the
socio-cultural assets of local community should be perceived –
as a point of departure - emphatically in terms of resources for
social development rather than as barriers (e.g. Rinne-
Koistinen 2003; Kuvaja 2007). In pursuing this idea we found a
rich variety of reflections and empirical studies supporting the
idea of learning about the stakes of local sustainable
development through analysing the pursuit of local people for
sustainable livelihood and viable living environment. For
example the concept of civic entrepreneurship as presented by
Tariq Banuri and Adil Najam (2002) refers strongly to both
community and dialogue in the development process.
Nevertheless, there seems still to be a missing link in
conceptualizing community from a perspective of mobilizing
bottom up resources for local development. This is important
since we (and many others) have concluded through many case
studies that communities (and not only
individuals/households) should be empowered in order to
strengthen local initiatives for sustainable urban development
and livelihood (e.g., Carley & Smith 2001).
Thus, as a conclusion from the previous research
experience with the ENHICA team I find myself still searching
for new conceptual tools that could effectively grasp the link
between community and action in the pursuit for sustainable
urban development and sustainable local livelihood (cf., Carney
2002).
2  ENHICA stands for Environment, Health and Information Activities for
Communities in Africa. The network was founded in 1995 by Dr. Mikko
Korpela (University of Kuopio) and Prof. Marja Järvelä (Univ. of
Jyväskylä). The core research activities were performed during the
years 1998-2003 and included several field work periods, mainly in
Nigeria.
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Very recently, in another research team under my
direction we came across the concept of social resilience (Adger
2000; Folke 2001; Langridge et al. 2006) while tackling the
conceptual challenge of analysing the present community
dynamics in some heavily natural-resource dependent rural
communities. More specifically, I was inspired by the work of
this other research team that is currently researching the
social impacts of wood procurement in forestry villages of
Northwest Russia (Södor et al. 2005). In this particular context
the concept of social resilience appeared to us as a perfect tool
for community studies when analysing the current social
dynamics of villages adapting to change under external
pressure. The forestry villages in Northwest Russia have
recently  been  in  the  middle  of  a  major  period  of  transition
involving modification in their basic local assets, such as
labour, skills and patterns of management. Obviously after the
collapse of the Soviet regime there has been a deep-going
reorganisation of productive capital. As a result, the
communities experience simultaneously external stress
emanating from the recent effects of globalisation on the
industrial  sector  as  well  as  from  major  transitions  in  the
institutional settings of public management both on national
and local level.
Thus, reaching out for understanding social resilience
can be taken not only as analytical task but also as a practical
matter. In its core meaning resilience equals coping with
change. Usually, we perceive more social change in urban
rather  than  in  rural  communities.  Therefore,  I  assume  it  is
worth  trying  to  apply  the  concept  of  social  resilience  to  urban
communities as well. Looking into recent literature it was, in
fact, easy to find numerous examples where the concept of
social resilience has been successfully applied to rural
communities, especially to those highly dependent on natural
resources (e.g., Adger 2000). However, there are reasons why it
is not obvious that the concept of social resilience can be
applied as effectively as a theoretical tool to case studies
addressing sustainability issues in urban communities. In
urban  milieu,  these  reasons  may  be  related  to  complexity  and
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(lack of) social cohesion, for example. In any case, my aim is in
this  paper  to  test  the  applicability  of  this  concept  in  the
framework of sustainability issues of urban communities in the
particular context of megacities in the South. The focus will be
mainly  on  urban  communities  most  vulnerable  in  terms  of
poverty and inadequate living environment.
The article is organised as follows. In the next section, I
will discuss key definitions of social resilience, especially in
relation  to  the  origin  of  the  concept  and  a  variety  of  different
contexts where the concept has been introduced. In the
following section, I explore some empirical case studies and
present them as examples of different ways of using the
concept of social resilience. A particular point is made about
difference as concerns rural and urban communities. Another
issue of importance is to analyse the particular characteristics
of urban communities in their pursuit of social resilience.
Furthermore, urban mobility and migration are briefly
addressed as a particular issue. Section 4 will discuss local
development and social resilience from the point of view of
community empowerment and participation. This is certainly
the most challenging part of the article, because it seems that
subjective powers or stakeholder roles have not as yet given all
the voice they should/could have in relation to evaluating
social resilience in these communities. However, this is a very
important aspect to be covered since sustainable development
needs local participation to be both effective and legitimate. It
also brings up the issue of local “political resilience”, and
perhaps even the concept of “resilient institutions” as an
analytical option.
Social resilience – definition and discussion
W. Neil Adger (2000: 347) defines social resilience as “the
ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses
and disturbances as a result of social, political and
environmental change.” In his presentation there is a strong
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parallel with the ecological definition of resilience3.
Furthermore, he is discussing social resilience in the
framework of defining the relationship between social and
ecological resilience. As to empirical analysis he is referring
mainly to cases of rural community development even though
his core definition of social resilience does not delimit the type
of communities in regard to the scope of the analysis.
Adger makes another important choice in defining social
resilience with reference to groups and communities and not to
individuals as actors. Nowadays we tend to think – especially in
modern societies – that there are specifically individuals (not
groups) that either do or do not cope with current social change
(e.g. Beck-Gernsheim 1996). We also tend to presume that only
rural communities – if any – may appear clearly as
communities while urban spaces are more complex and their
inhabitants more mobile in ways that prevent the foundations
for important social cohesion to appear in these spaces (see
Castells 1998: 60). However, this is not the whole truth, since
urban structure may well include something of functioning
communities or even ‘villages’ in more or less distinctive local
districts.  Curiously, this is most conspicuously seen in gated
communities that assemble some of the wealthiest people into
new residential areas (Kuvaja 2007). Simultaneously, it is less
clear how strongly poor people associate to carry out the
functions of village life in an urban context and how symbols
are attached to a particular urban milieu.
Especially  when  we  keep  in  mind  the  idea  of  an urban
environment or  urban  milieu,  we  might  find  strong  evidence
that some people share particular cultural and functional
aspects related to their living environment or neighbourhood
where reciprocity has been one of the traditional organising
principles (Harvey 1973: 281). I suggest calling this the
homestead principle of organising everyday life connecting local
inhabitants  to  a  particular  urban  space  and  to  each  other  in
3  Ecological resilience has traditionally been defined as the amount of
disturbance that an ecosystem could withstand without changing self-
organized processes and structures (defined as alternative stable
states) (e.g. Gundeson 2000).
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urban districts (cf., Kuvaja 2007: 52-53). When discussing
megacities of the South, we may also ask whether urbanisation
equals modernisation in these spaces in ways similar to Europe
or  the  United  States.  Or  would  local  community,  perhaps,  be
even more important in explaining the social dynamics of
African cities than has traditionally been the case in
modernised Europe and US? In countries of early
industrialization one aspect of modernisation is associated with
residential  anonymity  and  with  an  individual’s  right  to  seek
‘concealed’ privacy, even if this also has raised controversies
about the basic character of urban life.4
The relevance of community in urban circumstances of
the South will be discussed more empirically in subsequent
sections. Here it suffices to conclude that there is not
necessarily a predetermined discontinuity between the social
significance of community and the space between rural and
urban areas. Obviously distinctions and specifications need to
be made, yet those should be based more on regional and
historical context than be determined by the essence of the
type of community. Anyway, it is relevant – in this context – to
conceptually follow Adger’s suggestion denoting social
resilience primarily – and in general - as a qualifier of a
collective  unit  (such  as  community)  rather  than  that  of  a
singular actor (such as an individual).
In discussing the social organisation of the community,
Adger refers not only to social groups but also to institutional
architecture and to social capital – albeit in very general terms.
Importantly, these may indeed be considered as quite decisive
assets of any community when assessing the functioning of the
social system in circumstances of stress and disturbance (c.f.
Banuri & Najam 2002: 56-57). Whereas Adger works in the
field of human geography, a social scientist would probably like
to focus even more on functional networks within the
4  From the point of view of sustainable development the issue of
controversy in European urban policies has been the accelerated
urban sprawl related to the search of privacy, quality living
environments and reduced housing costs in ever more distant suburbs
or “commuter-towns”.
SOCIAL RESILIANCE IN SOUTHERN MEGACITIES / 252
community. Furthermore, from the point of view of the social
scientist the conflicting interests of different locally active
stake-holders are especially relevant when discussing the
internal driving forces emerging in cases of external pressure
(e.g., Jenkins & Smith 2001). By recognising and identifying
internal stakeholders, eventual local development initiatives
would be fully identified and not minimised in the final
analysis.
Of course, in the globalising world there are good reasons
to be concerned about the external forces bringing about
pressure towards social change in local communities. This is,
moreover,  historically  the  main  foundation  for  the  need  for  a
new analytical tool such as social resilience. However, the
social dimension of change is not only related in manifold ways
to other dimensions of development, such as ecological
development, but also includes some complex dynamics of its
own within the community in focus. In fact, understanding the
complexity of local internal dynamics has always provided firm
foundations as well as controversies within social sciences.
This view has been shared widely among social scientists at
any rate since Emile Durkheim (1987: 116) presented his sui
generis argument  on  the  explanatory  power  of  the  social
dimension that has been adopted as a fundamental principle of
sociology.
As to current discussions about defining social resilience,
Adger makes an additional strong point about the importance
of the political dimension. Simultaneously - and somewhat
surprisingly – he refrains from explicitly mentioning the
economic dimension of transition in his conceptual paragraph.
In spite of this the economic dimension does enter vigorously
into discussion as soon as he starts to refer to empirical cases.
Considering the immense power economic driving forces play in
the world today – extending their impact into the everyday life
of  the  poorest  urban  communities  –  one  may  take  a  critical
position in regard to any definitions of social resilience that do
not  take  an  explicit  position  in  regard  to  the  significance  of
economic factors. Consequently, I would organize my definition
SOCIAL RESILIANCE IN SOUTHERN MEGACITIES / 253
of social resilience in a community in a slightly different way
than Adger proposes.
First, considering both the internal and external driving
forces of social change I suggest that the political aspect of the
pursuit for social resilience is likely to assume some distinctive
principles  of  social  order  and  organisation  in  any  community.
However, when speaking specifically about the core of the social
dynamics in regard to social resilience one should start the
analysis by making a distinction between socio-economic and
socio-cultural resilience. The socio-economic aspect refers to the
social organisation of productive assets, such as property
rights  and  the  social  form in  which  labour  is  delivered  in  the
community (wage labour, private entrepreneurship, etc.). The
socio-cultural aspect identifies the social norms, social morality
and social identities of a community in symbolic terms.
Thus, there are clearly two principle aspects to be covered
within the social resilience discourse. The one is to answer
what is feasible and functional in socio-economic terms when
coping with external stress, and the other aspect addresses the
question  of  what  internal  reorganisation  of  social  order  is
acceptable and legitimate in view of prevailing local community
and culture. In general, we may then ask what makes a social
organisation at the community level highly resilient - in either
socio-economic or in socio-cultural terms, or both.  As regards
social change we can also ask how much stability a human
community needs to be socially resilient (cf., Adger 2000: 359).
Proposing this priority implies not minimizing the political
dimension.  Rather,  it  gives  high  priority  and  a  chance  to
implement social resilience with reference to the sustainable
livelihoods of the local people. I consider this priority to
resonate with the overall ideas of sustainable development and
the  principles  of  local  Agenda  21  in  particular,  because  it
acknowledges the need for endorsing bottom-up local policy.
As to the targeting of political resilience in particular, it is also
important to bring the issue of “resilient” local institutions to
the agenda.  However, this implies a huge task of conceptual
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work that cannot be accomplished within the scope of this
article.
Vulnerability and social resilience in large cities of
the South
The hurricane disaster in New Orleans in 2005 showed clearly
how vulnerable big cities can be in the clutches of natural
powers  even  in  the  richest  country  in  the  world.   From  the
point of view social resilience an event such as the impact of
hurricane Katrina clearly implies chaos in an urban area where
striking social disorder is most likely to appear. Even if the risk
of similar catastrophes may be on the increase due to climate
change, it is not the purpose of this article to tackle occasions
of major emergency and disaster connected to natural hazards.
While these disasters most often mobilise the world community
on the basis of a global alert, these emergencies are exceptional
cases in view of the challenges of exploring social resilience5. I
put  this  example  forward  mainly  because,  in  the  current
literature, coastal communities in general have often been
introduced as foremost examples of communities to be studied
from the angle of resilience (e.g., Berkes & Seixas 2005). In
such research social resilience is often not the main issue,
although it remains an important part of the multidisciplinary
or interdisciplinary effort aimed at finding solid solutions to
socio-environmental crises or major risks.
Regardless of the status of communities – whether they
are rural or urban – coastal agglomerations are very interesting
from the point of social resilience. On the one hand, coastal
resources are attractive for economic growth and they support
an increasing proportion of the world’s population (Adger 2000:
352).  On  the  other  hand  these  areas  are  highly  vulnerable  to
floods, pollution and storms. Adger introduces the case of
coastal fishing communities as an ideal example of the
5  In sociology there is a special research field addressing these
exceptional situation called sociology of disaster mainly taught and
studied in the United States. See e.g. Erikson 1994; Dyson 2006;
Pelling 2003.
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situation where communities, even if depending on a single
ecosystem, may be quite resilient in that they are capable of
diversifying their economies. This may be true yet, according to
our experience, economic growth and rapid urbanisation in
coastal cities might involve radical changes in the livelihood
assets of local people. For example traditional fisheries are very
vulnerable in the midst of such developments (Järvelä et al.
2001).
In the late 1990’s during our pilot research in West Africa
we discovered that coastal artisan fisheries were highly
endangered through both ecological deterioration and socio-
economic impoverishment. In Lagos the lagoons in the peri-
urban regions were invaded by water-hyacinth, seriously
harming fishing activity but also radically changing the aquatic
environment. Further, we were told in Accra that lagoons were
used as dumping sites resulting in similar deteriorating effects
on fishing activities and on the livelihood of fishermen’s
households.  The haul was diminishing and the fishermen had
to look for a better catch by going further out to the open sea.
This, however, required better boats that they seldom could
afford. Thus, urbanisation may bring about a vicious circle
especially from the point of view of traditional inhabitants and
from the point of view of artisanal fisheries in particular. These
communities may lack not only socio-economic means to
secure their position in the modernisation of fishing business,
but also remain without adequate socio-cultural assets while
trying  to  cope  with  change,  e.g.  by  finding  other  employment,
as their level of education is ordinarily very low. From the local
livelihood perspective the demise of local artisanal fishing may
have harmful effects on local employment as well as on the
standard  of  nutrition  among  the  poor  (c.f.  Johnson  2007).  In
more general terms a hypothesis has been introduced
addressing the distribution of benefits to rich and poor
households in case of the conversion of traditional production
into alternative uses of natural resources and productive space.
Poor people are generally more dependent on traditional
products than are rich households, and the latter thus receive
most of the benefits of eventual conversions (Adger et al. 2000).
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One of the most peculiar examples of this development
that was explored by the Finnish ENHICA research network is
a fishing village is Ebute-Ilaje in Shomolu Lagos. As described
by Kristiina Kuvaja (2007), this village – trying to survive on the
edge  of  a  lagoon  located  at  the  heart  of  Lagos  –  was  quite
successful in combining another economic activity with fishing,
namely  sand  excavation.  The  community  had  found  an
innovative yet dubious way of extending its living environment
into the lagoon by claiming land through filling the lagoon with
household  waste,  some  part  of  which  was  actually  brought  in
by the local government (Kuvaja 2007)6. In that way the village
seemed to be able to reach a new level of social resilience while,
however, simultaneously taking an obvious risk with the
community’s ecological resilience. The example of Ebute-Ilaje
shows  very  clearly  how paradoxical  the  situation  in  an  urban
low-income district may be with regard to social resilience and
vulnerability7.
The Ebute-Ilaje case is informative not only with regard to
the tension between social and ecological resilience. It also
serves as an example of the difficulty in making a clear-cut
distinction between rural vs. urban community. Since the
“village” Ebute-Ilaje is spatially located at the heart of the
megacity Lagos, one would certainly call it an urban district.
However  this  community  is  clearly  trying  to  prolong  its  way  of
life based on the direct exploitation of natural resources.  In the
low-income housing areas of the large cities of South this is not
exceptional even if Ebute-Ilaje has found a rather peculiar
approach to coping with the pressure of urban development.
Generally speaking, we can observe a rich diversity of rural
extensions into urban spaces in megacities of the South. Poor
people, in their acquisition of food and other necessities of life
6 The Ebute-Ilaje community is described more in detail in the PhD.
dissertation recently presented by Kristiina Kuvaja (2007) Living the
urban Challenge, Sustainable Development and Social Sustainability
in Two Southern Megacities.
7  The concept of vulnerability is often used to describe the insecurity of
individuals, households or communities in face of a changing
environment (e.g. Moser 1996, Miles 2001).
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in these cities, often resort to imitating rural ways of life (Thys
et al. 2005). Urban agriculture8 is a current phenomenon
persisting even in the fringes of the megacities in South. This
implies a constant struggle over land-use not only to securing
housing  but  also  for  other  purposes  such  as  gardening  and
small-scale cattle raising.
Curiously, poverty and ways of life driven by necessity
may appear amazingly similar in the rural and urban South. It
is common that livelihoods in these circumstances are not
based  on  regular  wage  labour  or  on  steady  private
entrepreneurship, but rather on subsistence agriculture,
gardening, raising domestic animals and petty trade of a great
diversity of items (e.g. Hope & Lekorwe 1999; Englund 2001,
94). From the present European perspective we tend to perceive
these urban “substance economies” performed by millions of
people as marginal, and therefore examples that ought to
vanish  from  sight  in  order  to  give  proper  space  for
modernisation take-offs. Thinking like this are we, in fact,
expecting the developing countries to repeat our historical
experience of industrialisation, giving opportunities to masses
of migrants from the countryside?  Is this at all realistic when
thinking about the livelihoods of the millions of poor in the
present megacities of the South? Or should the present
megacities and their “urban villages” look for alternative “post-
industrial” trajectories of development towards improved social
and ecological resilience?
However, the target of increasing social resilience in
deprived communities and social groups of the megacities in
the  South  can  be  understood  as  an  immediate  goal  to  be
targeted not only by development interventions but also by the
8  Urban agriculture is an industry located within (intra-urban) or on the
fringe  (peri-urban)  of  a  town,  a  city  or  a  metropolis,  which  grows and
raises, processes and distributes a diversity of food and non-food
products, (re-) using largely human and natural resources, products
and  services  found  in  and  around  that  urban  area,  and  in  turn
supplying human and material resources, products and services
largely to that urban area.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urban_agriculture; see
alsohttp://www.ruaf.org/node/513
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local inhabitants themselves. This is in fact what is currently
happening in many urban communities. However, the task may
be in many cases overwhelming since local people are often left
alone  with  their  initiatives  and  not  supported  enough  by  the
local authorities or other stakeholders holding powerful means
and assets for development (e.g. Drakakis-Smith 1995, 672;
Järvelä & Rinne-Koistinen 2005). Following Amartya Sen, we
frequently refer to the freedom of poor people as a “solution” in
the meaning that people should be allowed to lead “lives they
have  reason  to  value”  (Sen  1999:  85).  Yet,  what  would  this
freedom mean in more concrete terms from the social resilience
perspective? In the urban circumstances of the poor districts of
Southern megacities freedom is quite an abstract word unless
it is accompanied by more concrete access to public utilities
and services necessary for sustainable livelihood. In case these
facilities are available, then the trajectory of increasing social
resilience would signify a more concrete development strategy
where people themselves could have a bigger say on whatever
could be a feasible community performance in terms of
sustainable livelihood and social order at their local premises.
Hence, social resilience appears to be a useful conceptual
approach. In the current situation of megacities of South it can
be considered a relevant alternative, much more concrete in
view of a community than the general idea of freedom
connected to the capacities of individual citizens. This is most
obvious in regard to the socio-economic aspect of development
that connects a great variety of employment (including self-
employment) to social resilience in the urban space serving
both internal and external customers (Hope & Lekorwe 1999).
There is a greater challenge in understanding the socio-cultural
aspects of everyday life as a resource to be mobilized amongst
urban villagers to enhance social (and ecological) resilience
(Rinne-Koistinen 2004). Empirical evidence seems to support
the idea that people are following a homestead principle trying
to  cope  with  hardship  of  many  kinds  in  their  neighbourhoods
and that are, in fact, quite clever in resolving even very
challenging situations (Kuvaja 2007). Therefore one could
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highlight the need for more rigorous studies of the cultural
aspect of these ‘urban villages’.
Development, participation and self-help:
the problem of resilient institutions
Political resilience refers to the capacity of political institutions
and organisations to take decisions in order to enhance overall
community resilience. In critical discourse on development, the
lack of good governance, bureaucracy and corruption are often
cited as major barriers of local development in the South. Since
the Rio Conference in 1992 local sustainable development has
been politically articulated through the aims of increased
democracy and participation. Furthermore, Local Agenda 21
was approved by the World Summit to break the path towards
the local implementation of sustainable development. In view of
endorsing democracy and participation one of the key
principles was the recommendation that local governments
should increasingly refer to their constituencies in their pursuit
of sustainable development. Within the discourse on the
implementation of sustainable development the concept of
political resilience does not appear frequently, especially not as
applied to the local level. Therefore, discussing political
resilience in a local context makes a particular challenge for
academic work.
Referring back to the importance of the socio-economic
aspect in social resilience an important implication for the
grassroots is to promote locally sustainable livelihoods in every
culturally feasible and legitimate way. However this is not
enough when pursuing social resilience at the community level.
What is equally urgent is to encourage and indicate
institutionally responsible actors that can support and
reinforce sustainable development, simultaneously empowering
local  people  in  their  own  stakes.  This  is  what  I  would  call
political resilience at the community level.  Thus, political
resilience is an essential part of social resilience, where
improvements are urgently needed (cf., Toner 2003, 773). In
the current situation urban communities in the megacities of
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the South either lack proper organisation and good governance
or are without sufficient means to meet local demand for basic
public services and infrastructure. Unfortunately, low-income
housing areas often lack both of these assets (Mitlin &
Satterthwaite 2004: 246; Kuvaja 2007).
Recently, there has been a strong tendency to look for
new partnerships for action involving community stakeholders,
the market and the state in view of endorsing sustainable
development and reducing poverty and deprivation (Jenkins
and Smith 2001). From the grassroots perspective the most
essential proposal has been the central role that has been given
to NGOs in local development. It is true that civil societies in
most countries, including countries of the developing world
have invited thousands of NGOs to meet a great variety of
social and ecological challenges (Banuri & Najam 2002).
Probably millions of projects have been implemented and
assessed. Nevertheless there is still a lack of scientifically
systematized information about the performance of such
interventions and, in particular, about the efficiency of NGOs in
these interventions. Have they in fact succeeded in mobilising
local inhabitants on permanent bases? Can one consider after
a critical assessment that local people really have been
empowered through these projects (e.g. Korhonen 2006)?
Hence, what is actually the contribution of these new
partnerships to local political resilience?
To  summarise  I  would  argue  that  there  is  still  much  to
learn  and  to  be  improved  about  the  political  resilience  of  the
local institutions in charge of sustainable development and
sustainable livelihood. To support my argument I will briefly
discuss two recent case studies presented in my research team,
both in the framework of urban studies concerning megacities
in the South. The first case is concerned with the vital issue of
access to safe water on a daily basis. Here our experience in
Amukoko,  a  shanty  town in  Lagos,  shows  clearly  that  no  one
partner  or  local  stakeholder  is  able  to  provide  safe  water  for  a
low-income community and that the adequacy of self-help is an
important issue. The second example concerns housing rights
in Lagos where dramatic evictions are not exceptional. The
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empirical research experience shows that when major property
rights are at stake communities can be very vulnerable and
that the basic needs of citizens are sometimes not respected
even by public authorities.
In the late 1990’s Eva Rinne-Koistinen (2004) carried out
extensive field work in Amukoko in the Ajeromi/Ifelodun Local
Government Area of Lagos, with the aim to tackle the problem
of  safe  water  acquisition  in  a  megacity  shantytown.  The
starting  point  was  to  learn  through  methods  of  qualitative
inquiry about the significance of local knowledge in coping with
the very challenging circumstances of everyday life. Amukoko is
a very densely populated area with an estimated population of
320,000 consisting of a mixture of all major ethnic groups, with
a predominance of Yoruba (MSF 1996.) Amukoko is located in a
swampy area and there are two big canals ordinarily filled with
stagnant water and waste. The streets are often nearly
impassable, with a poor drainage system and huge refuse
dumps. Almost every available space is built-up with concrete
houses (face-me-face-you houses, e.g., Kuvaja 2001) containing
10-15 rooms with an average of 8-12 people per room. Many
houses lack toilet facilities, water and a solid waste disposal
system, leading waste to be dumped in the drainage or burned
in  the  backyards.  Household  water  is  normally  bought  from
water  vendors  or  drawn  from  the  wells  located  in  the
compounds (Rinne-Koistinen 2004).
In these circumstances, self-help in every day life is a
dominant strategy for survival (Järvelä & Rinne-Koistinen
2005). It became obvious to our research team that local
population  –  women  in  particular  –  had  their  own  security
measures in relation to water available for different household
purposes. We showed that local knowledge is an important
asset not only individually, but also in terms of social trust in
securing safe water. Thus, local knowledge can be understood
as an important element of social resilience. As to political
resilience the situation left much to be desired. Some
researchers had already expressed doubts about the feasibility
of a centralized water delivery system. Consequently, it was
obvious that the political resilience of the water supply system
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is quite a complex issue and should be addressed at the level of
local management. Even though local inhabitants were quite
able to make adequate assessments about the quality of water,
they still lack means to secure a supply of safe water on their
own terms. In fact, much of the water supply was sold in retail
through  secondary  markets  and  it  was  important  to  have
guarantees  and  trust  in  this  system.  A  further  problem  was
posed by price definition, since it should allow the inhabitants
to be able to purchase a sufficient quantity of water. From the
political resilience point of view, the problem we detected in our
study was the lack of institutional efficiency in bringing
together local stakeholders in solving the water issue.
Obviously, the current water management system was not
politically resilient.
The second example is, perhaps, even more startling from
the point of view of social and political resilience. Abidemi
Coker  performed  a  study  in  2006  on  the  role  of  NGOs  in
protecting housing rights in Lagos. Her case study was partly
motivated by an eviction in December 2005 in which 8,000
people – mainly government workers – were left homeless, and
given no alternative accommodation and no financial
compensation (Coker 2006). This incident was the culmination
of a longer process where a few high-rise residential buildings
owned by the state government were sold to private companies.
After a complicated political process in which a public bid was
included  to  give  a  chance  to  the  sitting  residents  to  buy  the
flats had failed, all tenants were forced to leave in spite of a
legal process that was initiated in support of the sitting
tenants’ housing rights. It became obvious that the government
was not interested in following the rule of law or in respecting
internationally recognised housing rights. This case –
unfortunately  –  was  not  the  only  one  in  recent  the  Nigerian
history.
Simultaneously, two major NGOs were active in the
protection of housing rights in cases such as the one described
above.  Both  of  them (Socio  Economic  Rights  Initiative  –  SERI,
and the Social and Economic Rights Action Center – SERAC)
expressed the objective of promoting economic, social and
SOCIAL RESILIANCE IN SOUTHERN MEGACITIES / 263
cultural rights. This is done through advocacy, research,
monitoring and documentation. Lawyers have an important
role in these organisations, and this becomes particularly
evident when eviction cases are taken to court. Recent
experience shows, however, that even the most influential
NGOs are not powerful enough to protect the housing rights of
the people. Abidemi Coker (ibid.), who had access to important
information though performing an internship period in SERI,
found  at  least  two  major  elements  of  failure  in  the  political
resilience of the current housing sector management. First,
local governments were almost totally unable to secure housing
rights  in  their  communities  due  to  lack  of  resources  and
adequate  staff.  This  has  to  do  with  the  general  tendency  of
shifting responsibility for social infrastructure to civil society
and  to  NGOs in  particular  (ibid.: 52). A second concern arose
from the fact that the two NGOs were not cooperating with each
other. Again this can be acknowledged as an element of
deficient political resilience. Since there are hardly any other
institutional actors capable of raising a significant performance
in  favour  of  the  housing  rights,  it  would  be  most  likely
contribute to political resilience if they could at least unite their
forces (ibid: 64).
Thus, if there is a main lesson we have learnt about
community and political resilience through these two case
studies, it seems to refer to the particular weakness of local
political institutions. From the point of view of political
resilience the most urgent and decisive impediment for social
resilience and sustainable livelihood is the unwillingness to
take responsibility and mobilize a joint effort in an appropriate
institutional setting that would meet the particularities of the
local community. Therefore the next issue to be tackled in the
social resilience discourse is to define criteria for “resilient
institutions” at the community level.
Conclusion
Simone (2001: 48) holds that decentralisation provides greater
political manoeuvrability for mitigating urban crisis. Indeed,
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the urban circumstances in large cities of the South have often
been described in terms of crises with reference to crumbling
physical infrastructure and to strikingly inadequate school and
health care facilities. While local authorities are often accused
of being unresponsive in regard to the basic needs of the local
population, it is also true that these governments have a
serious shortage of funds. According to Simone this situation
renders their powers to manoeuvre “largely fictitious” (ibid.).
Agreeing  with  that,  it  is  important  to  add  that  in  the  present
circumstances it seems evident that political resilience can
never be attained by simply delegating task of solving the
urban crisis on one single actor, such as the local government.
Consequently, a major challenge for the social scientist is to
thoroughly analyse the plausible multi-actor setting that could
be institutionalized locally with regard to mitigate urban crises
and promote sustainable livelihood and social resilience.
Hence, in the extremely vulnerable urban circumstances
of the mega-cities of the South, political resilience seems to be
an indispensable condition for any major improvement of social
and ecological resilience at the community level. Analytically it
is – of course – important to address even more individual and
particularized household survival strategies that may be
supported through specific mobility strategies, e.g., through
inward and outward movement in search of better livelihood
(cf., Kuvaja 2007). Yet, reducing vulnerability and eradicating
poverty in the whole community entails not only individual
actions and actors but also community input (such as physical
and social infrastructure) in terms of effective sustainability
strategies. In general this has been recognised, e.g., in many
policy programmes such as Local Agenda 21. However, the
pursuit and trajectories of actual implementation remains
unclear  unless  the  pattern  of  local  actors  and  their  mutual
organisation and joint efforts are made explicit.
Thinking about the challenge for social scientists of
understanding social resilience, it becomes evident that we are
here talking about potential “actors of change” taking key
positions in combating the urban crises in general, or some
specific elements of vulnerabilities of urban life. With regard to
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political resilience at the local level in particular, the first task
seems to be to clarify the concept and find its core relation to
the current mainstream discourse on participation as well as
on institutional and civil rights and responsibilities.
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[Dis]assembling development
Jeremy Gould
We may [thus] draw some general conclusions on the nature
of Assemblages… On a first, horizontal, axis, an assemblage
comprises two segments, one of content, the other of
expression. On the one hand it is a machinic assemblage of
bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies
reacting  to  one  another;  on  the  other  hand it  is  a collective
assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of
incorporeal  transformations  attributed  to  bodies.  Then on a
vertical axis, the assemblage has both territorial sides, or
reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and cutting edges of
deterritorialization, which carry it away (Deleuze & Guattari
1988: 88).
The focus should be…on methodological examination of how
the developmentalist complex is actually working and what it
is producing (Koponen 2004: 12).
The aim of this essay is to sketch a conceptual scheme which
could  inform  empirical  enquiries  into  the  algorithms  of
selectivity and translation via which evidence about social
realities in aid recipient contexts (‘developing countries’) is
converted into the  policies of dedicated aid agencies. I suggest
that these algorithms of selectivity and translation, along with
the special modes of agency that create and deploy them might
be thought of as properties of a socio-epistemic assemblage
termed ‘development.’ The task that this formulation proposes
is congruent with Koponen’s proposal (above): to examine how
[DIS]ASSEMBLING DEVELOPMENT / 270
‘development’ actually works and what it produces. In the first
instance, this essay is concerned with the effects of
‘development’ in academic Development Studies. Even within
this narrow remit, the ambitions are modest and will inevitably
fall  far  short  of  the  agenda  for  the  study  of  assemblages
sketched by Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 504): ‘In each case
[i.e., for bodies and enunciations] it is necessary to ascertain
both what is said and what is done.’
Development Studies
Development Studies, as a normative, problem-oriented,
interdisciplinary endeavour (cf. Koponen 2004: 5) claims
commitment to social progress, to the betterment of the human
condition, to identifying the means and mechanisms of
‘development’ that will bring about virtuous social ends. Such a
definition is extremely seductive; who among us is not appalled
by global inequity and mass suffering? Who would not want to
participate in redressing these injustices? The paradox
inherent in this formulation is that for the notion of
‘development’ to provide Development Studies with coherent
scientific substance it must simultaneously be both objective
reality and an instrumental agenda. We must be able to
identify actual instances and mechanisms of ‘development’,
while conceding that not all manifestations of social change can
be exemplars of ‘development’ (progress) in equal measure. To
justify its self-assigned mandate, Development Studies must be
equipped to distinguish between better and worse conditions
for the possibility of development.
For  better  or  worse,  this  is  hardly  feasible.  Were  the
histories of societies to follow predictable patterns, and were we
able to discern these patterns and able to adjudge in real time
which would lead to virtuous outcomes and which not – under
such circumstances it might, perhaps, make sense to speak of
‘development’ as an analytic tool. Each generation, to be sure,
produces those who claim the ability to discern such historical
regularities, only to have subsequent analysts find their
prescriptions and predictions – even when harnessed by state
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apparati as the basis for ‘policy’ – to be misguided. By now we
should have learned our lesson: the intrinsic instrumental
imperative of ‘development’ systematically undermines its
capacity for analytical objectivity. Predisposed to find the magic
equations of ‘development’, scholars of ‘development’ rush to
judgment and ignore the contingency and indeterminacy of
social change. The contemporary field of Development Studies,
so constituted, generates endless and competing versions of
virtuous prescriptions for social betterment, with no stable,
consensual criteria for adjudging their relative value and for
choosing between them. As a result, this competition for the
normative high ground, whereby we are asked to choose
between rhetorical ephemerals (poverty recduction vs good
governance; state regulation vs free markets), becomes itself
the focus of debate, perverting the theoretical and
methodological tools of the trade and at the expense of
empirical social analysis.
The complexity of development
‘Development’, then, will never be defined to everyone’s
satisfaction; we will never have normative consensus over
virtuous means and ends. Quite the contrary – despite recent
political pacts around such developmental objects as the
Millennium Development Goals and the Paris Declaration, we
have never been further from intellectual agreement about
what ‘development’ entails. The key to development is growth or
stability; innovation or respect for values; free or regulated
markets; private activism or representative democracy; rational
governance and/or rule  of  law;  better  health  and  more
education vs. biodiversity  and  global  justice  –  each  on  its  own
or in any variety of combinations. This is not simply a question
of diverging interests, i.e., the effect of conflicting actor
orientations. Rather, the impossibility of defining ‘development’
stems in essence from its ascribed nature as an
epiphenomenon.
Indeed, debates about ‘development’ are, for the most
part, carried out on the level of society as a whole. Development
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is conventionally construed as a property of ‘society’, as a
process by which a society or some of its essential aspects
change  from  one  condition  to  another.  The  UNDP  Human
Development Index, whereby ‘development’ is the aggregation of
x variables spanning every dimension of social welfare,
exemplifies this tendency.  For all its whims of fashion, there is
marked consistency in the way Development Studies resists the
‘piecemeal’ and ‘incremental’ theorization of ‘development’ –
narrow, i.e., disciplinary theorizations will always be found to
sin against a ‘balanced’ and holistic vision (eg., Nederveen
Pieterse 1999). This conceptual holism is a powerful epistemic
achievement and is perhaps the strongest argument in defence
of conventional Development Studies. By constituting a
discursive field within which various models must compete at
the level of ‘society’, Development Studies tends to pre-empt
reductionist  claims  for  the  greater  good  that  loose  sight  of  the
organic social whole. It is a genuine achievement that academic
Development Studies has largely resisted attempts to endorse
growth at the expense of equity, security over freedom, or
immediate consumption to the detriment of the long-term
health of the planet.
In the field’s constitutive holism resides, however, a
fundamental epistemological problem that undermines these
achievements in the long run.1 This is the fact that any attempt
to model, explain or define ‘development’ must inevitably be the
simplification of a virtually unlimited object, i.e., ‘society.’ Even
without the insights of ethnomethodology (Garfinkle 1968),
common sense tells us that there is no end to the possible
iterations of social facts. To appropriate ‘society’ (as a
precondition for defining ‘development’) we must of necessity,
simplify.  And,  as  we  know  from  recent  social  analyses  of
science (i.e., Mol & Law 2006), any attempt at simplification
will inevitably engender complexity as competing simplicities
1  The epiphenomenological view of development has other problematic
knowledge effects as well. Among these is the temptation to use
aggregate measures of ‘development’ to generate ordinal hierarchies of
peoples and places with strong normative connotations: who wants to
be associated with “the least developed countries” or be “in the
top/bottom 5% of the HDI”?
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‘interfere’ (Haraway 1991) with each others’ narrative
structures.
Competition among simplicities generates complexity over
time.  This  is  a  general  pattern,  but  it  naturally  plays  out  in
specific historical circumstances. The end of the Second World
War  was  a  formative  period  for  the  emergence  of  both
Development Studies and a global development industry
predicated on the notion of ‘development’ as a social
epiphenomenon. At this stage, the simplifying abstractions of
academic economics dominated the constitution of
‘development.’ The pioneer development economists introduced,
inter alia, factor productivity, market performance and human
capital as the pivotal variables of development. Almost
immediately, however, scholars in a range of academic fields of
knowledge challenged the quasi-hegemonic role of economics in
the theorization of Development Studies through myriad
competing simplifications. These competing views have
continued to evolve along relatively discrete trajectories: in
sociology (pursuing its concerns with modernity), in political
science (concerned with government), in anthropology (with its
metaparadigm of cultural relativism), and so on.
The perceived complexity of development has emerged in
the interstices of these competing simplifications. Consider, for
example, attempts to exorcise the incommensurability of good
governance and market rationality as ‘developmental’ axioms –
thus generating bridging concepts like ‘informality’ and ‘social
capital’ in the borderlands of economic, sociological and
political simplifications. Now, then, here is the crunch: Such
transdisciplinary engagements do not resolve definitional
problems; rather they contribute to the (re)production of
‘development’ as an empirically irreducible, i.e., a
foundationally ‘complex’ phenomenon. For a field of inquiry
that identifies itself as interdisciplinary and problem-solving,
such an excess of inevitable and irreducible complexity is
somewhat  awkward,  to  say  the  least.  Instead  of
interdisciplinary dialogue and theoretical refinement we get
concerted efforts at boundary maintenance – both within
Development Studies (between, say, anthropologists and
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political sciences regarding values and institutions), and
between Development Studies and its neighboring fields
(international relations, environmental studies, science and
technology studies, etc.). It is through such self-referential
‘debates’ that reductionist accounts of development compete for
the epistemic high ground.
The development industry
What drives the competition over the socio-epistemic privilege
to speak authoritatively about ‘development? Discursive one-
upmanship is not, one suspects, driven by an eagerness to
claim credit for the achievements of the development industry.
Sixty years of ‘development’ and countless trillions of dollars in
foreign aid have hardly made a dent in the structures of global
inequity (Easterly 2006). The instrumental programme of
development has little to commend it in empirical terms, and is
probably complicit in the deepening of global injustice and
growing disparities of welfare. More children, and parents, will
go  to  bed  tonight  sick  and  hungry  than  ever  before  in  the
history of humankind.
Career concerns – academic merit, recognition, enlistment
and school-building – certainly play a key role in entrenched
territorial  reflexes.  Bourdieu  would  have  much  to  say  in  this
regard (cf. Dezalay & Garth 2002). But basically, I suspect, it is
the banal materiality of ‘development itself which fuels the
conceptual border wars. One hundred billion dollars in public
allotments annually are ploughed into ‘development’, a sizable
chunk of which is deployed to enrol political support for its own
perpetuation. Indeed, the industry owes its existence to
political fiat. Only under very exceptional circumstances – such
as Finland’s deep fiscal crisis of the early nineties – do the
levels of public aid spending vary significantly from year to
year. Yet, the development industry’s resources are still
predominantly generated within national polities, and the
symbolic capital of academic credentials remains important in
the  mobilization  of  public  resources  for  foreign  aid.  On  the
other side of the coin, few working in the field of Development
[DIS]ASSEMBLING DEVELOPMENT / 275
Studies are immune to the allures of ‘development’ resources –
grants, commissioned studies, generously remunerated
consultancies and ‘missions’ to exotic places. Indeed, industrial
‘development capital’ is a valuable and convertible currency in
the academic world of Development Studies: the recognition of
one’s work as authoritative by the development industry can
often be converted directly into academic merit.
One  could  no  doubt  make  a  case  for  the  complicity  of
Development Studies in the failures of the development
industry,  but  my  point  is  rather  the  opposite.  The  knowledge
practices of Development Studies – embedded in the vain
pursuit  of  an  equation  with  which  to  engineer  the  virtuous
evolution of society as a whole – are themselves an effect of the
development industry. In the first instance, the notion of
‘development’ as a metastructural engineering project reflects
the perspective of an imagined community of Western states on
the threshold of the Cold War. Widespread ‘poverty’ and
‘ignorance’ were then (as now) seen as nutrient augur for
enemy combatants (during the Cold War these were called
Communists), and thus as grave threats to both capitalism and
democracy.  It  was  only  in  the  overall  transformation  of  the
underdeveloped societies that ‘freedom’ (Western civilization)
could prevail. This vision was grafted onto academic space
where a generation of repatriated colonial civil
servant/academics transformed it into the intellectual project
of Development Studies (see Kothari  2005).
The triumphalistic project of post-war Development
Studies has never managed to escape its intellectual origins.
The vision of ‘development’ that resided at the core of Cold War
foreign policy has largely retained its epistemic contours at the
core of the field. At the same time, Development Studies has
remained hostage to the strategic interests of Western,
capitalist states through shifting schemes of incentives and
mechanisms of enlistment. Of course, the strategic interests of
capitalist states have themselves evolved since the formative
days of ‘development’ in the 1950s and 1960s, reflecting
changes in the nature and organization of capitalism itself.
Individual national states have ceded large tracts of their
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strategic authority to supranational bodies – public agencies
and private corporations – themselves beholden more to global
actors and logics than to national bourgeoisies. Indeed, it
compounds the dilemma of Development Studies that time is
passing by its constitutive vision of a metastructural societal
engineering project: The policies and practices of ‘development’
are today less and less about the transformation of societies
than  they  are  about  the  management  of  ‘populations’,
irrespective of national boundaries.2
And yet,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  reduce  the  knowledge
practices of ‘development’ to capitalist or Western interests. In
this respect the constructivist critique of neo-realist
international relations theory (e.g., Wendt 2000; see both
Siitonen  and  Laakso,  this  volume)  has  a  valid  point.  The
strategic interests of rich, capitalist countries are a necessary,
but  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  the  existence  of  the
development industry. Where constructivist international
relations theory goes awry is in its reduction of the non-
strategic dimension to ‘values.’ The claim that Northern nations
cooperate – e.g., to promote ‘development’ in the South – due to
a convergence of values is based on an attractive premise, but
suffers from tautological reasoning. International mechanisms
for the allocation of public resources to ‘development’ can only
express the existence of a value consensus were there some
empirical link between rhetoric and reality, i.e., between foreign
aid and poverty reduction. Lacking such evidence, it makes
little sense to see the Millennium Development Goals, for
example, as a genuine expression of a shared commitment to
halving poverty by the year 2015. If this were truly the intent,
the  rich-country  parties  to  the  MDGs  would  hardly  resist  so
stubbornly reforming inequities in the international trade
regime  that  is  universally  known to  be  an  important  cause  of
poverty (cf. Stochetti, this volume). Developmental values no
more explain the actions and enunciations of the development
industry than a commitment to ‘freedom’ on the part of the US,
2  On the biopolitical and security concerns of ‘development’, e.g.,
Duffield 2001.
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Britain and their allies explains their invasion and occupation
of Iraq.
Where neo-realist ‘strategic interests’ (in energy) go a long
way toward explaining American policy in Iraq, the same kinds
of interests cannot read be read off the MDGs. Constructivist
theories are correct in rejecting opportunistic state interests as
an  explanation  for  development  policy  formation.  But  the  way
they resolve the causality of policy formation goes an analytical
step too far. By substituting the structural construct of values
for the interested agency of states, the explanation errs on the
side of structural determination: Agency is lost through the
cracks. If not to the strategic interests of states, then, where
should we look for the assertive forms of agency informing and
shaping  the  production  of  ‘development’?  Our  answer  to  this
question  will  depend  heavily  on  how  we  problematize  the
development industry. This essays argues for a view of
development as a ‘machinic’ configuration of bodies and ideas,
agency and enunciations. Publics in rich countries from
Finland to Japan mandate their governments to spend billions
on ‘development’ year after year. In Europe alone, twenty-
thousand professionals are employed to spend this money. Its
main outcome is ‘policy’ – understood as astronomical volumes
of text produced to mobilize, regulate and justify the moneys it
spends. But underlying and propping up ‘policy’ is an
enormous gallery of subsidiary products – practices and
artefacts, without which the development industry could not
perpetuate itself, could not continue to produce ‘development.’
‘Development’ – critical legacies
What kind of object does ‘development’ offer empirical social
science? What sorts of analytical tasks does this perspective
imply for Development Studies, and what sorts of analytical
tools might be commensurate with these tasks? The existence
of Development Studies as a (semi-)institutionalized field of
knowledge presents us (academics, practitioners, citizens) with
an intellectual-political challenge. The challenge is to ‘turn the
telescope around’ and direct the concerns of contemporary
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social science at the development industry – that is, to
accomplish the inverse of what occurred at the formative
moments of Development Studies in the middle of the twentieth
century. Instead of maintaining a field of Development Studies
constituted around the managerial/biopolitical concerns of late
capitalism, one could envision the subversive redeployment of
intellectual and institutional energies now held hostage to
‘development.’ I would like to suggest the interrogation of the
conditions of the possibility of the development industry itself
as such a subversive agenda. This inevitably directs our
attention to the knowledge practices through which the
industry constitutes itself and the empirical objects toward
which it is oriented.
The idea of ‘development’
This  is  not  an  entirely  new  idea  and  it  has  important
intellectual precursors. Structural marxist analysis of the
1970s,  enthralled  with  the  work  of  Louis  Althusser,  were
convinced that ‘development’ was pure ideology and that the
real underlying agenda could be revealed through an expose of
the material conditions of its capitalist production (Taylor
1979…). The ideological-critical thrust of the structuralist
tradition resurfaced in reconstituted foucauldian garb in the
late 1980s (Marglin & Marglin 1990, Sachs 1992, Escobar
1995).3 For these writers, ‘development’ was a form of
knowledge/power wherein discursive ‘rules of enunciation’,
that is, the way truth claims can be formulated, exercise violent
powers of exclusion. The texts of the development industry,
from a Harry Truman speech (Sachs) to a project document for
a development intervention in Lesotho (Ferguson 1990) could
all be read as evidence of the marginalizing effects of
‘development’ toward non-European populations. This critique
of ‘development’ expressed a deep suspicion of ‘eurocentrism’
and was, as a whole, totalizing – and not a little nostalgic for a
romantic, pre-industrial past.
3  Foucault was a student of Althusser although the teacher disowned
the student after the ‘idealism’ of The Order of Things (Foucault 1972).
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The seminal Doctrines of Development by Mike Cowen and
Bob Shenton (1996) represents a fundamental break with these
approaches. Cowen and Shenton problematize ‘development’
through  a  pair  of  analytical  distinctions  –  between ideas and
doctrines of development, on the one hand, and between
immanent and intentional development on the other. Breaking
with contemporary critiques of development, the focus of their
analysis  is  not  on  a  discursive,  textual,  reality,  but  on
capitalism itself, in richly theorized rendition. The
interpretative frame for their analysis reflects a strong Hegelian
current: the emergence of development as an ‘idea’ in the
minds of men prefigures its historical manifestation.
Along these lines, Cowen and Shenton trace the history of
‘development’ through economic, political and theological
debates in post-Enlightenment Europe. They identify
‘development’ first as an incipient idea, embedded in the
revolutionary, ‘immanent’ transformation of European society
by the emergence of a mode of production based on capital.
They  then  proceed  to  flesh  out  its  emergence  as  a doctrine,
manifesting the needs of local bourgeoisies (and the states they
control), to intentionally control the effects of spontaneous
capitalist development for the labour force (i.e., regulating the
supply of surplus labour). Through this analytical strategy, the
authors turn critical attention away from ‘development’ as a
totalizing discursive formation, to the specific relationship
between class-based states (as the regulators, or ‘trustees’ of
social change) and the ‘agency of development’ – an immanent
social force in the history of capitalism.
While magisterial in its execution, the compellingness of
their analysis stands on the merits of the author’s Hegelian
angle on history. While in its substantive views the analysis
owes  more  to  Marx  than  to  Hegel, Doctrines of development
shares its German ancestors’ common metastructural
perspective on Humanity (society) as the transcendental
Subject of History. The developmental agency of capitalism is a
property of society as a whole and represents a disembodied,
transcendental historical force. This position provides rich
access to the economic and conceptual history of capitalism, to
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which the authors make a radically original contribution. Yet,
for contemporary purposes, it becomes increasingly difficult to
make the connection between the transcendental agency of
19th century national capitalism and the policies and practices
of ‘development’ in the global South. As Southern labour
transmogrifies from being ‘surplus’ to being endemically
‘redundant’ with respect to the needs of capitalist production,
the tension between intentional and immanent development
loses much of its cogency.
The critical leverage point of Cowen and Shenton lies in
their notion of immanent development – it provides a normative
counterpoint to intentional efforts to regulate immanent
capitalism against its own spontaneous energies. Cowen and
Shenton show how mediating interests can intervene in the
form of ‘trusteeship’ to confound the immanent agency of
development; this occurred in Kenya, most notably, where
colonial trustees undermined capital accumulation through
paternalistic efforts to preserve the authentic social relations of
the ‘tribal’ population. In contrast, the critical leverage point
deployed by Escobar et al. – a notion of discursive eurocentrism
– is essentially nostalgic: all that remains beyond eurocentricity
is an ahistorical sense of authenticity – indeed, seen through
the Hegelian lens of Cowen and Shenton, the critique of
development as ethnocentism stands accused of a paternalistic
trusteeism similar to that of British colonialism!
Cowen and Shenton’s apology for development as an
analytical category would appear to toss Development Studies a
life preserver. One could even speak of two alternative
strategies of salvation. On the one hand, DS might constitute
itself as the science of immanent development. Its task is to
map and theorize the ‘agency of development’, something rather
closely  akin  to  the  ‘laws  of  motion’  (as  Marx  and  Lenin  were
wont to say) of capitalism. Putting aside the fact that critical
political economy already has this base covered, such a
strategy falls prey to the critical observations (about the banes
of complexity and engineering) discussed earlier. Seeing
development as immanent (a position that many would find it
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hard to defend), if anything, confounds the problems associated
with theorizing development as a normative epiphenomenon.
Alternatively, Doctrines of Development suggests a
framework for the study of ‘development’ as the analysis of
‘intentional development’ stripped of the instrumentality of
conventional Development Studies. Thus the analysis of
‘development’ would not aim at producing ‘knowledge for policy’
but  would  be  primarily  concerned  with  how  the  ‘idea’  of
development is translated into policy via specific forms of
human agency.
A socio-epistemic assemblage
Drawing on a set of parallel conceptual manoeuvres in
anthropology and science & technology studies (both of which
draw on Deleuze and Guattari, see ingress), I suggest that we
think of ‘development’ as an Assemblage.4 By  referring  to
‘development’ as a socio-epistemic assemblage I am, first of all,
making an explicit break with the convention of perceiving
‘development’ as an historical epiphenomenon. ‘Development’
in this sense is not a qualitative property of society; rather,
‘development’ is the product of specific, delimited social
practices. ‘Development’ as a socio-epistemic assemblage is
constituted from two inseparable elements: one is epistemic –
‘development’ is the ensemble of ideas that is pulled together
via discursive and non-discursive acts (‘enunciations’) that
evoke the notion of ‘development.’5 The other element is social,
4  Cf. the notion of ‘ethno-epistemic assemblages’ espoused in Irwin &
Michael 2003.
5  The formulation ‘discursive and non-discursive practices’ derives from
Foucault. At first blush, his invocation of discourse and its negation
would seem to counsel analytical attention to all possible events –
hardly a very helpful methodological guideline. In my understanding,
however, the pairing of discursive and non-discursive practices points
to the importance of the ‘inaudible ’ routines and inanimate artefacts
that accompany discourse and provide its institutional ambience – i.e.,
both the things and practices that make discourse possible and those
that ‘fill in the silences’ between audible/legible discourse.
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and doubly so: first, because ‘development’ is a public6
discursive fact, a figment of the social imaginary; and second,
because the act of achieving a socio-epistemic assemblage – a
configuration of bodies and enunciations – implies the agency
of embodied social actors. In other words, this notion of
‘development’ as a socio-epistemic assemblage is at once a
configuration of ideas, practices and actors.
The  fashionable  (cf.  Marcus  &  Saka  2006)  notion  of
assemblage is not evoked here as an explanatory concept. It
assignment to the notion of ‘development’ tells us little about
what  kind  of  an  empirical  entity  ‘development’  might  be  in
substance. The idea of assemblage does, however, provide us
with a kind of mapping device for approaching ‘development’
empirically. Briefly, thinking of ‘development’ as a socio-
epistemic assemblage suggests a number of basic coordinates.
Following the original formulation by Deleuze and
Guattari, an assemblage has two dimensions. Horizontally, an
assemblage is ‘machinic’ in nature: it is constituted out of
heterogeneous elements that have been made to ‘come together
and consolidate’ (DeLanda) by processes external to the
constituent elements. But an assemblage is not a machine – no
one  has  designed  it;  no  one  owns  it;  no  one  is  fully  in  charge.
Reading  into  Deleuze  &  Guattari  we  can  infer  that  an
assemblage is not purely human, but relies to a large extent on
non-human,  i.e.,  technological  agency  (cf.  Latour  &  Woolgar
1979). An assemblage produces its outcomes through the
collaboration of intentional and unintentional agency; some of
the intent is embodied in human form, some is hardwired into
technological artefacts (a word-processing program ‘intends’ to
produce documents; an organizational incentive scheme
6   I  am  explicitly  limiting  the  notion  of  development  to  public  repre-
sentations. As will be clear, I will be further privileging representations
evoked by specialized development scholars and, by the same token, to
dedicated private and public development agencies. This is for
pragmatic reasons. There is such an enormous body of text revolving
around the notion of ‘development’ that its makes sense to focus on
these core sites. One could also argue that Development Studies
departments and journals, along with dedicated development agencies,
constitute key ‘political locations’ (cf. Gupta & Ferguson 1997) in
public controversies about social ends in the South.
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‘intends’ to produce motivation). By the same token, the agency
of both human and non-human actors generates unintended
outcomes. Human and non-human agency ‘comes together’ in
an assemblage to produce specific outcomes – this is what
gives  it  its  apparent  coherence  –  and  we  know  it  through  its
products and through its technologies of (re)production.
Deleuze & Guattari tell us that an assemblage’s vertical
axis relates to its stability or instability. This is expressed
through the concepts of territorialisation and
deterritorialization. Territorialization, for all its geographical
connotations, is not about space/time integrity – D&G are clear
about this. Rather, it refers to the properties of the assemblage
which work to stabilize its intrinsic heterogeneity: the recurrent
practices, norms, routines and habits, as well as the
incumbent technologies and artefacts around and through
which agency is coordinated.
Deterritorialization refers to factors that work against the
stability of the assemblage – practices and artefacts through
which heterogeneity reasserts itself: resistance, contradiction,
tension, conflict. D&G indicate that deterritorialization is
constitutive of an assemblage. This formulation suggests a hint
of autopoeisis, but a functionalist reading gainsays the spirit of
their ‘nomadological’ sensibility (ibid.: 23-4). Rather, one
should see deterritorializing elements as working against fixed
structure and boundaries. Such destabilizing acts and ideas
are unimaginable irrespective of the assemblage and its logics,
but are not implicated in its coherence, its persistence. In other
words, an assemblage is not intrinsically a static, water-tight,
functional entity. It encompasses destabilizing elements that
stand in provocative juxtaposition to the practices that give it
coherence and stability. The extent to which any empirical
assemblage exhibits functionalist properties depends on how it
is constituted and upon the contingent specifics of its
relationship with its environment. ‘Development’ may appear
more or less autopoeitic from different perspectives, at different
sites and at different times. Its political fragility or
unassailability can only be ascertained through empirical
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study: neither the stability nor the instability of ‘development’
is predicated by the notion of assemblage itself.
The act of assembling ideas and actors involves a finite
selection of a virtually limitless universe of possible elements –
the past fifty years have demonstrated clearly that there is, in
principle,  no  limit  to  the  ideas  and  actors  which  could  be
associated with ‘development’. This implies that a socio-
epistemic assemblage is both process and logos. There is no
instantaneous calling into existence of ‘development’ – it is put
together of pieces over time. Perhaps this time is simply the
duration of reading a policy document, or of giving a lecture. It
could  also  be  the  much  grander  duration  of  a  ‘paradigm’  or
epistemic epoch during which certain concepts and causalities
become taken for granted, as a quintessential mode of
‘understanding, acting, relating’ (Foucault 1994: 598, cited in
Rabinow 2005). Irrespective of the duration of the process (and
its spatial integrity, or lack thereof), some logic of selectivity is
inevitably in play. While possible assemblages of ideas and
actors are limitless, cognitive demands for consistency and
coherence conspire to ensure that any given assemblage can be
characterized by some sort of logos. Are such patterns of
selectivity arbitrary and contingent, or can we identify
continuities, and the operation of specific interests at work?
This is another issue to which we must return later.
In a sense, the notion of epistemic assemblage merely
confirms what social constructivism and, with much greater
rigor, ethnomethodology have long insisted – that our
understanding of social reality is contingent upon language and
is mediated by sets of practices embedded in specific modes of
agency and in concrete matrices of social relations. But these
claims for thinking of ‘development’ as a socio-epistemic
assemblage point beyond generic constructivist premises to a
critical historization of ‘development’. For these purposes what
is needed is not so much a genealogy of the notion (à Cowen &
Shenton), but a mapping of the conditions for the possibility of
development’s quasi-hegemonic assemblage. Very briefly, I
believe that at least the following conditions should be taken
into consideration:
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? the specific historical conjuncture (structural asymmetry
as a condition for and outcome of global capitalism)
? the specific work that ‘development’ is required to perform
at this conjuncture, i.e., managing (‘depoliticizing’) a
grossly unjust and politically volatile order of
asymmetrical wealth, power and esteem;
? the specific sites where the assemblage coalesces, i.e, the
infrastructural nodes and social matrices that constitute
the quasistatal development industry; and
? the specific forms of ‘development agency’ via which the
assemblage is accomplished.
Development agency
‘Development’ as a socio-epistemic assemblage is constituted
through specific forms of embodied social agency.’ This agency
animates the ‘horizontal’ axis of the assemblage – the
intersection of bodies and enunciations. Let us call the energies
expended in the achievement of the assemblage ‘development
agency.’ Certain basic facts can be easily recognized about
development agency, many of which have already been noted in
passing. Development agency is, among other things,
a) A ‘postcolonial’ phenomenon. Development agency is
historically embedded in the asymmetries of wealth and
power established through the colonial order. Development
agency is both a product of colonialism and an important if
secondary7 mechanism for the ‘transformative
reproduction’ of postcolonial asymmetry.
b) Development agency is embodied primarily in dedicated
‘development agencies.’ Such agencies vary immensely in
size, organization and political accountability. Some are
public (like USAID or the World Bank) while others are
private (like the Open Society Foundation or Save the
Children). Development agencies are also embedded very
differently in politico-legal jurisdictions: some are
accountable to national regulation (SIDA), some to
transnational conventions (UNDP) while others are
transjurisdictional, i.e., in practice they fall outside of any
established jurisdiction (Oxfam, Aga Khan Foundation).
7  The mechanisms by which capital organizes production and exchange
on a global scale being primary.
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c) Development agency is manifested in specialized
‘developmental’ roles or functions embodied by individual
or corporate social actors. Such functions (departmental
chief, desk officer, policy analyst, monitoring and
evaluation consultant) have a strong structural quality
(they exist irrespective of individual volition), but are
naturally instantiated and reconfigured under the impact of
the individual agency that animates the function.
d) Development agency works through skills and expertise
embodied in a semiprofessionalized8 corps of ‘development
agents.’ Academic Development Studies has a formative, if
not determinate function in the production of this
expertise.
e) Development agency is a normative-instrumental project.
Due to the structural discrepancy between its ambitions
and its achievements, the credibility of development agency
is constitutively in crisis. Because ‘development’
unavoidably undermines itself – it cannot both maintain
global asymmetry and eliminate it – it is constantly in
search of new rhetorical-ideological justifications to uphold
its self-styled moral aims.
  These justifications are contingent, ‘surface’ phenomena
– they play out primarily in volatile arenas of quotidian
political rhetoric. Yet, such enunciations are both enabled
and constrained by structural conditions: the knowledge
practices through which ‘development’ produces itself and
its working environment.
Practices and products: The vertical axis of ‘development’
Development agency is characterized by a wide range of
knowledge practices. Of specific interest here are those by
which ‘evidence’ becomes ‘policy.’ In abstract terms we might
postulate a set of patterned mechanisms, or algorithms, by
which representations of reality in recipient countries (data) are
selectively appropriated as pertinent facts (evidence) and
8  The level of professionalization varies immensely. Indeed, the markers
of professionalism are themselves in constant flux. This flux is largely
the outcome of two parallel trends in the development industry: one of
‘ngoization’ (e.g., Lang 1997), by which activist movements are
colonized by development agencies through the outsourcing and
subcontracting of developmental activities; and secondly, through the
progressive devolution of developmental functions within development
agencies to citizens of recipient jurisdictions (see below).
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further translated into guidelines for action (policy).9 To
understand the algorithms of selectivity and translation via
which evidence is converted into policies and practices – we
must start with the empirical knowledge practices associated
with the exercise of development agency.
The current social scientific interest in knowledge
practices has emerged at the interstices of anthropology (e.g.,
Riles 2006) and science studies (Mol & Law, op.cit.). Indeed,
there  is  an  emerging  movement  in  both  fields  that  would  tend
to define their substantive interests specifically in relationship
to knowledge practices. It is somewhat surprising, then, to note
the lack of a systematic problematization of the concept in this
emerging literature. This may be due to a reticence to engage
with  the  original  source  of  the  term  which  is  likely  to  be
commercial management studies (see Prusak 2001). Rather
early on, at least by the 1960s, business analysts were actively
interested  in  how  the  ways  that  knowledge  was  managed
affected productivity. Such interest was manifest in research
about organizational learning and communication (see
Kontinen, this volume) and in experiments with different
storage and retrieval systems (Alavi & Leidner 2001). What
distinguishes the business management approach to
knowledge practices from that of the current social scientific
interest is the relationship to knowledge. For business studies,
knowledge is largely a given.10 There is more and less useful
knowledge, but its production is not problematized. What
characterises social scientific concerns with knowledge
9  Guidelines or policies are subsequently subjected to further processes
of selectivity and translation as they are (or aren’t) ‘implemented’ in
‘the field.’ While problematizing these processes of implementation is a
vital precondition for mapping the dynamics of development agency,
the scope of the present essay doesn’t allow for extending the analysis
into this realm (but see Mosse 2005; Lendvai & Stubbs 2007 for
kindred analyses).
10  “Increasingly, economists, strategy academics, and commentators
agree that a firm can best be seen as a coordinated collection of
capabilities, somewhat bound by its own history, and limited in its
effectiveness by its current cognitive and social skills. The main
building block of these capabilities (or unit of analysis, if you prefer)
is knowledge, especially the knowledge that is mostly tacit and
specific to the firm” (Prusak, op.cit.: 1003).
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practices is precisely the contingent nature of knowledge and a
desire to problematize the social mechanisms by which ‘facts’
become constituted as knowledge and, hence, the basis for
action. While this general concern with the contingency of
knowledge has been central to the the social sciences since
Foucault, Derrida and others instigated the ‘post-positivist
turn’  in  the  1970s,  what  distinguishes  the  current  wave  of
interest is its systemic ethnographic application to modern
sites of knowledge production and consumption such as
bureaucracies, firms and laboratories (Latour & Woolgar 1979,
Marcus 1998, Riles 2000, Coelho 2005, Anders 2005, van
Gastel & Nuijten 2005,)
What we can infer from these and other recent studies
(Knorr  Centina  1999)  is  that  a  knowledge  practice  is  not  an
empirically discrete entity, spatially or temporally separate from
the everyday flow of events accessible to ethnographic
observation. Practices related to the production, storage,
retrieval and consumption of knowledge are ubiquitous forms
of social interaction in any organization. Rather than try and
elaborate a theoretical framework for the analysis of
developmental knowledge practices (for which the ethnographic
data is still rather thin), let me propose a heuristic taxonomy
with  which  one  might  begin  to  organize  the  chaotic  empiria
which an ethnography of ‘developmental’ knowledge practices
would inevitably confront.
The territorialisation of ‘development’
The socio-epistemic assemblage of ‘development’ might be seen
to achieve a modicum of stability and coherence through three
sets of knowledge practices. These ‘territorializing’ mechanisms
can be tentatively characterized as opaqueness, order and
objectification:
? Opaqueness – Inaccessibility to public scrutiny is a primary
property of the ‘development’ assemblage. The knowledge
wielded within the development industry has conventionally
been secreted behind the dual veils of foreign policy
confidentiality and commercial discretion. Behind the barrage
of glossy reports, upbeat websites and colourful public
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spectacles (largely outsourced to client organizations) lies a
shadowy world of opaque paperwork – confidential policy
memos; limited distribution ‘drafts’ for official documents;
tendering dockets; personnel files, and so on. With the growing
subordination of development to security concerns, the
shadows surrounding ‘development’ are deepening.
? Order – Development agency is largely embedded in
bureaucratic organizations where managerial order is a
primary raison d’être. It is in the production and maintenance
of order that the territorializing mechanisms exercised by
development agency are at their most profuse. A great deal of
this ordering relates to personnel management (job
descriptions, incentive systems and related career-trajectory
arrangements). Much of this, again, is an expression of the
tireless search for efficiency (much accentuated as new public
management procedures have colonized the industry). At a
very general level, one could speak of two kinds of ordering
practices: those related to vertical relations among actors
(hierarchy), and those concerned with day-to-day horizontal
interactions within an agency (procedure).
? Objectification –  The  fundamental  existential  dilemma  of
‘development’ derives from its normative-instrumental
character. The self-justification of the development industry –
i.e., the basis for its access to public rents – is based on claims
its leaders and main functionaries know they can never fulfil.
This engenders an incessant need to conceal the arbitrary
political nature of its rationalizations through various
objectifying practices. Such practices can be bureaucratic –
they can relate to procedural rules; they can invoke
professional expertise, as when ‘absolute poverty’ is linked to
‘a decline in biodiversity’ or ‘growing insecurity and violence.’
Objectifying knowledge practices often revolve around the
production and graphic presentation of statistical information.
Finally, the language of ‘development’ – a set of ‘discursive
regularities’ governing the formation of objects, enunciative
modalities, concepts and strategies (Foucault 1972) – is
naturally fundamental to the coherence of the assemblage.
As we have learned, the territorialisation of an assemblage is in
constant tension with inevitable deterritorializing tendencies.
Against opaqueness we have practices responding to the
objectifying rhetoric of accountability, ownership and
participation; against order one can posit counterhegemonic
strategies related to timing, scale and style (Gould 2005). There
is no limit to the range of factors that might work to destabilize
the mechanisms of objectification: indeed, any legible
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perversions of the language, expertise or moral claims of
‘development’ could have that effect.
Excursus: The language of ‘development’
Development agency is most easily identified through its
discursive traces: it is most tanglibly in acts of speaking and
writing that ‘development’ is assembled as an empirical entity.
As  an  approach  to  examining  the  nature  of  the  language  of
‘development’ it can be useful to think about the social – i.e.,
communicative – context in which development agency is
deployed. In this regard, I found these EU/OECD statistics on
the spatial composition of EU ‘development staff’ quite
interesting (Table).
The significance of the extensive devolvement of operational
tasks to ‘locals’ is open to many interpretations. At first blush,
the increased employment of local staff lends credence to the
notion that donors are actively promoting greater ‘recipient
ownership’ of EU policy prescriptions. But just as obviously,
the global devolution of the EU’s neoliberal agenda to a legion
of functionaries drawn from countless educational, socio-
cultural and linguistic backgrounds in dozens of countries can
have other outcomes as well.
Table: Staff in some European development agencies
donor HQ
field/
expat
field/
local
total
Germany 1,900 1,300 3,350 6,550
UK 1,565 453 920 2,938
EC 959 559 2,021 3,539
Denmark 847 503 974 2,324
Sweden 664 185 88 937
Finland 164 69 22 255
EU total 10,004 4,446 8,439 22,889
Source: EU/OECD: EU Donor Atlas 2006
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Clearly, promoting the ‘harmonized’ and ‘aligned’ aid
programmes prescribed by the Paris Declaration requires the
radical streamlining of the conceptual apparatus framing the
performance of development-related tasks. Just as development
agents must work through uniform models, they must also
have access to a common language. What kind of a language is
this?
The nature of the contemporary language of transnational
development policy is a rich area for study. My own excavations
have suggested two tightly inter-related characteristics which
might be termed consensualism and desemanticization. I have
no doubt that there is much more than can be said along these
lines.
Consensualism, embodied in terms like partnership,
harmonization and alignment, reflects the need of the
transnational development industry to deflect any doubts about
the inevitability of its prescriptions. Development policy
rhetoric cannot entertain the possibility of divergent interests
or, which is in effect the same thing, of alternative policy
regimes. The consensualism of development policy thus
represents, to paraphrase Chantal Mouffe (2000), an ‘attempt
at insulating politics from the effects of the pluralism of value’ –
and hence, a ‘misguided search for a final rational resolution’
to fundamentally divergent interests.
Desemanticization (e.g., Iveckovic 2006) is a consequence
of  this  dilemma.  Since  the  interests  of  donors  and  the
recipients  are  not  perfectly  congruent  –  any  more  than  the
interests of donors and recipients among themselves would be
identical – the language of development policy must be
systematically perverted to accommodate the systematic lack of
correspondence between concept and reality. ‘Partnership’
must be desemanticized to encompass the gross empirical
asymmetries of assets and leverage between donor and
recipient; ‘multiculturalism’ must be retooled to invoke a
hierarchy of divisive ethnonationalisms. And so on.
The  insulation  of  policy  from  politics  is  thus  not  a
contingent  or  accidental  outcome;  it  is  a  structural  feature  of
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the nature of ‘development.’ This has profound implications for
the study of ‘development.’ What, for example, does this imply
for attempts to engage ethnographically with policy processes?
What are the costs – politically, socially, psychologically – of
attempting to translate a desemanticized language?
Conclusions
Koponen (op.cit.) advocates for a field of Development Studies
that focuses on the engineering aspect of development agency,
on its ‘interventions.’ The argument outlined here takes a
different tact. In order to understand how ‘development’
actually  works,  and  what  it  produces,  we  must  begin  with
development agency and its knowledge practices. We can only
begin  to  understand  ‘development’  when  we  can  see  how  its
agents have succeeded in maintaining, as Koponen (ibid.: 6)
observes, an ‘ideological conviction about the desirability of
‘development’ and the concomitant moral imperative to foster it
through development interventions.’ This moral imperative
cannot be taken for granted, nor can it be gleaned through the
examination of engineering blueprints (policy) and the projects
(interventions) they engender. Policies and projects are only one
of product of ‘development’ and ephemeral ones at that (e.g.,
Mosse 2005). More crucial to the essence of ‘development’ are
the epistemic conventions, social technologies and coordinating
artefacts without which the production and reproduction of
‘development’ could not be achieved. ‘Development’ is much
more than a ‘complex of discourse and action,’ (Koponen loc.
cit.),  and  much less  than  a  belief  or  ideology  (ibid.).  To  grasp
the effects of ‘development’ one must look beyond the projects
done  in  its  name  and  the  rationalizations  espoused  for  its
existence, to the knowledge practices through which these
projects and claims come to appear natural and compelling to
the development agents who carry out the work as well as to
the taxpayers who foot the bill.
There is no doubt that we need ‘political ontologies’ (Hardt
1990) of the projects development agency engenders in
practice. But before we can begin to trace the effects of these
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projects in the world, we need to better understand the
conditions of their possibility. Postcolonial development studies
may have failed in this task, but its very failure is a compelling
argument why we must keep on trying.
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